SESSION ONE

Examining the Environments That Displace

Global Shifts: Urbanization, Migration, and Demography  »  Spring 2017

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The Syrian Civil War rages on with reverberations around the globe. Whatever the reasons for the outbreak in protests and revolution may be, these alone cannot explain the deluge of broader problems that beset Syria, which is suffering not only from the horrendous conflict but also from endemic economic and ethnographic issues for almost half a century. A primary cause has been the poor governance practices first by Hafez Al-Assad, and now his son Bashar, which have led Syria into crises that have been averted by their neighbors. It is these crises that have led the country into a Civil War mired in layers of complexity that seems nothing but inescapable. In this paper I will discuss how the Assad regime’s misguided endeavors at economy and governance in Raqqa and Hasakah province contributed to problems that will continue to plague Syria beyond the current conflict.

The Fertile Crescent, that follows the Euphrates northeast out of Iraq and curves further east to the coastal plains of Latakia, has provided Syria with ample agricultural output for over 8,000 years. However, much like its water-poor neighbor Jordan, 80% of Syria is prone to desertification. Undeterred by this, Syrians have become accustomed to managing this fragile environmental balance to ensure the continuity of agriculture across the fertile areas of the country. Despite this historical precedent, however, recent developments have severely strained agricultural production and significantly reduced the output from this once arable region with its sufficient water supply. The Syrian Civil War has brought to light the systematic depletion, destruction and the reappropriation of Syria’s irrigation systems. The track record, rarely discussed, of the disastrous attempts by the Assad Regime to implement agricultural projects has led to droughts, mass population displacement and the precarious stirring of ethnic conflict across Syria.

The Euphrates or Tabqa Dam project was constructed with the assistance of the Soviet Union between 1968 and 1973 as the largest and longest dam in Syria. It was intended to provide hydroelectric power as well as irrigation on both sides of the Euphrates. Yet the project never achieved its goals in these two areas but instead had several disastrous consequences. First, due to poor planning coupled with the desire to construct a larger rather than a more effective dam, the project ultimately failed at its purpose. It was never able to provide the amount of electricity it was supposed to provide, and to make matters worse, significant agricultural output downriver was devastated due to the new irrigation canals and increased water salinity. Second, the construction of the dam resulted in the displacement of 4,000 Arab families from the area around Lake Assad right into the Syrian Kurdish heartland to the north of the dam. This forced relocation of Arab families was carried out in order to create an “Arab Belt” that would bifurcate Kurdish territories in northern Syria. This “Arab Belt” project was suspended three years later, but the land was never returned to the Kurds and the Arab families remained, resulting in tensions between Arabs and Kurds in the Raqqa and Hasakah areas that has lasted until today.

The erosion of Syrian agriculture would become painfully evident between 2006 and 2010 when Syria experienced what may have been its worst drought in recorded history, leading to the displacement of over 200,000 Syrians from 160 rural villages and their migration to the larger cities in the west of the country. By the time the drought ended, roughly in 2010, the United Nations estimated that it had eradicated the livelihoods of over 800,000 Syrians. The areas most affected by the drought were southern Syria, but mainly the northeastern parts of Hasaka and Raqqa province, commonly known as the Al-Jazira region. So even before the commencement of the Civil War had started, Syria was already facing an internal humanitarian crisis which affected some of the region’s most vulnerable, and also one of its most important subgroups: farmers. Syria’s...
agricultural output may have sharply declined after 2011 due to the conflict, but according to U.N. figures, it had already seen a sharp decline after 2006. That year agricultural output as part of Syria’s GDP decreased by 13.5%, and a further 8.7% the following year.

This mass migration of entire villages exacerbated a preexisting trend of migration of rural Syrians to the cities, which had begun with the disastrous Soviet-style central planning of Hafez Al-Assad and continued under the reign of Bashar Al-Assad. Fifty years of sustained incompetence and overambitious agricultural projects resulted in the depletion of the country’s land and water resources. It was these initial centralized decisions, beginning in the 1970’s under the governance of Hafez Al-Assad that initiated a tradition of incompetence, as well as the negligence to acknowledge this incompetence. The result has been the slow degradation of farmland that had been managed and maintained for millennia. In addition, refugees from conflicts in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine contributed to the stress on these already mismanaged resources. As a result, these unemployed and unlanded farmers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and refugees from rural parts of the country overburdened resources and contributed to tensions in the cities in which they settled. The ensuing unrest created by this mass internal displacement is widely considered one of the main factors in the decision of many Syrians to protest against the regime in 2011.

In response to this environmental and social upheaval, the regime of Bashar Al-Assad did little or nothing at all to mitigate the issues at hand. Little care was given to the poorer and majority Sunni areas that were the main victims of the drought and the concomitant loss of livelihood. This segment of Syrian society has a negligible amount of influence in the Syrian state apparatus, and as such could not count on support from the government. The rule of law and the government institutions were notoriously weak and corrupt long before the Civil War began. Anyone who questioned state policy could be imprisoned, tortured and even killed. Furthermore, the Syrian economy had been focused myopically on developing industry and cultivating tourism. These sectors had little to offer the millions of farmers and rural Syrians dependent on agriculture, nor did the relatively lucrative oil and gas industry that was prevalent in many of the rural areas of Hasakah and Raqqa provinces. Longstanding exclusion from these industries by the regime left the displaced population impoverished and without many options. It is also worth noting that at least one of the ministers in charge of these destructive economic reforms, is now the Syrian representative at the World Bank, charged with helping to fix Syria’s current economy.

The Syrian Civil War brought to the fore the utter devastation of what had always been a fragile but well-managed system of agriculture. Syria does not boast bountiful land and water resources, but its inhabitants had for millennia managed these resources, through turbulent as well as calmer times. It took until 1963, and the implementation of disastrous central planning, disrupting the knowledge and traditions of farmers and inhabitants of rural Syria, to begin the degradation of these systems. Migration and violent conflict certainly contributed to this problem, but the evidence points to a prior cause, an incompetent and negligent government that created the initial problem, as well as these other issues that exacerbated the overall situation. Calamitous, myopic and self-interested central planning have typified the Assad Regime’s governance for decades, and will continue as long as he remains in power.

The policy recommendations are as follows:

- **Address Poor Governors:** Too often negligent or incompetent policy-makers remain in power through corrupt regimes. The instance described in the paper concerns the former Syrian Minister who was responsible for a number of disastrous policy decisions, but who is now the envoy of the Syrian Government to the World Bank, charged with revitalizing Syria’s economy. Addressing this revolving door by demanding those responsible for catastrophic failures not be involved in International Organization efforts, and by insisting on competent representatives to International Organizations would offer a chance to avoid repeating past mistakes and to prevent systemic corruption from marring attempts of the international community to better nations and their peoples.

- **Link Governance and Environmental Issues:** As in Syria, issues of governance and environmental issues are often not viewed as interdependent. This way of thinking needs to change, and environmental concerns need to be a mandatory criteria of any major government initiative. This consideration will avoid the massive catastrophes we saw in Syria, and environmentally sound policies will help avoid the myriad adverse side-effects that come as a result of not considering the environmental consequences of major decisions.
• Prioritize Sustainability and Productivity: With regard to the return of refugees to their homes, in Syria or in any other situation in which large numbers of persons were displaced, sustainability and productivity of the land should be the primary concern. Whether or not there is shelter or humanitarian aid present, if there is a lack of arable land or a lack of economic activity or viability, there is no real incentive for displaced people to return. Therefore in order to incentivize the return of displaced persons and also to make their return viable and sustainable, these environmental and economic factors need to be addressed immediately and prioritized in a post-conflict scenario.
Refugees in protracted situations are doubly marginalized: first, as people in flight, torn from their home communities; and second, as aliens in often tenuous sanctuaries. Protracted situations generate further negative consequences, including deep impoverishment, secondary movements and an outsized discourse. Finding themselves marginalized spatially, legally and programmatically, many refugees have undertaken a secondary movement to Europe and beyond.

The international refugee regime was not designed to deal with longstanding, dependent populations. Yet, as the multilateral peace and security system is increasingly unable to resolve problems at their root, it has relied on short-term humanitarianism to respond to long-term displacement.

The secondary movement of refugees has put this approach under the spotlight, leading on the one hand to a reaction that stigmatizes refugees and invokes isolationism, but on the other to a renewed commitment to international and individual solidarity and burden sharing. These underlying trends and developments—including General Assembly resolutions (sustainable development, refugees and migrants), the largely urban nature of displacement and a call for fresh partnerships—offer a chance to reframe and reinvigorate responses to the refugee situation.

REFUGEES IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE PERSISTENCE OF EXILE

Refugee situations are not meant to endure. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established in 1951 as a temporary organization, with a five-year existence. For a time, refugee situations had beginnings and endings. Post-partition Indians and Pakistanis, 1956 Hungarians, 1972 Ugandans, 1970s Indochinese, 1980s Guatemalans and 1990s former Yugoslavs: all of these refugees were absorbed into new communities or repatriated.

But some situations persisted. Palestinian refugees fled beginning in 1946 and remain in exile; Sahrawi refugees fled the Western Sahara in 1975 and struggle on in remote desert camps. At the turn of the century, the number of unresolved conflicts multiplied, and with them prolonged refugee situations. Somalia, Central African Republic, Iraq, Libya and now Syria: the international community, it seemed, could tolerate failed states, conflict and sprawling refugee flows.

In large part, this was because solutions were elusive. In 2015, only 200,000 refugees out of the 16 million under UNHCR mandate repatriated, and 6.7 million (41 percent of those under UNHCR’s mandate) were in a protracted situation. Some 86 percent of these refugees are hosted in low- and middle-income countries, and by the end of 2015, countries in developing regions hosted 13.9 million of the world’s total refugee population, compared with the 2.2 million hosted by countries in developed regions.

PERMANENT EMERGENCY RESPONSE: LOSS OF HOPE, SECONDARY MOVEMENTS

In 2003, the United Nations General Assembly removed UNHCR’s temporal limitation, extending it “until the refugee problem is solved.” The UN, it seemed, no longer conceived of a world without refugees, and opted...
for the bureaucratically sensible but conceptually pessimistic approach of putting its refugee agency on a permanent footing.

Inadvertently, perhaps, this crystallized a short-term response mode (emergency/humanitarian) as a long-term strategy, disconnected from political and economic approaches. The archetype of this approach (albeit never the predominant one in practice) was the refugee camp, which saved lives, but kept refugees in geographically distinct spaces, and entrenched marginalization.

For example, Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, three years into exile, were boxed in. War continued in Syria. Livelihood and education prospects were dim. Poverty kept rising—a UNHCR/World Bank report found that 7 in 10 registered Syrian refugees living in Jordan and Lebanon could be considered poor; and that about half of them were vulnerable to food shocks.\(^6\)

When, in addition to that, the World Food Program (WFP) food rations were cut, many felt they had no choice but to set off a dangerous, expensive and uncertain journey to Europe. As a senior UNHCR official stated to the General Assembly, speaking of refugees crossing the Mediterranean, “without safety, access to basic rights and regularization of their status, they will be compelled to move onward to other countries.”\(^7\)

The fact of being a refugee was the driver of marginalization. As former High Commissioner Antonio Guterres put it in October 2015, “for refugees, their legal status is their biggest vulnerability—being poor at home is not the same as being poor in a country that is not your own. It is no coincidence that those crossing the Eastern Mediterranean today are Syrian refugees, and not poor Turks, Jordanians or Lebanese.”

This dramatic secondary movement of people was often reported from the perspective of the European continent—of unmanageable floods of humanity breaching borders and threatening security. But viewed from Jordan or Lebanon, it was something else—the failure of even a relatively well-funded operation to deliver opportunity, inclusion and hope.

