The Global Order After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

April 14, 2022
ABOUT PERRY WORLD HOUSE

Perry World House is a center for scholarly inquiry, teaching, research, international exchange, policy engagement, and public outreach on pressing global issues.

Perry World House’s mission is to bring the academic knowledge of the University of Pennsylvania to bear on the world’s most pressing global policy challenges and to foster international policy engagement within and beyond the Penn community.

Located in the heart of campus at 38th Street and Locust Walk, Perry World House draws on the expertise of Penn’s 12 schools and numerous globally oriented research centers to educate the Penn community and prepare students to be well-informed, contributing global citizens. At the same time, Perry World House connects Penn with leading policy experts from around the world to develop and advance innovative policy proposals.

Through its rich programming, Perry World House facilitates critical conversations about global policy challenges and fosters interdisciplinary research on these topics. It presents workshops and colloquia, welcomes distinguished visitors, and produces content for global audiences and policy leaders, so that the knowledge developed at Penn can make an immediate impact around the world.

This workshop is made possible in part by Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Shapiro Global Workshop on Geopolitics Fund.
INTRODUCTION

On April 14, 2022, seven weeks into the Russian Federation’s most recent invasion of Ukraine, Perry World House hosted a workshop with policymakers, academics, and current and former government officials on The Global Order after Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. The workshop focused on the invasion’s effects in four domains:

1. Ukrainian and Russian politics and economics
2. Global economics
3. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU)
4. The Indo-Pacific

It also included a public keynote address by Ukraine’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations Sergiy Kyslytsya.

The panel on Ukrainian and Russian politics and economics focused on the factors that led to the current conflict and the implications for national politics in both countries. Expanding to the global economy, the workshop discussed the global food, energy, and financial shocks the conflict has induced and may continue to induce. The third panel on NATO and the EU discussed the prospects of Ukrainian membership in NATO, how NATO can better assist Ukraine, and what the future holds for this conflict. The final panel focusing on the Indo-Pacific discussed the war’s implications for Taiwan and how other countries, namely the People’s Republic of China (PRC), view the war. The workshop was conducted under Chatham House Rules, so none of the material in this report is attributed to a specific individual or organization.

All of the major issues affecting Ukraine, Russia, and the international community are reflected in the priorities of the Global Order research theme at Perry World House. Russia’s invasion of its neighbor will have ramifications for the future of international governance structures. The recommendations and discussion in this report continue the Global Order theme’s focus on some of the most important issues facing the world, such as changing power dynamics, the impact of new and emerging technologies, and the future of international organizations. The Global Order after Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine workshop also served to fulfill Perry World House’s mission to leverage Penn’s academic research to address global policy issues in part by “bridging the gap” between academia and the policy community for stronger policy solutions.

Given the changing nature of the conflict in Ukraine, this report is structured to provide actionable policy recommendations that were discussed and debated throughout the workshop. These recommendations span the various panels as the workshop discussions evolved throughout the day. The hope is that this report will serve as a guide for how the various stakeholders—including the United States, EU, and NATO—can bring an end to the conflict. The report also provides recommendations for the Ukrainian government.
WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

The workshop brought together members of the Penn community, academics, and current and former policymakers. The following people participated in panels throughout the day:

Tobias Bunde
Postdoctoral Researcher, Centre for International Security, Hertie School, University of Governance in Berlin

William Burke-White
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania

Thomas J. Christensen
Interim Dean; James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations, Columbia University

Fiona Cunningham
Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

Jacques deLisle
Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law & Professor of Political Science; Director, Center for the Study of Contemporary China, University of Pennsylvania

Melissa Flagg
Founder, Flagg Consulting; Visiting Fellow, Perry World House

Sarah Hammer
Managing Director of the Stevens Center for Innovation in Finance at the Wharton School, and Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School

Kimberly St. Julian-Varnon
Ph.D. Student and Penn Presidential Ph.D. Fellow, University of Pennsylvania

