The 2026 Bangladesh Elections: A Q&A with Muhib Rahman

On February 12, 2026, Bangladeshis went to the polls in the first general election since the July 2024 uprising that overthrew Sheikh Hasina. Perry World House Postdoctoral Fellow Muhib Rahman answered questions about the election’s outcomes and what opportunities and challenges now face the new government.

Perry World House: When a student-led movement forced Sheikh Hasina’s resignation in 2024, the mood in the country was optimistic and hopeful. In the wake of the first election since her departure, is that still the case?

Muhib Rahman: After the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s fifteen-year-long repressive rule, there was widespread relief and a sense of restoration. Especially for young people, the moment felt like a regaining of political agency. They did not see the July revolution as merely removing an autocratic leader but reclaiming the right to participate meaningfully in politics. I think that sentiment carried over into the February election.

The election itself, despite pre-election anxieties, was largely peaceful and procedurally credible, though there were sporadic incidents and allegations of irregularities. Turnout was about 60 percent, suggesting that people across party lines—including a significant segment of former Awami League supporters (currently banned from participating in elections)—chose to participate rather than boycott. There was a festival atmosphere, as citizens lined up to vote after years of frustration over contested or noncompetitive polls. In that sense, the optimism of 2024 was fully there.

However, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has secured a two-thirds majority in parliament. With that level of political leverage, the BNP could potentially derail the reform agenda that many citizens hoped would follow the post-Hasina transition. The new government has already signaled that it may not honor the July Charter, approved by a 60 percent majority in the referendum. In the recent past, supermajorities have been the starting point of autocratic consolidation in Bangladesh. Citizens remember how overwhelming parliamentary dominance allowed for a monstrous repressive state apparatus to emerge during the Hasina era. So, the post-election mood is not entirely euphoric, but I would say more vigilant.

Nevertheless, hope continues in the post-election days. The youth population accounts for roughly 40 percent of eligible voters and has already demonstrated its willingness to take to the streets and force a repressive regime to fall. That memory is a reassurance: it sends a strong message to anyone in power and hopefully will put some limits on how they govern.

PWH: How significant are the constitutional changes approved by voters? Will they usher in fundamental changes to Bangladesh’s political system?

MR: The proposed constitutional changes approved by voters are the most significant reforms the country has debated in decades. But the vote itself is just the starting line. The real transformative power is not in the referendum result—it lies in implementation.

There are two major pieces in the referendum that the new government has significant issues with. First, the reform agenda includes a move to prevent one person from serving as both the party chief and the head of government. Historically, the system has basically handed the Prime Minister’s Office a blank check, which is exactly how the country ended up with personalist rule during the Hasina era. Splitting those roles addresses the structural roots of the country’s authoritarian drift.

Another proposal is a bicameral legislature with proportional representation. This could change how parliamentary politics works in the country. Right now, if a party gets a supermajority, it can basically legislate without any constraint. A proportionally represented upper house could put in place checks that do not rely solely on street protests or external pressure. Ideally, it moves parliamentary processes away from this winner-take-all mandate.

But there has been skepticism from day one. The referendum was bundled in a way that never quite sat right with the BNP. Now that they have secured a two-thirds majority, the incentive to follow through on those referendum proposals has diminished significantly.

So, the referendum result is significant as an expression of public appetite for reforms. But it does not automatically guarantee systemic transformation. Whether these propositions lead to a genuinely new political setting will depend on how much pressure opposition parties, Jamaat and the NCP (the National Citizen Party), can actually apply in parliament. There will be some pressure from the international community, especially the United States, to keep the BNP on the reform track. But the BNP might implement reforms selectively—those that align with its party interests.

PWH: What are the biggest domestic and international challenges facing the new government?

MR: Domestically, the main challenge is rebuilding the economy and creating opportunities for a growing and educated population. One of the key drivers of the 2024 political upheaval was frustration over limited economic opportunities, especially among youth. The new government has made addressing that challenge a priority and set an ambitious goal of turning Bangladesh into a trillion-dollar economy over the next decade. But that requires critical tasks such as attracting large-scale foreign investment, controlling inflation and corruption, and improving the quality of education and skills development. Without visible progress, political goodwill may dissipate quickly.

Another immediate concern is law and order, especially considering the interim government’s lack of effectiveness in containing crime and violence throughout the country, and the post-election violence targeting the opposition. The government needs to rebuild trust in the police and administrative institutions without reverting to the repressive tactics of the previous era. The government will have to walk a fine line in distinguishing between people going out into the streets to make legitimate demands and the potential for that to escalate into a “mob” culture of popular retribution. A balance between firmness without coercive overreach will be delicate.

Perhaps the most complex domestic issue is patronage politics. Corruption is very difficult to manage. Local political organization in Bangladesh is deeply intertwined with rent distribution and informal networks of loyalty. Anti-corruption rhetoric resonated widely, and all parties emphasized it during the campaign. But dismantling patronage systems risks destabilizing party cohesion and local power structures. Tarique Rahman will need to put in place political arrangements that maintain stability, satisfy party members, and address popular demands for cleaner governance. Managing that tension will define the administration’s credibility.

In foreign policy, the main challenge down the road would be how the new government can strike a strategic balance in its relations with major partners while retaining significant autonomy. Tarique Rahman appears to prioritize stability and normalization. It feels like a deliberate move to step back from that strategic drift toward China we saw during the interim government. Now, the focus is shifting back toward normalizing relations with India and leaning into the partnership with the United States. The Cabinet member selection also provides important clues. By retaining the Foreign Minister who served in the latter half of the interim government, Rahman is choosing functional continuity. This decision signals that the U.S.-Bangladesh relationship will remain a top priority, particularly given the person’s instrumental role in managing ties with Washington during the transition.