**NEW, INNOVATIVE PARTNERSHIPS TO LEAVE NO ONE BEHIND AND RESPOND COMPREHENSIVELY**

The arrival of Middle Eastern refugees into the heart of Europe refocused attention on refugee situations, in both positive and negative ways. Whereas one line of argument criminalizes the refugee and invokes barriers, while ignoring the wider issue of unresolved problems; another has reaffirmed and strengthened calls to deal with refugees comprehensively and inclusively.


The 2030 Agenda provides the basis (not apparent in the previous Millenium Development Goals) for making the development of all people, including refugees, a requirement. As High Commissioner Filipo Grandi put it: “the principle of universality, the pledge that no one shall be left behind, and the explicit recognition that refugees and internally displaced people are among the most vulnerable, are a key entry point.”\(^8\) If no one must be left behind, then part of the “no one” includes refugees; and if a country is serious about meeting its sustainable development goals, it must include all people on its territory, including refugees. This is a powerful argument in favour of refugee inclusion, and the dismantling of separate treatment and response mechanisms.

In the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants\(^9\) States declare solidarity with persons forced to flee and reaffirm their obligations to fully respect the human rights of refugees and migrants; and, pledge robust support to countries affected by large movements of refugees and migrants. They acknowledge “a shared responsibility to manage large movements of refugees and migrants in a humane, sensitive, compassionate and people–centred manner.” The Declaration outlines elements for a comprehensive response to refugee displacement based on principles of international cooperation and burden sharing. Rather than responding to refugee displacement through a purely, and often underfunded, humanitarian lens, the elements of the CRR framework are designed to provide a more systematic and sustainable response that benefits both refugees and their hosts.\(^10\)

Underpinning these efforts are the new UN Secretary-General’s call for a “surge in diplomacy for peace” and a new way of working that recognizes the strategic connections amongst peace, development, human rights and humanitarianism.

Both the 2030 Agenda and the New York Declaration emphasize the need for new and innovative partnerships. The Declaration calls for UNHCR to develop comprehensive responses, and to involve a multi-stakeholder approach that includes “national and local authorities, international organizations,
CONCLUSION: “OUR COMMON FUTURE SECURITY”

Former High Commissioner Sadako Ogata observed that there are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems. In concepts valid for our era, an earlier High Commissioner, Thorvald Stoltenberg, said in 1990:

*If the causes of refugee movements go unchecked... the threat to our common future security is a real and immediate one. But... it is not individual refugees or migrants who pose this threat... The threat of which I speak lies... in the root causes of refugee movements and uncontrolled migration... in the inequalities and injustices that we have created or condoned. The solution is not to put up barriers... What is needed... is a clear policy of asylum for refugees and a firm commitment to development aid...*[1]

When a person fleeing violence or persecution crosses a border and finds sanctuary, that is a small win for postwar internationalism. When that same person finds herself frozen in a “long-lasting and intractable state of limbo,”[2] that win is squandered, and cycled into future problems. Recent agreements, and new UN leadership, provide launchpads to help break the cycle of protracted exile and permanent emergency response. What is now needed is to give the multilateral, international approach a boost from new and non-traditional partnerships and coalitions.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND POLICY GAPS

Objective: mobilize a coalition of non-traditional stakeholders to find a new model of international cooperation and solidarity with refugees in long-term situations.

QUESTIONS:

- The multilateral framework for responding comprehensively to refugee situations is strong and has just been reinforced, but the collective state will to take action has been weaker. What can other actors do to both shore up the traditional structure and move it beyond its current strictures?
- Over 60 percent of refugees are in urban areas, and they are staying there for increasing periods of time. How can we reconceive protection and support to this connected, dispersed and skilled group? Is there a specific type of urban response to refugee inflows? Are there actions and policies that cities and mayors can take that central authorities may not be able/willing to?
- Inclusion is about involving refugees in mainstream programmes in the absence of a true durable solution (e.g., assimilation). What might this look like in practice? Are there any norms or models?

ENDNOTES

1 This piece is written in a personal capacity and does not purport to represent the views of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
2 They do not fall under UNHCR’s mandate as they predate the existence of the office, and have an agency—UNRWA—dedicated to caring for them, but not to finding solutions.
3 Comparing figures over the past 20 years, 2015 witnessed the third-lowest level of refugee returns, with smaller numbers being recorded only in 2010 and 2014. During the past two decades, an estimated 17.1 million refugees returned to their country of origin. However, while some 12.9 million refugees were able to return between 1996 and 2005, just 4.2 million did so in the following 10 years (Global trends).
4 UNHCR, Global trends: Forced displacement in 2015
5 A/RES/58/153
6 The welfare of Syrian refugees: Evidence from Jordan and Lebanon, Verme et al. WB/UNHCR
7 Remarks to the UN General Assembly plenary meeting, "Global awareness of the tragedies of irregular migrants in the Mediterranean basin, with specific emphasis on Syrian asylum seekers," Volker Türk, Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, 7 April 2017
8 Filipo Grandi, October 2015
9 A/71/L.1*, 13 September 2016
11 Thorvald Stoltenberg, opening statement at the 41st annual session of the Executive Committee, 1 October 1990
12 UNHCR, ‘Protracted refugee situations’, EC/S4/SC/CRP.14, 10 June 2004
Environmental Change and Human Mobility

By Susan F. Martin, Donald G. Herzberg Professor Emerita in International Migration and Founder of the Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University; Perry World House Visiting Fellow, 2016-2017

Experts generally agree that the environment is but one of the many reasons that prompt people to move, sometimes operating on its own but more often through other mechanisms, particularly loss of livelihoods affected by environmental disruption. Nevertheless, there has also been growing recognition that climate change poses profound consequences for human mobility. The Fifth Assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change projected that climate change would increase displacement of people. The detailed review of the evidence indicated that extreme weather events would be the most direct pathway from climate change to migration but sea level rise, coastal erosion, and loss of agricultural productivity would have a serious impact on movements in the longer-term.

Migration is not only a consequence of environmental change, however; it is also an important mechanism for adaptation to the changing environment. Migration is an age-old risk management strategy that enables households to diversify livelihoods, particularly for those who would otherwise be fully dependent on climate-related occupations, such as farming or fishing. Migrants send remittances to their home communities, not only to support their own families but also to invest in or provide technical advice on sustainable practices. Migration can also reduce pressures on fragile environments, allowing some to remain in situ while others seek new places to live.

When planned, migration can be highly beneficial. Yet, often people are unable to move in a safe, orderly fashion. Migration is expensive, requiring financial, human and social capital. Instead, many of the expected movements will be in the form of displacement—that is, reactive and often mass movements when conditions force people to flee their homes. People survive but few of the benefits of migration accrue to those who are displaced. Perhaps most at risk are those who are immobile, unable to get out of harm’s way on their own. The poorest, oldest and most infirm are often in this category. To survive, many will need assistance from governments or other actors in planned relocation programs. The history of such programs, particularly in the context of large-scale development projects such as dams, is not promising, though, in providing adequate protection for those who are relocated. Too often, the affected populations are worse off after relocation than they were beforehand.

Vulnerability or resilience—that is, the capability to cope or adapt to changing environments—will determine the degree to which people must move and whether those movements will be beneficial or detrimental. To some extent, these factors relate to pre-existing conditions in the affected households. To a large extent, though, policies matter in determining whether people have the wherewithal to cope in situ or the means to move safely elsewhere. Migration, environmental and development policies and plans need to take into account the ways in which vulnerability and resilience influence decisions and capabilities to stay or move in the face of deteriorating conditions, as well as their short, medium and long-term impacts.

Despite the important role that migration can play in helping people adapt to environmental change, there are few legal admissions alternatives for affected populations. Nor are there legal frameworks in place for protection of those who are displaced or moved through planned relocation programs although there is some progress in developing such policies. The Nansen Initiative (renamed the Platform for Disaster Displacement) is a case in point. Aimed at addressing protection gaps related to cross-border displacement in the context of natural disasters and the slow onset...
effects of climate change, it was governed by a Steering Committee, chaired by Switzerland and Norway, and including Australia, Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Germany, Kenya, Mexico and the Philippines. A Consultative Committee was formed to bring the expertise of representatives from international organizations dealing with displacement and migration issues, climate change and development, researchers, think tanks and non-governmental organizations to bear.

The Agenda for Protection, adopted as the outcome of the Nansen Initiative, focuses on three principal areas of action. The first is to improve the collection of data and to enhance knowledge on cross-border disaster-induced displacement. The second area of the agenda focuses on “humanitarian protection measures.” This section is most pertinent to the development of measures to complement and augment protection of those displaced by environmental factors. These measures include ones related to the admission of disaster displaced persons from abroad as well as those preventing the return of displaced persons to countries experiencing natural disasters and the effects of climate change. The third set of recommendations is aimed at strengthening the management of disaster displacement risk in the country of origin so that those affected by natural disasters and the effects of climate change would not need to cross international borders.

The protection agenda is non-binding but includes concrete steps that governments can take to improve their policies. It was endorsed by 109 governmental delegations during a global consultation in October 2015. More than 360 participants from governments, international organizations, academic institutions and civil society attended. That so large a number of governments endorsed the agenda was impressive. Those who spoke at the consultation noted the utility of the agenda and the flexibility of governments to adopt its recommendations in accord with national law. The German government has funded a follow-up that includes resources for training and technical assistance for countries that wish to implement these measures.

Work on increasing protection in the context of planned relocation has been driven by academia and international organizations. A coalition led by Georgetown University includes the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, International Organization for Migration, World Bank, and UN University. The project has resulted in a set of principles based on existing international law and guidelines based on practical experience. The principles emphasize that relocation should only take place when there is strong evidence that there are no other alternatives and there is consultation with the affected populations. The guidelines focus on actions to be taken at each stage of a relocation, from the planning process through the integration of the relocated into their new communities. A second stage of the project involves development of operational guidance on implementation of the guidelines in accordance with the principles.

Where there has been less progress is in the migration area. Environmental migrants fall in between regular labor migration policies and those related to refugees. They are not moving for purely economic reasons, although they may have lost their livelihoods because of environmental change. Nor are they displaced by conflict or persecution, as are refugees. But, as is the case with refugees, many cannot return safely to their home communities. The international community has recognized the gap. The September 2016 UN High Level Meeting Addressing Large Scale Movements of Refugees and Migrants recognized a category of vulnerable migrants who fall outside of existing legal frameworks and pledged to take action to fill the gap, likely via a mechanism of what is now being called mini-multilateralism as exemplified in the Nansen Initiative. The results are to be discussed in a summit in 2018 that will adopt a new global compact on safe, orderly and regular migration to include these vulnerable groups.

Policies to address the interconnections between environmental change and human mobility will need to include provisions to build resilience, prevent displacement, prepare both source and receiving communities, establish legal frameworks for admission, and enable households and communities to benefit from migration. More specifically, recommendations include:

Educate both climate-affected populations and policymakers about current and expected changes in the environment, as well as potential adaptation

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1 The author was a member of the Consultative Committee.

2 These recommendations are drawn from Susan F. Martin and Jonas Bergmann, Environmental Change and Human Mobility: Reducing Vulnerability & Increasing Resilience, Policy Brief (Washington, DC: World Bank KNOMAD project), forthcoming.
strategies. Such education can enable better decision-making regarding mobility options. There is a gap between people’s understanding of future climate impacts on their lives and livelihoods and their own migration opportunities and costs. At the same time, policymakers must understand how climate-affected populations perceive their vulnerabilities.

Increase resilience through multi-faceted approaches that will benefit vulnerable households and help them avoid entrapment or displacement in detrimental circumstances. There are no one-size-fits-all solutions for people in affected communities. Building resilience includes enabling people to remain in place to the extent possible while recognizing the need to facilitate movements, when needed, including through planned relocation and new labor migration programs.

