Democracy Democracy in Eastern Europe: Georgia, Moldova, and Romania

Foreign interference, flawed elections, and public protests have exposed the strains facing democracies in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus over the past two months. 

The results have been dramatic: nail-biter elections in Moldova, massive street protests in Georgia, cancelled elections in Romania—all against the backdrop of grinding war in Ukraine and Russia’s continued attempts to undermine the westward orientation of its neighbors.

There is a bigger picture to Russia’s efforts: according to Alexander Vershbow, a Perry World House (PWH) non-resident senior advisor and former deputy secretary-general of NATO, Russia’s “overarching goal in the region: weaken these countries’ independence and sovereignty, to promote the success in elections of pliable politicians that favor Russia's agenda, to weaken support for the United States and the rules-based order that it seeks to defend, and to undermine NATO and EU unity and influence in Russia’s neighborhood.” Destabilizing democracy is one tool to achieve these objectives.

What happened?

Moldovans went to the polls on October 20 to answer a fundamental question: should their country continue to aspire to join the European Union? Most expected a comfortable win for a resolution to enshrine a pro-EU orientation in the country’s constitution. Then Russia got involved. Using the full spectrum of election interference tactics—including media influence operations, cyberattacks, and straightforward bribery—Russia sought to drive voters away from EU integration and its chief backer, incumbent President Maia Sandu. In the end, the pro-EU side won with an extremely slim majority. In a presidential runoff election on November 3, Sandu narrowly defeated Russia-backed candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo. 

In Georgia—another EU candidate country—contested parliamentary elections on October 26 cemented the rule of the Georgian Dream party, in power since 2012. The subsequent decision to suspend EU accession negotiations – six months after the passage of a controversial “foreign agents” law, a bill that mimicked the law Russia uses to crack down on civil society and opposition figures—led to widespread protests from pro-EU and pro-democratic forces throughout the country. Protests against the government’s pro-Russian and authoritarian tilt have entered their third week despite an increasingly harsh crackdown on journalists and demonstrators.

Finally in Romania—an EU and NATO member—the out-of-nowhere first round win of far-right pro-Russia presidential candidate Călin Georgescu, the subsequent revelation of the extent of Russian media manipulation, and the equally shocking cancellation of the second-round vote by the constitutional court, launched Bucharest into uncharted political waters.

What do these events have in common?

The most obvious link is the role of Russia. “In all three countries, Russia’s actions share a common thread: an attempt to erode trust in the Western model, including the EU, NATO, and the United States, Russia promotes narratives that portray a pro-Western orientation as a pathway to chaos and conflict, citing Ukraine as an example” Ecaterina Locoman, senior lecturer of international studies at the Lauder Institute, University of Pennsylvania, writes.

It’s part of Russia’s grand strategy, explains Mitchell Orenstein, professor of Russian and East European studies and political science at Penn. “Russia wants to be recognized as a great power with a recognized sphere of influence.  It wants to control former colonies and weaken their relations with NATO, the European Union, and the United States.”

Implicit in Russia’s message was a threat, explains Vershbow: “Russian propaganda, subversion, fraud, bribery, funding of political parties and other hybrid tools of election interference attacks seek to convince the population of these countries that fighting for democracy and pro NATO policies will only promote social unrest, regional instability and frictions in relations with Russia that could ultimately expose them to pressure and violence as occurred in Ukraine.”

While Russian tactics weren’t novel—TikTok and social media manipulation is not new—they were effective. Samantha Bradshaw, a Perry World House lightning scholar who was also a member of an election monitoring mission to Chișinău in November 2024, noted “Russia employed several tactics to disrupt and undermine the elections in Moldova, including the alleged vote buying scheme funded by Russia and managed by Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, where it was estimated that more than 39 million dollars were transferred from a Russian bank to the accounts of 138,000 Moldovan citizens.” 

The divides also reflect regional and global trends: skepticism toward mainstream parties, the growing appeal of the populist right, dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy – trends that are accelerated by economic uncertainty and geopolitical ferment.

What comes next?

The pressure is unlikely to cease.  “The forces of democracy and authoritarianism appear to be evenly divided at the current moment” says Orenstein. “We observe strong support for democracy everywhere these authoritarian gambits occur.”

That support will be put to the test. In Moldova, critical parliamentary elections this spring will put even more strain on institutions.  According to Locoman, there is reason for concern:

“The parliamentary elections remain a significant test for the pro-Western coalition. The future of Moldova’s pro-Western trajectory and its aspirations to join the EU largely depend on whether this coalition can maintain power and resist external pressures. However, the fact that pro-Russian actors were allegedly able to buy votes and influence voter decisions through financial means further underscores the weakness of Moldova's institutions. The mechanisms designed to counter such actions appear to be ineffective, highlighting structural issues within the country’s democratic safeguards and their inability to properly address these threats.”

In Georgia protests continue into their third week and their fate is far from certain. Changing course back to a pro-Europe political orientation will not be easy. Locoman observes “In Georgia, analysts talk about how the Georgian Dream Party did not abruptly "put the frog into boiling water;’ rather, they have gradually increased the temperature, incrementally filling state positions with loyalists and like-minded individuals. This slow erosion of institutional independence has made it far more difficult for the Georgian people to the systemic changes the party has implemented.”

Romania—already a member of the EU and NATO—faces a re-run of presidential elections in 2025 – while polarization and threats of violence increase.  This has already overshadowed a major achievement: Romania’s entry to the EU Schengen zone, a long sought after affirmation of Romania’s place in Europe. It will be a challenge for mainstream parties to mount an effective opposition to the surging far-right candidate, as the controversial constitutional court decision continues to shake citizens’ faith in the countries democratic institutions.

More broadly, according to Orenstein, “the West has consistently failed to adequately address Russia’s hybrid war tactics for over a decade.  In focusing all attention on the kinetic war in Ukraine, they did not do enough to address Russia’s hybrid war everywhere else.”

An effective response will have to be multi-faceted, leveraging not only diplomatic tools but technology, media policy, and other regulatory measures.  For example, countries will have to overcome structural hurdles in their media environment: Bradshaw observes that “a challenge for independent media in countering disinformation and broader Russian propaganda efforts is that independent media struggle to generate competitive revenue in the age of digital media.  False or misleading content can easily spread for free, while journalism requires resources to fact check information and develop high quality news.”

Russia believes its efforts are working.  “Russia invests a lot in these hybrid attacks, thinking they can defeat the West without more military confrontation” says Orenstein. How Moldova, Romania, and Georgia respond to the pressures will be a test of how far their influence goes.