Address structural sources of poverty and unsustainable environmental practices that create vulnerabilities, especially among those dependent on subsistence agriculture. Improving access to credit, land tenure and land rights would help many affected populations remain safely in place or move in safety.

Ensure that the most vulnerable groups are involved in adaptation planning. Groups such as the elderly, extreme poor, and disabled need to be involved in the development of migration-related adaptation plans if the benefits are to accrue to them as well as more resilient households.

Plan and consult with those in need of relocation in order to avoid entrapment and displacement. Planned relocation is an essential strategy for assisting particularly vulnerable populations move to safer and more sustainable locations but, without careful planning as well as effective consultation, relocation can be disastrous for all parties. Plans need to take into account a range of circumstances, amongst them compensation for lost property and access to livelihoods, health, educational, and other services.

Design effective labor migration programs that enable safe and orderly movements. Such programs will reduce risk, however, only if migrants are able to earn enough to support themselves and their families. Existing temporary mobility schemes in Australia and New Zealand are potential models for other regions.

Facilitate remittance transfers to migrant households and communities to help ensure greater resilience. Increasing access to financial literacy, financial inclusion, and skills training programs, particularly for poorer households, will help increase the positive benefits of migration and remittances.

Encourage diaspora investment in sustainable land management that can help entire communities benefit from migration. Governments should give greater attention to the potential role that diasporas can play in financing investments in land restoration in climate-affected communities.
SESSION TWO

Strengthening the Urban Inclusion of Refugee and Migrant Populations

Global Shifts: Urbanization, Migration, and Demography ➔ Spring 2017
Note on the Integration of Urban (or Non-Camp) Refugees: The Case of Syrians in Turkey (and Lebanon and Jordan)

By Ahmet İçduygu, Professor and Former Dean, College of Social Sciences and Humanities and Director, Migration Research Center, Koç University, Istanbul; Perry World House Visiting Scholar, Fall 2017

Over the past few decades, many countries and their cities have been considerably affected by the arrivals of migrants and refugees. However, not all countries and cities are affected equally. Some of them seem to be affected more than others. Some are mainly affected by the arrivals of labour migrants, the others are affected by the flows of refugees. There are also major differences in the adaptation responses between cities facing with different migrant and refugee profiles. Therefore, it is important to understand the specific context of the interaction between the migrants or refugees and the city-related actors, institutions and processes.

Given the sudden and unexpected nature of refugee arrivals, which is quite different from the arrivals of other types of migrants, there is a need to pay special attention to refugee situations in the cities. Here, I will focus on the situation of urban (non-camp) Syrian refugees living in Turkey (and Lebanon and Jordan) with a focus on socio-economic prospects and challenges concerning their survival and integration on the one hand and social acceptance by the host societies on the other. My research and observations intend to contribute to the debates through insights on the socio-economic conditions of non-camp Syrians, their level of integration to the host societies, difficulties and challenges encountered and the perception of host urban communities about the arrivals and settlements of Syrian refugees. I argue that the open-border and “temporary protection” policies of the neighboring countries, such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, have already reached their limits with the increasing number of new arrivals and ongoing difficulties faced in integrating into the host societies. I would suggest that there is an urgent need to create a “social-justice approach” with a long-term integration policy that targets the rights of Syrians through socio-economic incorporation and peaceful co-existence with the host communities.

Urban centers and refugee camps are the two main areas in which refugee studies have developed interest to analyze social exclusion and inclusion of refugees. Between these two main areas where refugees live, the issue of urban refugees requires a specific attention due to the fact that over 60 percent of the world’s 19.5 million refugees live in urban environments. Refugees continue to settle in urban areas in escalating numbers for various motivations; correspondingly, this put urban centers under significant influence and pressure, and push scholarly and policy-relevant research on the issue of urban refugees.

What we can learn from the cases of Syrian refugees in the urban areas of the three neighboring countries, Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan? It is now well-known that a series of uprisings and protests started back in March 2011 demanding a regime change in Syria has gradually evolved into a civil war and resulted in more than 7.6 million of Syrian people to be internally displaced and 4.9 million to seek refuge in neighboring countries, i.e., Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and to a lesser extent Egypt. The ongoing Syrian crisis is considered to be the biggest refugee crisis since World War II. Since 2011, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan are the three countries hosting more than 4.5 million Syrian refugees in total. In all three of the countries, majority of the Syrian refugees live outside of the camps in urban areas like cities and towns.

The largest Syrian refugee populations are found to be in biggest cities in each country. Istanbul (475,654 Syrian refugees), Beirut (280,170) and Amman (176,419) are the biggest refugee-hosting urban metropolises. My recent study examines the policies of exclusion and inclusion with regards to Syrian refugees in three major cities, Istanbul, Beirut and Amman in a comparative perspective on their experiences of social integration.
within receiving societies. Three cases of urban refugees provide the opportunity to mainly discuss similarities and differences within the sociopolitical spectrum in which how the central and local administrative policies reshape the urban refugee experiences and integration of refugees. Furthermore, the ability of refugees harmonizing the urban life and their impact on the social fabric has been analyzed thoroughly in a comparative manner.

As far as the Syrian refugee flows are concerned, the initial response of each country, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, was to issue an open-door policy. The common problems in all countries vary in degrees. In all three of the countries, the majority of Syrian refugees live outside of the camps that influence their situation in a better way. However, in the context of “camp versus non-camp debate,” there are hotly debated questions of “dependency syndrome versus self-sufficiency,” “long-term versus time-limited assistance,” and “state security/human security.” For urban refugees, the main challenges they experience are access to housing, health, education (lost generation), resource scarcity and low-paid employment in the informal economy. As the number of urban refugees increase in cities and towns, this created increase in demand for housing, therefore high rent prices followed along with negative impact on the housing sector and resource capabilities, especially in cities like Amman and Beirut where the ratio of refugee population is high compared to the urban population. The competition over resources and opportunities was fueled by increasing housing costs; existing unemployment was deepened by the low-wage employment of refugees in the economy creating gray zones of informal economic activities. Local governments, especially municipalities of urban settings, lack coordination with civil society and international organizations and suffer from financial inadequacy. Much of the efforts are done in ad hoc processes, with limited effect in terms of scope and durable solutions. Public opinion is diverged in the sense that nationals understand the humanitarian crisis but strongly emphasize concern over the long stay of Syrian refugees. In all three countries, initial approaches towards refugees were to treat them as guests, and gradually this conceptualization transformed into a more distant labeling as negative attitudes and discontent, followed by opening and closure of the borders due to security concerns. The socio-ethnic divergence and social tensions extend towards instable societal reactions and slows down efforts of integration.
Making a Success of Refugee Reception and Integration

By Kathleen Newland, Senior Fellow and Co-Founder, Migration Policy Institute

With more than 21 million refugees in the world today, it is no surprise that unprecedented numbers of people are seeking protection in prosperous western countries. Wealthy western countries today are largely sheltered from flows of asylum-seekers coming directly from countries in which armed conflict and persecution are rife. So-called “secondary movements” from countries of first asylum are motivated by the dire conditions and lack of prospects that most refugees face when they flee across international borders to the low- and middle-income countries that shelter 86 percent of the world’s refugees. A small proportion of refugees and migrants turn up to seek asylum in the west, but in 2014–2016 these arrivals rose sharply, particularly across the Mediterranean Sea to Europe, and across Mexico to the United States. Although many of the receiving countries have refugee resettlement programs, the magnitude and the spontaneous, unplanned nature of the arrivals challenged their capacity to receive and integrate the refugees. In many receiving countries, the unanticipated wave of refugees and asylum seekers generated some degree of political backlash.

RECOGNIZING THE COSTS OF RECEIVING REFUGEES

The most serious challenges of receiving large numbers of newcomers are those related to the absorptive capacity of communities that receive refugees. These have become acute in countries receiving large numbers of asylum seekers in a short time frame. Sweden, for example (with only 10 million residents) received over 35,000 unaccompanied minors among asylum seekers in 2015 alone. This was enough to fill more than 1000 new classrooms in Swedish schools—and does not count the number of children who arrive with their parents. The number of teachers cannot always be expanded simply by increasing the education budget—the supply of teachers who are specialized in teaching children and adults who are not competent in the local language is often limited. Many U.S. school districts faced similar issues with respect to children arriving from Central America.

Refugees and asylum seekers can place strains on schools, health-care facilities, infrastructure, and many kinds of public services. Even if housing for refugees is subsidized, stocks are inelastic in the short term and may result in competition for low-cost housing with low-income natives, or in overcrowding and substandard accommodations. These strains are most acutely felt at the local level, and they often become electoral issues. Policy dialogue is often made more difficult if refugee advocates are unwilling to acknowledge that the costs of receiving refugees are real and can be difficult to manage, especially in the short term.

CULTURAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES

The challenges of cultural integration are prominent concerns in communities receiving refugees whose language, religion and customs differ from the native-born population. While many communities feel enriched by ethnic diversity, short-term problems of communication and misunderstanding create tensions that can be exploited as wedge issues by populist commentators and politicians. Terrorist incidents like the attacks in Paris, Berlin, London and San Bernardino, California fan these tensions, and populist portrayals do not make a distinction between resettled refugees, refugees who have received asylum, asylum seekers, unauthorized immigrants and legal residents or citizens “of immigrant background.”

The risk of populist backlash indiscriminately aimed at visible minorities is a challenge for many liberal democracies. In Germany, where the population as a whole has been generally welcoming to refugees,
whether resettled or awarded asylum, there were about 500 attacks on refugee shelters, transport or gathering places in 2015, including an arson attack in December that injured 10 people, including a two-month-old baby. This kind of pattern, by no means unique to Germany, is a broader challenge to the rule of law.

The electoral success of right-wing politicians running on anti-immigrant (and in Europe, anti-EU) platforms throughout the West, threatens the political consensus that supports the international humanitarian system. In many countries, mainstream politicians are driven to the right on asylum and refugee issues by a passionate minority. In the United States, for example, where the refugee resettlement program has long enjoyed bipartisan support, 31 state governors called for a moratorium on resettlement of Syrian refugees after the Paris attacks, even though no refugees were identified as taking part in the attacks. Measures to slow the pace of arrivals and reduce the volumes are often controversial, as can be seen in the agreements between the EU and Turkey and between the U.S. and Mexico. But by “cooling the fever” of reaction, they may actually make possible more reasoned, and generous, integration policies.

THE NEED FOR INNOVATION

The challenges of refugee reception are real but not insurmountable. Policy innovation and experimentation are needed; both old and new programs should be monitored closely to develop a more systematic idea of what policies have been effective in eroding the barriers to reception patterns and programs that can handle greater numbers more successfully. Where possible, better communication with communities and local authorities about arriving refugees can ease concerns and help them to prepare to meet the needs and benefit from the personal assets of refugees. Countries like Denmark and Norway offer good practice in the way that municipalities are consulted about timing and readiness to welcome new arrivals through their resettlement programs. It is a relatively simple matter to make sure that receiving communities are well-informed about the characteristics and need of refugees resettling in the locality, but such information is not always forthcoming in a timely way.

Orientations and trainings for refugees who are awaiting resettlement or are housed temporarily in reception centers for new arrivals can be valuable, but what is funded is often brief and perfunctory. Particularly when waiting periods are long, the time could and should be productively used for language instruction, vocational training, and life skills such as financial management. Germany has a serious program involving 700 hours of language instruction and 300 hours of practical and cultural orientation. These investments are likely to pay off in earlier employment and readiness for school. Resources, especially teachers, could be supplemented with on-line instruction, but such programs should be monitored for effectiveness so that design can be improved. Private-sector engagement at an early stage could be helpful in targeting vocational training; educational and professional associations could also take advantage of this time to assist qualified refugees with recognition of their credentials.

The most comprehensive services of the most competent welfare state are no substitute for personal contact between refugees and members of the community in which they settle. Harnessing the broad good will that many people have toward refugees when they understand who they are and why they have fled is important for successful integration, but a lack of systems to do so can lead to frustration and a lapse into apathy. Local and national authorities should support people-to-people programs that bring together refugees and their new neighbors. Housing policies that lead to residential segregation are inimical to this goal.

Social support of the kind that makes for successful settlement is built into private sponsorship arrangements for refugees. Several countries have experimented with various forms of private sponsorship, but Canada is the acknowledged leader in the field, with a long-standing and successful program. It is co-sponsoring a new initiative to share its experience and mentor other states that are interested in developing programs. Broadening sponsorship opportunities to private citizens, civic groups, the private sector and educational institutions is a path that more governments would do well to explore.

Relatively few studies track the economic and social outcomes for refugee populations, owing to a lack of data. Data collected by governmental authorities does not normally differentiate between refugees and other migrants, making it difficult to formulate evidence-based policies. More systematic collection of data on how refugees fare once they are accepted for permanent residency would be extremely useful.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCCESSFUL REFUGEE RECEPTION AND SETTLEMENT PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

Some generalizations about the ingredients for success of refugees can be derived from the extensive experience of refugee resettlement and integration of successful
asylum seekers in a number of countries. The Australian Refugee Council highlights community support; access to training, mentoring and language instruction; affordable housing with access to community-based resources and transportation; participation in the labor force; social connectedness; and access to cultural, sporting and voluntary activities. To these might be added:

- **A clear (and clearly communicated) rationale** covering both the humanitarian and the foreign policy reasons for protecting and assisting refugees in one’s own country.

- **Good management of refugee policy and programs.** People get alarmed when they feel that authorities are not in control, as was the case in Germany toward the end of 2015. Moreover, resentment builds when programs are perceived as being poorly or unfairly managed, to the detriment of the native-born population.

- **Adequate resources to support programs.** The federal government in United States gives only 8 months of cash and medical assistance to refugees, which leaves state-level public assistance programs to make up the difference; it pays only half the considerable cost of the public health insurance program for the poor (and most refugees are poor when they first arrive) and very little in school impact support.

- **Strong institutions to implement programs.** The U.S. resettlement program contracts with nine national non-profit, voluntary agencies that have accumulated a wealth of experience in helping refugees, asylees, and other people granted protection in the United States to settle successfully and integrate in their new communities. They, in turn, work with more than 350 local affiliates based in the refugee-hosting communities. Most states have refugee coordinators to act as a liaison between state social service programs and the voluntary agencies and federal authorities. In addition, many cities have an office that oversees responses to the needs of “new Americans,” both refugees and immigrants.

- **Personal involvement of community members to help refugees integrate locally.** Often, this requires a system for managing and channeling volunteerism. Without this, the goodwill of people who are willing to commit to helping refugees locally can dissipate, leading to frustration and, ultimately, indifference.

Some of these elements are amenable to adaptation to a wide range of different settings and circumstances. Resources are obviously the most difficult part, for poor and middle-income countries especially, but also for richer ones under pressure to limit government expenditures at every level.

Explanation and involvement are important in building support for refugee programs. So is personal encounter. People who have never met or interacted with a refugee are less likely to develop empathy toward them. Evidence of the fact that most refugees do well in the United States is not as widely disseminated as it could be, and data is hard to find. An MPI study on outcomes for refugees in the United States confirms that integration is strong over time.

It is also important to manage expectations. Integration takes time, and economic costs are front-loaded while benefits take time to emerge (tax payments, revitalization of neighborhood, business creation and so forth. A study by an expert panel assembled by the National Academy of Sciences measured two outcomes for immigrants: integration (the process by which immigrants and the native-born come to resemble each other, which is a two-way street) and well-being. Greater integration does not always produce greater well-being: notably health, crime, and intact families are areas in which immigrant well-being declines as integration proceeds—that is, as they more closely come to resemble the native-born. It is also important to acknowledge that, while most refugees succeed, some individuals and groups will not thrive and will need long-term support.

The Refugee Council of Australia points out that while the short-term costs can be high as refugees settle and adjust, successful integration brings permanent social, cultural and economic benefits—not least that five of Australia’s eight billionaires have refugee backgrounds. In particular, receiving countries may benefit from the young age profile of refugees, in countries where new retirees outnumber new labor force entrants—a factor that applies in most European countries as well as Australia—and the potential for revitalization of rural areas and other regions outside of major metropolitan areas.

Several U.S. communities have also experienced the dynamism that new refugee populations can bring—to the extent that some struggling post-industrial cities such as Baltimore, Detroit and Pittsburgh have actively sought refugee resettlement. The small city of Boise, Idaho, found that the arrival of refugee families stabilized the school population in an area where declining enrollment had threatened the viability of some schools.
Public policy and political expression have an impact on how refugees are regarded and on their chances of integration. French policy of laïcité is damaging, especially when it picks fights over things like headscarves and burkinis. Politicians who portray refugees as security threats or scroungers obviously encourage marginalization and exclusion. This may create a self-reinforcing loop, as some of the people who are excluded react by rejecting the norms of the broader society.

Mass media and social media have a strong impact on how people view refugees, which can be positive or negative. In many countries, they amplify negative political messages about refugees. But they can also amplify positive messages—the social media campaign “I’ll ride with you” started with a single individual in Australia and went viral worldwide with its message of solidarity and inclusion for Muslim minorities. Civil society can call upon common values and traditions of welcome where they are strong, and try to inculcate them where they do not exist.

**THE BIGGER PICTURE**

A common, critical factor that in determining whether refugees will be accepted and integrated into receiving societies is the self-confidence that societies have, or lack, at the individual and collective levels. A confident society is less likely to feel the need to marginalize newcomers and to enforce hierarchical structures that need to have an out-group at the bottom. A confident society is more likely to be a welcoming society, as individuals and institutions are able to overcome their fears of being disadvantaged by the successes of the “other”—in other words, they are less likely to see interactions as taking place in a zero-sum game.

Conversely, marginalization and inequality within a country set the stage for policies and attitudes of social exclusion of newcomers. The regions within countries that are most hostile to refugees are, in many cases, those that have been left behind in economic and social development—the emptying rural areas, the rustbelt cities (which, ironically, are likely to benefit from an infusion of population). Northern France and Appalachia are two examples. By contrast, the great global cities—New York, Amsterdam, London, Chicago, Toronto—tend to welcome refugees, as do the thriving “blue” cities in U.S. “red” states—cities such as Austin, Texas; Boise, Idaho; and Iowa City, Iowa.

To foster attitudes of inclusion in places where it does not come naturally, local residents and local institutions need to be engaged in planning and reception of refugees, so that they do not feel that settlement is something that is being imposed on them without their involvement. Civic leaders, such as clergy, teachers and principals, elected officials, employers, and leaders in local institutions such as Rotary Clubs, Women’s Institutes, labor associations and sports leagues can help to communicate the purpose and needs of refugees in their midst to the broader community. This kind of leadership from within, which gives people an opportunity to help another person, can foster social inclusion of refugees while also building a larger edifice of solidarity within communities too often fractured by class, race, religion or politics.
Fostering Education and Opportunities for Refugees: An Update


As the Obama Administration prepared for the Leaders’ Summit on Refugees slated for autumn 2016, National Security Council and State Department staff in Washington and at the U.S. Mission to the UN in New York debated how best to structure the event. The Summit would be modeled on a Peacekeeping Summit the U.S. Government had organized the year before, a meeting the President considered a success. Attendance of foreign leaders had been predicated on their governments committing to sizable new contributions in three areas: money, troops and equipment. It had generated significant pledges to UN peacekeeping. But in applying the concept to the humanitarian sphere, it was harder to divide needs into three easy-to-describe baskets. One clear need was for financial contributions to UN humanitarian appeals that were severely underfunded. These funds would help refugees but also other victims of conflict and natural disasters. The United States asked relatively wealthy countries to take refugees in—either through the UN refugee agency’s (UNHCR) formal resettlement program or other paths of entry, such as scholarships or humanitarian visas. A third category needed to be devised to encourage the countries that already hosted refugees to do more.

What to ask of the refugee-hosting countries? This was a delicate question in that these were countries that had already been doing much over years and in some cases decades. While a G-20 country like Turkey could afford to build two dozen well-appointed camps for Syrian refugees along its Southern border, the other top hosting countries are Pakistan (1.6 million refugees), Lebanon (1.1 million), Iran (979,000), Ethiopia (736,000) and Jordan (664,000). More than 80% of refugee-hosting countries are not rich. Even when they allow international organizations and aid agencies to run camps for the refugees, developing countries still experience demands on their resources as large camps have an impact on security, the environment and local economies. Dadaab camp (actually a sprawling complex of several camps) in Kenya near its border with Somalia, is the world’s largest with nearly 260,000 Somalis registered as refugees. From an empty patch of earth, Za’atri camp, in northern Jordan housed roughly 150,000 refugees at its peak in 2013 and became, at that point, Jordan’s fifth or sixth largest city, before shrinking in size.

Experts also recognize that refugees no longer live primarily in camps. UNHCR estimates that, throughout the world, the percentage of refugees who live outside of camps is 72%. Refugees try to make it on their own by pursuing opportunities in cities, renting apartments or squatting in decrepit buildings or in informal collection of tents pitched on vacant lots.

In talking to humanitarian leaders and the refugees themselves, we became convinced that more had to be done to help refugees not just survive their flight and the early days of their exile but also deal with the long years of living in limbo that could follow. Refugees wanted opportunities to get jobs and earn a living without fear of exploitation, arrest and penalties and to send children to school. Some needed to finish their own education or gain skills to become self-sufficient. This certainly appeared to be the case with so many young, able-bodied men and boys migrating to Europe in 2016 in search of opportunities. With 2.3 million Syrian children out of school (1.75 million were inside Syria; 530,000 Syrian children were refugees in other countries), UNHCR and UNICEF feared a “lost generation” in the Middle East. Globally, in 22 countries affected by crisis, nearly 24 million children living in crisis zones were out of school—or one in four school-aged children. And, because so many crisis situations were dragging on for years without resolution, expecting young people and

This paper reflects the individual views of the author.
families to wait until conflicts were resolved before they could be educated really meant that they would miss out entirely and never attend school. “If we do not give education to these little children—who are now homeless and suffering from child labour,” 16-year old education advocate Malala Yousafzai warned in a 2014 talk, “these children can then in future become terrorists.” Yousafzai was just one of many concerned that without education, refugee children would be susceptible to radicalization and recruitment into terrorist causes.

For this reason, the “third basket” of the Leaders’ Summit focused on initiatives that would boost education and self-sufficiency. The statement of the sponsors read, in part:

Altogether, at least 17 governments participating in today’s Summit have committed to strengthen and adapt their policies so that more refugees can attend school and/or lawfully work. The commitments announced today will help ensure that one million children have improved access to education and that one million more refugees have opportunities to pursue opportunities to legally access work. Noting the importance of fostering an environment of inclusion, as applicable, we are pleased that so many countries have made commitments to help facilitate these goals and recognize that, for purposes of implementation, refugee host countries will continue to require sustainable donor support.

In addition to this focus, there were related initiatives unveiled at the time of the Summit. UN Special Envoy and former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, UNICEF and other UN agencies, donor governments and NGOs created Education Cannot Wait, a fund to help children receive an education during crises. The World Bank set up a Global Crisis Response Platform to provide grants and loans to help low- and middle-income countries that host large numbers of refugees. Earlier, at the February 4, 2016 London Summit, Jordan had agreed to a compact with the EU to allow Syrian refugees to work in certain sectors in exchange for increased European investment in Jordan. Lebanon sought a similar compact.

What has happened since? In the United States, a new Administration took office in the U.S. and quickly issued an executive order to halt refugee resettlement to the United States for several months, reduce the overall number of refugees allowed in, and drastically restrict entry from seven majority-Muslim countries. The courts blocked the original Executive Order and a revised version issued some weeks later—actions that the Trump Administration has indicated it intends to appeal. It likely has the authority to reduce the overall number of refugees resettled in the U.S.—lowering total number of arrivals from nearly 85,000 in FY 2016 to 50,000 in FY 2017. In March, it proposed a Federal budget that would cut funding for the State Department and USAID (by nearly 32% on average), including cutting budget accounts that fund international humanitarian agencies. There was little detail—the U.S. government would fund “high priority areas,” ask other countries to pay “their fair share” and challenge relief organizations to become more efficient and effective.

The new Administration also is moving very slowly to nominate candidates for political appointments. As of April 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is the only Senate-confirmed appointee of the Trump Administration serving at the State Department. USAID has zero. Career staff serving in acting capacities lead the key humanitarian offices at State and USAID. And the Breitbart website was calling for those career staff with oversight of the refugee resettlement program to be removed from their posts.

In sum, initial actions of the Trump Administration were contrary to Obama Administration policies for aiding refugees and contrary to the generous spirit of the Leaders’ Summit. One exception to this trend is the U.S. announcement, on April 5, 2017, of another tranche of humanitarian aid to Syria. Under Secretary Thomas Shannon—the State Department’s most senior career diplomat—led the U.S. delegation to the fifth pledging conference for aid to the Syria crisis in Brussels and he announced $566 million in aid, an amount in keeping with the U.S. track record of making significant contributions to humanitarian causes throughout the year.

Named the “Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region Conference,” the Brussels conference was sponsored by the EU, UK, Germany, Norway, Kuwait and the United Nations and is reported to have raised $6 billion. Evidence that the Syrian regime had used chemical weapons a day earlier to kill scores of civilians, including children, in the town of Khan Shaykhu in Idlib province overshadowed the work of the conference. And, of course, the conference was focused primarily on the crisis in and around Syria at a time when there are many other uprooted people around the world.

Will there be a follow-on Leaders Summit to again bring attention to and help all of the world’s refugees in September 2017? While no formal announcement has
been made, preparations are said to have begun in earnest to reconvene world leaders on migration and refugee issues at the UN in September. The Netherlands may step forward to host an event with Italy—but this has yet to be decided and may not be a direct follow-up to the Leaders’ Summit.

Are we making progress in affording refugees the opportunities they seek—to send their children to school, to acquire skills and livelihoods, and work to support themselves and their families? At the April 2017 conference in Brussels, UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner Kelly T. Clements took the opportunity to summarize some of the progress made related to the crisis in Syria: “there have been important advances: policy shifts with regard to education and employment opportunities, improved access to international financing and preferential trade terms for host countries, and a growing convergence between humanitarian and development action.” Indeed, the Government of Jordan seemed particularly astute in building on commitments made at the London 2016 conference and maximizing a mix of traditional grant funding and newer mechanisms, such as the concessionary financing facility administered by the World Bank. In terms of fostering employment in the region, a joint report sponsored by a number of countries, the World Food Program (WFP), International Labour Organization (ILO) and UN Development Programme (UNDP) released at the Brussels conference reported only “very modest” progress toward creating jobs, but did represent smart collaboration among UN agencies and included “critical guidance” on how to create new economic opportunities and expand existing ones in six countries hosting Syrian refugees. In the area of education, UNICEF provided data that showed progress in enrolling children in school—but also highlighted the very large percentages of Syrian children still left out.

How can academic and policy institutions and other leaders contribute to these efforts and efforts that go beyond the Syria crisis and help refugees in other parts of the world? In order to push back on the notion that refugees are solely a burden to countries that host them, more must be done to build the evidence base for the short-term and long-term impact that refugees have on economies. Such an analysis could usefully examine the economies of the neighboring countries that allow refugees to cross their borders, and the economies of countries that choose to take them through UNHCR’s resettlement program. Advocates maintain that refugees have an overall positive impact in the places they are allowed to work—by spending their salaries, paying taxes, opening businesses, revitalizing neighborhoods and investing. A May 2016 study by economist Philippe Legrain intended for a European audience found that “investing one euro in welcoming refugees can yield nearly two euros in economic benefits within five years.” Critics claim that refugees compete for jobs with locals, work off the books, depress wages, and rely on government handouts. Overseas, the arrival of UN and other members of the “humanitarian community” of aid agencies in areas near crisis zones can boost employment opportunities but also distorts local economies as rents for office space and residences rise and aid workers distribute imported food to refugees in camps. Research can help quantify the actual costs and benefits of hosting refugees, how best to target investments, and how to make the most of the promise and contributions of refugees.

We need to find ways to get more refugee and displaced children in school, and to do so without disadvantaging poor children in countries that host refugees. A number of organizations seek to get more children in school. These include the Center for Universal Education at Brookings, the Global Partnership for Education and the Global Business Coalition for Education. A number of other worthy organizations and initiatives focus specifically on educating displaced children, including international organizations (UNICEF, UNHCR), NGOs

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<th>Syrian children out of school:</th>
<th>2014/15 School Year</th>
<th>2015/16 School Year</th>
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<td>Inside Syria</td>
<td>2.12 million (40%)</td>
<td>1.75 million (32%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syrian Refugee Children</td>
<td>0.63 million (45%)</td>
<td>0.53 million (34%)</td>
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(e.g., Save the Children), the No Lost Generation initiative, and the Education Cannot Wait Fund. Staff in the State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration worked with students at George Washington University to start a “No Lost Generation” student group on campus. This idea has spread; there are now fifty university groups in the United States and three other countries. University Presidents and administrators who have spoken out against the travel ban in President Trump’s Executive Order on refugees and immigrants could also devote their energies to promoting education of refugees overseas.

The private sector has a role to play. Indeed, some in the private sector appear eager to help refugees. The same day as the Leaders’ Summit, President Obama met with private sector leaders at the UN who had made significant commitments to aid refugees. These were among a number involved in a White House “Partnership for Refugees” that was announced (as a “Call to Action”) in June 2016, managed by USA for UNHCR and Accenture, and then, in November, spun off to the Tent Foundation (a charitable endeavor begun by Hamdi Ulukaya, the founder of Chobani Yogurt company). Tent had earlier announced the “Tent Partnership for Refugees” at the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland in January 2016 as a platform for businesses that wanted to aid refugees through giving (contributions of money, goods or services), hiring refugees, and “shaping” supply chains (sourcing products and services that originate with refugees/companies that hire refugees). Tent is also making grants to organizations that will spur the social integration of refugees and undertake projects to help match refugees with jobs.

Private sector interest did not end with the conclusion of the Obama Administration. In early February 2017, more than 120 tech companies moved swiftly to join a court brief against President Trump’s executive order on refugees and immigrants. Many innovators associated with U.S. high tech companies also want to lend their ideas and know-how to humanitarian efforts, but not every need can be solved by a nifty high-tech solution or app. Tent aims to continue convening private sector companies on these issues, but such an effort would also benefit from the involvement of business schools and NGOs that can evaluate the most useful contributions. The most successful private sector contributions tend to build on the firm’s established business model matched with NGOs that steer contributions to address actual needs.

Despite changes on the U.S. political scene, the number of displaced people around the world continues at record levels, protracted crises grind on and the pressing need for help for conflict victims has not lessened. If at all possible, the Leaders’ Summit on Refugees should once again be held to highlight actions to date, including in crisis zones outside of the region around Syria, and spur progress. Humanitarian leaders need to follow-up on expressions of support for refugees—from politicians, businesspeople, celebrities, academics, journalists and members of the public—and convert noble sentiments into action, especially action that will shore up the capacity of countries hosting refugees, help refugees pursue livelihoods and get more displaced children to school.
ENDNOTES

1 Not everyone viewed the peacekeeping summit as an unqualified success. Some in senior levels of the UN remembered the bruising diplomatic negotiations that had preceded the 2015 Summit as the U.S. government insisted on promises of increased contributions in advance and turned away some countries. They feared a repeat of the “pay to play” model, but this discomfort did not derail U.S. plans and Secretary General Ban was a co-sponsor of the 2016 Summit.


6 Remarks to Connected Women Summit reported in HuffPost UK www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/03/04/malala-yousafzai-syrian-refugee-camps-terrorism_n_4895670.html.


“According to the UN, we are seeing the highest level of displacement since World War II.” That makes us alert; that gives us reason to meet at Perry House. But it might be worth to put these figures in the historic context: First, mankind has migrated for the last 130,000 years. The prime trigger is simply the will to survive and to improve living conditions. And this has not changed until today. In 2016, about 250 million people lived as migrants for more than one year outside of their birth country, regardless of whether they were a war refugee, poverty refugee or tax refugee. This equals three percent of the world population, and this proportion is constant for the last 60 years. This applies also to the number of people who have left their home country between 2010 and 2015—about 0.5 percent of the world population, 36.5 million people (Guy Abel und Nikola Sander, Wittgenstein Centre for Demography, Vienna).

What do I want to say with these figures? The level of displacement of people reflects global normality. The only unusual fact is that Europe, and in view of the reaction of the new president even the U.S., feel affected by the influx of refugees. This contrasts the reality of migration in the current conflicts considerably: Europe houses, with about 1.5 million refugees for the last years, about 0.3 percent of its current population. Turkey houses 3 million, Lebanon 1.3 million and Jordan about 0.8 million. This exceeds the relative European numbers by far, even though the conditions of housing, livelihood and education can hardly be compared.

In the following I would like to give some tentative answers to the questions which were meant to lead us through the session. These are answered from an intertwined perception: A German urban planner’s point of view and a representative of the German Association of Cities—the first and the latter have learned a lot throughout the last decades and years of refugees moving to (and from) Germany:

How are marginalization and inequality shaping the inclusion and/or integration of refugees and immigrants?

Marginalization and inequality shape day-to-day life in all market economies—and probably in all remaining socialist or communist economies, too. It seems to be an inherent characteristic of humans living in societies that stratification, personal and collective egoisms and different education, income and housing opportunities lead to inequalities, marginalization and even exclusion. This has not at all been bound solely to refugees; generations of lower income and social classes also experience subtle or obvious rejections by major parts of society. Sometimes even the other way around—a minor group determines the kind of education, living, access to services etc. for the majority, in its extreme form apartheid. In its more subtle forms, it leads to poll results like in Turkey or the U.S., which leaves the more marginalized groups behind and even aggravates their marginalization through exclusion of all kinds of opportunities including better education.

From modestly or low paid laborers’ and jobless people’s points of view, refugees and immigrants are not marginalized at all. They are eligible to obtain all basic services as the so called “bio-Germans”; they get the same amount of transfer income as any other German citizen after 18 months of being jobless, and from a headliner readers’ point of view, they absorb 23 billion Euro of German taxpayers’ money over the last year. Refugees and immigrants even receive much more attention than they have ever received in their lifetimes. Even students which have arrived from the refugees’ countries of origin legally complain about the “attitude of pampering refugees,” for which they accuse Germany.

The reaction is as simple as it is brutal—marginalized or nationalist and right wing groups fed with nicely packed but overly simplified “truths” by right wing intellectuals.
take the marginalization of refugees in their own hands: they burn down or attack refurbished accommodations for refugees (more than 1,000 attacks in 2015, almost 1,000 attacks in 2016); they nourish a discussion on the “Islamization of the Christian occident,” which generally finds absolutely no proof at all in Europe; and they gather with either subtle or even offensive phrases between 10 and 25% of voters behind their newly founded right wing party Alliance for Germany.

The German Administration at all levels, except a couple of highly criticized and legally pursued incidents, does not act with refugees and immigrants in an unjust way, which provides evidence for the presumption of systematic mistreatment. But the intrinsic patterns of marginalization—such as the exemption of post-migrants from jobs in the private sector because of their names or physical appearance, the rejection of renters with foreign names or appearances and—this may not remain unmentioned—the patterns of mater- or paternalism many of the volunteers in the refugee-scene adopted—all contribute to marginalization at different levels of intensity.

What are the criteria for successful refugee policies, and are they applicable across cultures and situational contexts?

The most critical criterion lays in starting the education of refugees, screening their professional or vocational potential and determining their future status as early and rapidly as possible—will they remain refugees with a limited status and rights, for example, to choose their place of residence as long as they depend on transfer income (residence obligation applies in some of the states of Germany)? Or, are they going to shift their minor legal status towards a full immigrant’s status with all rights of self-determination? Is there a path for naturalization for those who pursue it?

For refugees, a critical criterion also goes along with a semi self-determined pattern for accommodation. “Semi,” as refugees in most cases cannot afford to pay an accommodation by their own means and depend on the assignment of an apartment by the housing authorities. Another factor is the conflicting discussion between the schools of “physical integration” (mostly German politics) and the “stability in homogeneity” (mostly international scholars). The one fears the “ghettoization” of quarters due to the concentration of immigrants, while the other sees factors of mutual stabilization in “arrival quarters” which prepare the newcomers for life in the host country. The truth depends on the situation that arriving immigrants and refugees face and the “docking points,” on which they can hook in the arrival quarters. Most important is that the people do not remain for a longer period than necessary in emergency shelters and forms of mass accommodation, which popped up in Germany over the last 30 months, even in small industrial areas.

The applicability highly depends on the self determination of the host country and its dominant population and political setting: Does the host country allow for a considerable additional amount of public resources in personnel and funds to go strikingly beyond the mere “administration of refugee cases” towards the support of public or civil entities which provide for individual potential analysis, training programs, language qualification, psychological and social consultancy, etc.? Is there a joint understanding amongst the majority of the society that for a considerable period of time resources will be allocated to people who do not guarantee, “at the first sight,” a positive rate of social and financial return? This discussion is not only triggered by the already deprived local population but also by very much differing perceptions, comments and expertise of the scientific society. The fact that, in the past, all investments in the integration of migrants and refugees paid out 125% is widely neglected or put at stake by different numbers.

And finally, even the proponents of immigration and a humanitarian and integrative approach to refugees are not at all clear about the fact that integration does not only change the incoming people but also the population already in place. The truth lays probably in the term “inclusion,” which was meant to describe in the respective UN Charta the full participation of disabled people in education, professional and public life. This also requires changes in the welcoming society -not all at once but a constant change towards a society which bears a stronger imprint through migration over centuries, decades and the past few years.

To what extent can we change or influence the public’s will to receive vulnerable populations, and how does the media shape views of immigration?

The German proverb goes as such: “Often the child has already gone down the well”—i.e., it is much more difficult to readjust a wrong societal preoccupation than to familiarize a society with the pros and cons of immigration and integration of refugees before the “big wave” arrives. And it would have been much easier to sort out the non-refugee cases beyond the German boundaries in the countries neighboring the conflict country than in Germany itself. At the moment the
discussion is virtually on the verge: Do we want to invest more in refugees and immigrants in view of the uncertain outcome? The answer is rather “We need to invest more in order to maintain all our wellbeing” than “We cannot afford more refugees.” Or, even harsher but not at all uncommon: “The boat is full.” We need a positive narrative, such as the one of the German refugees from the east who built up Germany from scratch. This is the partly accepted narrative of the industrious guest workers who contributed to the blossoming of the German economy and to the “mediterranization,” which we all enjoy by now; and the narrative of the Eritrean apprentice who became best in the World plasterer championship. When the narrative in the contrary is nourished by five Syrian youngsters lighting a homeless person’s sleeping bag on fire in an underground station, an Afghan youngster stabbing, strangling, raping, and killing a young female student who was even engaged in an initiative for refugees, or a self-declared IS fighter who injured Chinese tourists with an axe, then we have a hard stand to convince a majority. Media and press play a decisive role—and are distrustfully monitored by a growing base of “postfactual” fans who only believe in fake news they generated or adopted themselves.

How and why do increased interactions between different groups create camaraderie in some cases and conflict in others?

A safeguarded social and income status might be seen as a prerequisite for camaraderie—but this is not the case. Camaraderie and solidarity with the fate of immigrants and refugees is a socially cross-cutting phenomenon as is, on the other side, the rejection and even hate shown to immigrants and sometimes foreigners. The negative phenomena are fed by education, overly interpreted “own experiences,” (which often have to do with blackmailing through third parties, exaggerations of oral experience and the mushrooming of web driven lies), prejudices which travelled journeys over a multitude of generations and, to a certain but very dangerous extent, “fear of racial extinction” by those who look, act and believe differently.

A certain proportion of these people cannot be won back, but those on the verge or strongly influenced, if not infiltrated by radicals, can be brought back in what we hope is still the mainstream of people: emphatic, based on social principles, sharing interest, or at least—neutral and uninterested. There is only limited evidence in generating fireworks of intercultural festivities, solidarity meetings and support networks which try to activate those on the verge. Most important is to prove that we show interest in the “bio-Germans” whom we haven’t sufficiently acknowledged in the past decades. It urgently requires to show those who doubt that the state invests more than ever in them. Also, it is critical to install a functioning and fast reacting social monitoring system which provides for the spatial investment needs in our cities and communities. Because the critics are correct: the distribution pattern is spatially unjust. However, they are not directed towards immigrants and refugees but rather to the “already haves” amongst all of us. The investment figures in our cities show that, for the most part, the quarters of the upper half receive more per capita funds than those of the lower half of our income strata. If we react too late we lose our local population of the lower half, not to count the right wing intellectuals. And we need the lower half of our population if we want to include immigrants and refugees in a way which pays out for the whole of our societies.
SESSION THREE

Sustaining and Improving Urban Life

Global Shifts: Urbanization, Migration, and Demography › Spring 2017

Kacyira | Klaus | Molokoane | Montgomery
Reflections on Sustaining and Improving Urban Life

By Aisa Kirabo Kacyira, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General and Deputy Executive Director, UN-Habitat; Perry World House Visiting Fellow, 2016–2017

The urbanization process has long been a catalyst for societal progress. Today, there is a growing recognition of the inextricable link between urbanization and socio-economic development. Cities have become a potent force for inclusive and sustainable socio-economic growth, development and prosperity, as well as for innovation, consumption, and investment. However, in order to develop their full potential, cities require solid economic policies, rigorous urban planning and design measures, as well as sound urban management, laws and governance.

Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development has recognized urbanization as a driving force for development and prosperity. Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 11 calls for “inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable cities.” The New Urban Agenda (NUA), which was adopted last year in Quito at the 3rd United Nations (UN) Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III), put forward a clear action plan for advancing development through urbanization. Its implementation has the potential to positively shape the future of cities and ensure sustainable development by supporting efficient economic growth and environmental sustainability and ensuring that cities are socially inclusive and promote shared prosperity.

International frameworks, such as the SDGs, the Paris Climate Agreement, and the NUA, and their respective follow-up mechanisms provide an opportunity to build on this momentum and devise global strategies for implementation, monitoring and review. In that context, it is crucial to create alliances for implementation on the ground, making full use of partnerships with various stakeholders and empowering local actors to contribute fully to the search for solutions.

INCLUSIVE CITIES

Putting People Center-stage

A city should first and foremost be a reflection of its citizens and create a sense of belonging. Citizens should have their voices heard and valued, not only in social innovation projects and decision-making but also in the planning, implementation and evaluation of urban policies. In short, cities should be inclusive.

Reaching that goal depends on several factors, including sufficient political commitment by stakeholders in government and other relevant sectors. In addition, incentive structures must be adjusted to avoid biases towards uneven and unequal development. This, in turn, requires leadership that reflects a city’s people and diversity. Well-balanced, representative institutions are critical to facilitate inclusion, whether it concerns universal access to services, spatial planning, participatory policymaking or accountability. Policymaking should also be undergirded by evidence-based mechanisms that use disaggregated data to adequately capture the state of our cities. Finally, it is crucial to recognize and strengthen the complementary roles of national and local governments in achieving inclusive growth.

Improving Access to Public Spaces and Land

Public spaces help build a sense of community, civic identity and culture. They are critical for creating a more inclusive urban environment. In fact, access to public spaces not only improves people’s quality of life, it is also a first step towards civic empowerment and political participation. Moreover, ensuring access to public spaces for the most vulnerable residents is a powerful tool to combat discrimination and insecurity.

This paper reflects the individual views of the author.
Urban policies are an important means to provide access to public spaces and address spatial inequalities. High-density development and efficient street networks, for instance, make access to jobs and services easier. They also limit urban sprawl, with direct benefits, such as lower land and energy consumption as well as decreased greenhouse gas emissions. The sustainable maintenance and management of public spaces require sound economic and financial models. It is therefore key for cities to put in place adequate financial frameworks and governance systems to ensure municipal finance mobilization. Endogenous job creation and strategic investments will further secure sustainable funding and can generate a virtuous financial circle, in addition to healthy competitiveness.

Another major issue is access to land. We need to provide equitable access to land and security of tenure, and should be aware of the impact of urbanization on the value of land. Mixed land-use and socially diverse neighborhoods are critical components of inclusive cities, as are policies for the acquisition of land for public use and the availability of houses in different price ranges and tenures. Difficulties in securing access to adequate, affordable housing for all should be compensated through proper public spaces and services. Overall, fair and effective urban planning supported by the requisite laws makes cities more compact, efficient and people-oriented—and thus more equitable and sustainable.

Providing Access to Services and Infrastructure as well as Opportunities

Policies, investments, and plans that promote more cost-effective access to basic services and infrastructure can contribute to making cities more inclusive. For example, by connecting social and political commitments with targeted investments and job opportunities, the urban poor can be better integrated. Furthermore, transparent, pro-active planning systems can increase a city’s credit-worthiness. This positively influences the investment climate and allows political leaders to deliver on safe and inclusive urbanization projects. Taking into account rural-urban linkages when establishing an integrated development agenda is similarly important.

Beyond the local level, cities also need to follow up on international commitments concerning the nexus between urbanization, economic, social and environmental development, as well as peace and security. Monitoring and performance management compacts are useful tools to advance the implementation of those commitments. In addition, cities can use frameworks, such as the SDGs, to learn from one another and share lessons learned, including on accountability measures. Needless to say that implementation is not without its challenges, not least because of the various interconnected governance layers and short-term mandates of political leaders. Investors also take advantage of loopholes and contribute to short-termism.

Addressing the needs of marginalized groups

Another feature of inclusive cities is their ability to address the needs of marginalized, vulnerable groups, such as slum dwellers, migrant workers, indigenous peoples, minority groups, children, young and elderly people as well as persons with disabilities. Today, one third of urban dwellers in the developing world (863 million people) live in slum-like conditions. More women and girls than men and boys live in poverty in cities around the world. They are commonly responsible for unpaid care work, face greater risks of violence, especially in poorly designed urban spaces, and often lack access to basic services and infrastructure. Furthermore, over three billion people (almost half of the total global population) are under the age of 25. Many of them live in cities and towns in countries affected by crises and fragility, and are at high risk of becoming radicalized and violent.

Urban policies are key to addressing inequalities and the exclusion, even criminalization, of these groups. They can help avoid or reduce divided cities typified by gated communities, slums, increased polarization and privatization of urban space. They can contribute to creating safe spaces for vulnerable groups and empowering women and girls—economically, legally and in terms of political engagement. They can also provide young men and women—society’s most essential and dynamic human resource—with opportunities for training and jobs. In doing so, urban policies and programs can support efforts to sustain peace in countries at different stages of the conflict cycle. In addition to addressing the youth bulge, they are also important in ensuring the inclusion of disabled persons and the rapidly growing number of elderlies. Finally, by improving access to adequate housing, urban policies can help integrate migrant laborers who increasingly move from rural to urban areas.
THE ROLE OF NATIONAL URBAN POLICIES

Coherence and coordination between central and local governments are essential to ensure synergies and complementarities of interventions at different levels, and to incorporate urban growth into national and local planning. National Urban Policies (NUPs) play a critical role in this regard: their adoption and implementation contributes to an enhanced synergetic connection between the dynamics of urbanization and the overall process of national development. To harness urbanization, mitigate negative externalities and promote an “urban paradigm shift,” a coordinated approach and clear policy directions are needed. Unfortunately, these are still lacking in many countries, where different government departments are in charge of dealing with different aspects of the urbanization challenge, often working at cross purposes.

NUPs should therefore provide an overarching framework to steer public interventions in urban areas and serve as reference for government ministries and service providers as well as legislative institutional reforms. NUPs are also an important instrument for raising awareness of the benefits of sustainable urban development, and for promoting inclusive consultations with various urban stakeholders. Finally, it is crucial to include strategic territorial regional planning frameworks with clear urban-rural linkages as well as an urban legal framework. These should be responsive to the real needs and capacities on the ground and take into account available resources, especially with respect to land use and land tenure security as well as the allocation of private versus public space and land value capture.

In conclusion, urbanization is a man-made phenomenon. If managed well, it is probably the most accessible and affordable policy strategy to achieve sustainable development. While common global principles of urban planning and policies remain relevant, it is important to note that urbanization is also a human process and cannot simply be copied. It will grow to reflect the citizens’ culture and identity in each context. UN-Habitat has responded to these challenges by investing in global and thematic research, and has tested its findings through operational programs at national and local levels, in both peaceful and crisis environments. Tangible transformative results have been achieved and, today, together with its partners, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, UN-Habitat is braced to scale up and support Member States in the implementation of the NUA. The leadership role of governments, their effective coordination and a proactive engagement with our partners all are crucial in this regard.
Even when they are islands—and there are surprising few major metropolises among them—cities are not islands. The economic developments and trends that occur in cities are not uniquely determined by urban policy. This was among the fundamental insights of the “Global City” phenomenon. The “Global City,” as Saskia Sassen and others outlined it, was not simply a cosmopolitan city of regional and global commercial exchange—new Timbukts, Jeddahs, Gaos—but a particular form of commercial city, with a particular form of politics, determined by particular patterns of international exchange.1

For Sassen, the “tipping point” came in 1970s, when key institutions of the national government—particularly in the executive branch in the United States—began “to function as the institutional home for the operation of powerful dynamics constitutive or critical for ‘global capital.”2 For Keller Easterling, the denationalization of economies has been carried out at the city level in the form of Export Processing Zones, Special Economic Zones and their like which have proliferated in the last three decades. “While extolled as an instrument of economic liberalism,” writes Easterling, “it trades state bureaucracy for even more complex layers of extrastate governance, market manipulation, and regulation.”3

The prevailing world order, constructed after World War II and revised, most notably in the 1970s, ever since, has undoubtedly facilitated these trends. It has provided the technocratic expertise necessary to support the economic exchange at the heart of the “global city.” It has facilitated the development and sharing of technologies that have altered how we look at cities from above. It has underpinned a period of relative peace and stability that has been interstate violence diminish but new forms of violence in cities proliferate.

But it is also under intense strain. Global governance institutions such as the United Nations are struggling to adequately address transnational challenges such as climate change and migration (with direct effects upon cities). Autocrats in the global north and south undermine democracy. A populist surge in Britain, the United States and France calls into question long standing pillars of the post-World War II order such as the EU and NATO. “Donald Trump’s stunning electoral defeat of Hillary Clinton marks a watershed not just for American politics,” wrote Francis Fukuyama in the Financial Times, “but for the entire world order.” But even before the recent elections, as Henry Kissinger noted in World Order in 2014, new technologies, emergent superpowers, cyber threats, and nuclear proliferation were already challenging the resilience of the world order.4

How then, amid a globalized economy but uncertain world order, can urban policy be used to disrupt the income inequality and, in the case of the United States, the stagnant wages that have accompanied the rise of the Global City? This question of course starts with the city, and what policy initiatives can be taken at the municipal level—but it also stretches beyond that. The residents of such cities, Sassen, rightly points out, are uniquely situated to conduct politics across scales: locally, nationally and internationally. The same holds for their mayors—and they know it.

Cities have long been engaging in trade and commercial diplomacy, but over the last decade they have built out robust international engagement on climate change and sustainability. More recently they have added the challenges of inclusivity and income inequality to their international agenda. “The Paris Action Plan for Inclusive Cities,” signed by over 50 mayors and supported by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Ford Foundation, among others, lays out concrete actions cities can take in the spaces of education, labor markets and skills, housing, and infrastructure and public services, to improve inclusivity and opportunity. Such actions focus on the city-level, and the plan includes the usual multilateral caveat recognizing that “the competencies of local governments in these policy domains differ across countries, and that local initiatives operate within broader regional and national policy frameworks.”5 How might cities and residents go about influencing the shape and form of the wider global
First, some local actors are seeking reform within the key international institutions of the post-World War II order in the form of a voice for local actors. Indeed, the gap between the collective economies, populations and reputations of cities and their actual global influence at these institutions is remarkable. In October at Habitat 3 in Quito, mayors and leaders from over 500 cities, organized by United Cities and Local Governments, collectively called for a seat at the “Global Table.” For those seeking such reform, the absence of local voices in these institutions undermines the legitimacy of the current order and limits the ability to implement global accords such as Agenda 2030 and the New Urban Agenda.

Another approach seeks more fundamental change, heralding new forms and practices of politics that stretch well beyond traditional political sites. The playbook for how U.S. cities will resist or adapt to developments in Washington D.C. is still being written, the practical approaches for how cities or citizens can oppose the creaking world order has been developing for some time, from the 1999 Seattle WTO protests, to the 2003 global protests against the Iraq War and the Occupy movement. Leading academics with interdisciplinary approaches are helping outline these opposition tactics. In Vertical, Stephen Graham of Newcastle University outlines “vertical appropriation” techniques that can be used to resist the vertical geographies of power that stretch from the GPS satellites of space to the water wells beneath city streets. In Extrastatecraft, Easterling has collected approaches to language, rumor, hoax, and protest that be used as forms of politics. These are not the diplomatic norms of U.N. chambers adapted to new voices, but rather streets, buildings, and even comedic language turned into sites of political opposition.

Finally, while the current world order under is under strain, a simple lesson from American diplomacy in the 20th century remains: reliable partners and platforms for collective action can help amplify influence. But how to organize such collective action in the 21st century and without a preponderance of power? The answer offered by those in opposition to or independent of the world order is the same: networks.

Perhaps recognizing the challenge of legacy institutions, key philanthropies and leaders have seemed more inclined to build new platforms, such as the Rockefeller 100 Resilient Cities, the C40 Cities and more locally the Urban Sustainability Directors Network. While also seeking to apply pressure on national capitals and even state, they suggest a fundamentally different approach: they are networked rather than hierarchical. Collective action results from access to resources and knowledge rather than from status or the leadership of a single city or country. Power is dispersed and practical; it is the ability to actually implement policy in some of the world’s most important cities. Judged from this perspective, cities are immensely powerful. Consistent with a more networked approach, cities are building their own diplomatic relationships outside of traditional foreign policy channels. Mexico-City and Chicago may provide the most visible example of this, but cities around the world are building boutique bilateral relationships focused around commercial and cultural exchange, some of which are being done in opposition—in tone if not in policy—to national governments.

The world order is under intense strain, and with it the global economic structure that has led to the global city. How much of a say cities have in shaping the emergent or adapted order will depend on the three approaches above. Outlined below is one policy option that could disrupt economic inequality for two of the three approaches.

**Policy Options**

- **Reform or adapt international institutions**: From the municipal perspective, and that of organizing groups such as the UCLG, lobbying efforts should be wisely targeted. The G20, for example, is perhaps the most representative body of world power at the national level. As Michael Cohen of the New School has pointed out, it has yet to fully consider the nexus of the global economy and urbanization. Germany is often at the forefront of global urban diplomacy, and city advocates who want to amplify their efforts around inequality should focus on mobilizing around the G20.

- **Independent Action**: C40 climate Cities and Rockefeller 100 Resilient Cities provide two networked models by which cities can take local action. These approaches share best practices, offer staff to implement them, and perhaps just as importantly, build regional and global political momentum around issues. In collaboration with the OECD or separately, leading foundations must decide to put significant resources behind the chief policy challenges around inequality, including housing, transportation and education. Meanwhile, leading cities actively engage with residents and civil society to formulate engagement with such networks.
ENDNOTES

1 For background on the concept, and the debate surrounding it, see: Michele Acuto and Wendy Steele, “Introduction,” Global City Challenges: Debating the Global City (Palgrave: New York, 2013).


In order for urban policies to really make change – to disrupt the status quo of institutions that systematically perpetuate marginalisation and inequality – they must come from a foundation of inclusivity. This means that those groups that have suffered the effects of marginalisation and inequality—the urban poor—must be involved in the design, implementation and monitoring of urban policies. The agency and innovation of organised communities of the urban poor must be recognised and resourced and collaborative urban planning and development institutionalised into national, regional and municipal planning programmes.

For example, urban development policy and practice must be informed by the uniquely rich information that organized informal settlement and slum dwellers gather through settlement and city-wide community-driven data collection methodologies, including profiling, enumeration and mapping. Data collection serves as a critical tool for the empowerment of these communities, and as a powerful basis from which to enter into partnerships with other key stakeholders, including the State, to set the agenda for development priorities and upgrading needs.

In this way, innovative solutions co-produced by the urban poor, government, and other urban decision makers can begin to meet the needs of the entire city, starting with the poorest. When policy is informed by the needs and priorities of grassroots communities and integrated solutions are implemented, disruptive social change becomes possible.

Another critical example of this is the policy language around the prevention of forced evictions. At SDI, we like to talk about “inclusive” cities as being “slum friendly cities.” That is the kind of attitude and those are the types of strategies we want to see urban policies advocating for—ones that create cities that are embracing of informality. This includes cities’ approaches to evictions. What SDI advocates for is the creation of a holistic approach to evictions that calls for the co-production of alternatives to evictions through active partnerships between organised urban poor communities and urban decision makers, particularly local governments. The co-production of in situ, incremental slum upgrading solutions should be referenced as providing effective alternatives to evictions and as the default approach to dealing with inadequate, unsafe housing, infrastructure and basic services. When this is not feasible, organised urban poor communities should be central to the planning and implementation of the relocation and resettlement process.

This, of course, is certainly disruptive to the institutions that perpetuate some of the most extreme forms of urban marginalisation and inequality through the continued practice of forced evictions—a practice rooted in the notion that there are indeed sets of individuals who should not be granted equal access to the city.

Implementing Inclusive Urban Development

Policies only take on meaning through implementation. This, of course, is the case for national urban policies as well. As such, these policies must be drafted in partnership with the local stakeholders responsible for implementation. Institutional space must be made for municipalities and grassroots communities to engage and offer input throughout the drafting process, allowing for the development of national urban policies that speak to the needs on the ground and are seen as implementable at the local level. This kind of collaborative planning must be institutionalised at every level and must be set out in the national urban policies themselves in order to ensure the devolution of sustainable, inclusive urban development.

Additionally, the incorporation of community-collected data plays a critical role in the drafting of any urban policy. Community-driven data collection allows for active participation of communities from the beginning of the development process through the identification of development needs and priorities, and through to the monitoring of implementation of strategies. SDI has demonstrated that cities have to work with urban poor communities to collect baseline data and maps of all
informal settlements in the city. This is the beginning of forming a relationship with those who have remained invisible in city planning in the past. When this knowledge is brought to the table in the drafting process, it results in national policies that speak to local realities.

**CRITERIA FOR INCLUSIVE CITIES**

The first step in the creation of an inclusive city is the recognition of the existence of all settlements in the city and formalisation thereof. This is why SDI has partnered with Cities Alliance and United Cities and Local Governments–Africa in the creation of the Know Your City Campaign. The Know Your City campaign is a global campaign for gathering citywide data on slums as the basis for inclusive partnerships between the urban poor and their local governments. Every household, every neighborhood and every informal settlement has to be counted. There can be no inclusive or equitable development planning and investment, nor effective city governance if the increasing majority of the residents of informal settlements remain unaccounted for.

Key to this is the creation of protocols for cities to map and collect data on slums at the citywide level. SDI’s experience shows that slum mapping has many immediate and long-term benefits. Firstly, it helps settlements to develop a collective understanding. When communities visit each other to support data collection, settlements begin to network. Most SDI federations have emerged through such exercises. Secondly, sustainable development for cities requires that information about all urban settlements is collected and updated. Invariably, city governments lack capacity to collect data on all settlements. This leads to skewed investments, exacerbated disparities between amenities and service provision, and increased backlog in service provision. Thirdly, in times of increased awareness of city responsibility to vulnerability, reaching the most vulnerable and often least documented is always a problem for city administrations.

Helping the poor to create a voice, a collective identity, and possibilities to participate in urban transformation and change is an integral aspect of what we all seek in the creation of inclusive, resilient cities.

Additional criteria include:

- Voice of the people living in poverty to be heard;
- Organized communities making a meaningful contribution to our own development;
- Capacitate and empower people from poor communities to be self-reliant and understand their role setting their own development agenda;
- Strong organized communities that are doing precedent setting projects that can be scaled up and influence policies;
- Decentralizing funds and resources to support communities to carry out their own activities and social, economic and political development;
- Connecting and funding organized communities nationally, regionally and globally with the main objective of addressing the issues of housing, secure land tenure, livelihoods and unemployment and putting women at the center of the process;
- Building grassroots social movements that will influence public policy to respond to the needs of the most marginalized communities at all levels;
- Forging and institutionalizing partnerships with grassroots communities at the center of decision making at all levels of government;
- Holistic development, through integrated approaches and community-centered processes;
- Strength of data collection of information to define our own development agendas;
- Respect of culture, ancestral knowledge, and language;
- Investing in the leadership and organizing of communities as the core step in poverty reduction and sustainable development.
Internal migration is one of the fundamental processes by which poor countries transform themselves, with a well-recognized role in propelling national economic growth (Lewis 1954; World Bank 2009). It is equally significant in the lives of individuals. For all who migrate—girls and women, boys and men—the move marks a transition from one environment that is relatively familiar to another about which much may be unknown. In making the passage from the known to unknown, each migrant is likely to confront a range of risks and social dislocations, doing so in the hope of securing better life-prospects for the long term.

Protection and safe passage are especially important for adolescent girls. The period from age 10 to 19 is fraught with risk yet also rich with opportunity, a time of multiple transitions when many girls leave their parents and natal homes for new surroundings. Many types of evidence are needed to illuminate girls’ lives, but knowledge of the size of migration flows and their demographic composition is essential to understanding the scale of program resources required to reach girls in need, and to get a sense of where within a country and a city those resources would be best deployed.

The focus on urban destinations is justified in part by the remarkable demographic transformation that is underway world-wide. According to demographic forecasts, the countries of the developing world will grow by nearly 3 billion in total population by 2050, with nearly all of this growth taking place in their cities and towns (United Nations 2012). By 2030, the populations of rural areas are forecast to be on the decline. The more fundamental rationale, however, has less to do with demography than with governance. Cities are important settings in which to consider adolescent girls because of their potential to connect girls to the resources that could provide both protection and opportunity. Cities are places where all manner of resources—capital, institutions, government—are concentrated. A well-governed city provides even its poor and newly-arrived residents with ready access to good schools, effective health care, and beneficial social services. But if a city’s governance system bears little resemblance to this ideal, new migrants can find themselves socially excluded and unable to take advantage of resources that may be no more than a stone’s throw away.

WHERE AND WITH WHOM DO MIGRANT GIRLS LIVE?

The literature is often read to suggest that urban migrants live, disproportionately, in slums. And yet in an analysis of demographic data from the Demographic and Health Surveys and census microsamples (Montgomery et al. 2015), colleagues and I have found that in-migrant urban girls are no more or less likely to live in homes with inadequate drinking water and sanitation than are urban non-migrant girls. No doubt many of these girls do live in slums of one kind or another—child domestic workers may be an exception—but these slums can differ greatly in ways that affect the access of migrant girls to transport, employment, health, and other services (UN-Habitat 2003). Slums can also vary in terms of the communal energies they can bring to sustain women’s groups and associations of the poor, which provide poor city dwellers with a collective identity and give them voice in the halls of local government. After all, adolescent girls are unlikely by themselves to be able to influence local government programs and services; they could only hope to do so if local women’s groups, groups of the poor, and local NGOs begin to speak on their behalf.

Whether or not they reside in slums, migrant urban girls often live in what would appear to be socially isolating circumstances: most such girls are unmarried at the time of their move and after arrival, they are much less likely to reside in households headed by a relative, and also less likely to live with a mother, father, or spouse. But so far as I am aware, no quantitative demographic survey has asked about relatives living nearby, for instance in the same city as a newly-arrived migrant.
girl. In an insightful qualitative account of migrants in Indore, India, new migrants whose family members were already in Indore were found to be more fortunate than isolated migrants: they could call upon at least a small network of social resources to ease the process of adjustment. As Agarwal and Jones (2012) write, Migrants living in these slums typically had family connections in the area, which were instrumental in the decision to migrate and certainly in the choice of migration destination. …On arrival in the city, relatives provided considerable informational and practical support, such as arranging accommodation in their own or a rented home for the initial period. In this way, migrating to join family connections provided not only familiarity but also security for girls and their families.

For the migrant girls who had no option but to live with non-relatives and far from family, connections can nevertheless be maintained between the elder females of the migrant’s city household and her parents in the village home (Temin et al. 2013).

With the aid of modern technologies, it is no longer obvious that to be accessible, personal and social resources must be nearby in the geographic sense. An emerging literature, mainly based on small qualitative and quantitative studies of China and countries in Southeast Asia, suggests that migrant girls in these regions are actively constructing their own geographically far-flung personal networks through the use of mobile phones and text messaging (Bunmak 2012; Lin and Tong 2008; Ngan and Ma 2008; Yang 2008). The phenomenon is especially marked among the migrant “factory girls” who work very long hours in tedious jobs, and who enjoy precious few opportunities to savor leisure time in the company of friends and family. For them, text messaging becomes a form of virtual social life that maintains connections with parents and family, and which sustains friendships and allows space for a bit of flirtation and experimentation with attractive identities (as through the adoption of “beautiful” on-line names and other communication tactics).

**DO MIGRANT GIRLS CONTINUE TO BUILD THEIR HUMAN CAPITAL?**

As a group, young migrant girls have levels of education that exceed those of rural non-migrant girls, but which fall short of the education attained by non-migrant urban girls of the same age. Even so—a point that is very often overlooked—a significant percentage of migrant girls are able to continue their schooling after arrival. The Indore, India study (Agarwal and Jones 2012) provides insight into what is entailed when a migrant girl attempts to enroll in school:

> Enrollment was a challenge for some girls: on making contact with a school in the city, girls and their families were asked for a range of documents, including certificates of their school results, transfer certificates, and case certificates for accessing scholarships. [The] implications included having to return to the village to obtain the necessary documents, paying bribes, or even having to change the choice of school. …Girls could be entered into a class behind their age peers if they had not attained the required educational standards. …More serious implications…were that girls might not enroll for fear of being unable to cope with the [urban] education level, or enrolling to leave soon afterwards because they were unable to keep up with their peers.

These difficulties were especially apparent among girls who had not been to school in some time—the gap in their training made re-entry a challenge. This is an area in which specially-focused programs and interventions might make a significant difference.

**MIGRANTS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF THE URBAN POOR**

The literature has yet to explore the potential of one prominent form of urban social capital—urban women’s groups and associations of the urban poor—to benefit newly-arrived migrants. These community-based associations figure hardly at all in most accounts of urban adolescents and migrant girls, but in much of Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, they have proven to be vital intermediaries—a type of bridging social capital—that have served to link poor urban-dwellers to the larger structures of government and civil society where greater resources are held than in the poor communities themselves.

In the well-documented case of India, associations of slum-dwellers have provided the poor with effective “voice” in local bureaucratic and political circles (Appadurai 2001; Burra, Patel, and Kerr 2003; Wit 2002; Garau, Sclar, and Carolini 2005; D’Cruz and Satterthwaite 2005; Karanja 2010; Pervaiz, Rahman, and Hasan 2008). These groups have emerged over the past 25 years, beginning in Asia, and then spreading to...
sub-Saharan Africa and to an extent also to Latin America. It is only recently that adolescent programming has begun to take advantage of these developments, and only recently that urban poor associations—which employ community mobilization as a means of securing adequate housing, sanitation, and water supply—have recognized migrants and adolescents as significant community sub-groups warranting attention. In their activities to date, the large slum-dweller associations have not taken the specific concerns of adolescent migrant girls into account, being more focused on securing housing and adequate drinking water and sanitation—but there is no reason to think that greater breadth cannot be achieved.

In Indore, Agarwal and Jones (2012) note the difficulties that migrants face in learning about and taking part in such local associations:

In regards to women and children’s groups, although many girls were aware of the concept, they were unaware of the groups available within their own neighbourhoods. They also feared what would be expected of them or where they would have to go if they agreed to participate. Moreover, women’s group members themselves expressed that people in the community tend not to invite recent migrants to social activities and groups until they are acquainted and unless they are certain that the migrants intend to stay on a more permanent basis. Yet, many adolescent girls have little opportunity initially to become acquainted with others.

These barriers are especially formidable for temporary migrants. In Indore as in many Indian cities, an Anganwadi center is an important source of nutritional supplementation and basic health care for community members, including adolescent girls. But center staff are often reluctant to enroll temporary migrants, whom they suspect will soon leave and create havoc in record-keeping, thus exposing staff to criticism from higher-ups. Agarwal and Jones (2012) conclude that frontline workers and NGO staff may need to be sensitized to the situations of migrant girls, and be sufficiently flexible to allow even temporary migrants to participate in programs as appropriate. Clearly, creative program and outreach efforts will be needed if migrant girls are to be welcomed and fully incorporated in urban community groups, which are present in many cities and in principle could assist new migrants to settle in.

Women’s groups and associations of the urban poor would therefore seem to have much to contribute to easing migrant’s integration into the community. Married adolescent girls could be encouraged to become members of women’s groups, and encouraging full group membership for mothers of girls from migrant families could work to the benefit of these younger migrants and perhaps raise the overall profile of migrants in the group’s concerns. Women’s groups should be sufficiently flexible to allow for girls’ circumstances: for example, a girl whose length of residence is uncertain could delay joining the savings and loans activities until she feels more rooted in the community, but meanwhile could take part in other group activities.
REFERENCES