Sergiy Kyslytsya
Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations

Bonny Lin
Director, China Power Project and Senior Fellow, Asian Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Ecaterina Locoman
Senior Lecturer of International Studies at the Lauder Institute, University of Pennsylvania

Orysia Lutsevych
Head and Research Fellow, Ukraine Forum, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

Anna Mikulska
Energy Fellow, Baker Institute for Public Policy and Graduate Coordinator and Lecturer, Russian and East European Studies, University of Pennsylvania

Chris Miller
Assistant Professor of International History, The Fletcher School, Tufts University

Mitchell Orenstein
Professor and Chair of Russian and East European Studies, University of Pennsylvania

Kevin M.F. Platt
Edmund J. and Louise W. Kahn Term Professor in the Humanities and Graduate Chair of Russian and East European Studies, University of Pennsylvania

Trudy Rubin
Worldview Columnist, Philadelphia Inquirer; Visiting Fellow, Perry World House

Paul Stronski
Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Susan A. Thornton
Senior Fellow and Visiting Lecturer, Paul Tsai China Center, Yale Law School

Heli Tiirmaa-Klaar
Director, Digital Society Institute, European School of Management and Technology in Berlin; Visiting Fellow, Perry World House

Jane Vaynman
Assistant Professor, Political Science, Temple University; Lightning Scholar, Perry World House

Alexander Vershbow
Former NATO Deputy Secretary General and U.S. Ambassador to Russia; Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Perry World House

Caitlin Welsh
Director, Global Food Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The workshop’s primary goal was to propose concrete recommendations for policymakers responding to rapidly evolving events in Ukraine, the region, and around the world. Participants offered actionable policies related to defense, economics, global food and agriculture, framing and the information war, and the Indo-Pacific and China. This section addresses each of those areas and provides a succinct list of recommendations.

DEFENSE

Workshop participants offered recommendations for NATO and U.S. defense strategy. The discussion centered on what the U.S. policy should be moving forward as the conflict becomes more protracted; what type of support NATO and/or the United States should provide to Ukraine; and suggestions for NATO’s governance structure regarding Article 5.

NEED FOR STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY

The U.S. government should stop being “self-deterred” and signaling to Russia what it will not do in the conflict. Instead, the Biden administration should introduce more strategic ambiguity into its policy response to the Russian invasion. This would reduce Moscow’s certainty about potential U.S. action, which might in turn temper Russian military tactics.

INCREASE WEAPONS DELIVERIES TO UKRAINE

NATO members should provide both offensive and defensive weapons to Ukraine. These should include supplying fighter jets, tanks, more sophisticated air defense systems, and heavier weapons (e.g., anti-armor, anti-aircraft, and anti-tank weapons). It is unlikely that these actions will lead to Russian escalation. An emphasis should be placed on weapons that Ukrainian forces know how to operate, such as MIG-29s, S-300s, and Buk anti-missile systems, as well as Javelin and next-generation light anti-tank weapons (NLAW).

INCREASE TRAINING FOR UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES

Augmented in-kind support should be complemented with increased military, intelligence, and cybersecurity training for Ukrainian armed forces. NATO members and the United States should also work toward training the Ukrainian military to operate more advanced and sophisticated weapons systems. This would allow them to reduce their reliance on legacy systems from the Soviet era.

SUSTAINED SUPPORT FROM THE WEST

The West should be prepared to sustain its military, economic, and political support to Ukraine over the following weeks, months, and possibly years. Many participants in the workshop agreed that Ukraine’s struggle against Russian forces would not be a short fight, but a longer war. The West should do away with the notion that this conflict will be resolved quickly.
REDEFINING NATO’S ARTICLE 5

The compounding effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, inflation, and rising food and fuel prices are increasing domestic economic pressures in Europe. Given these concerns in many NATO member countries, NATO should redefine Article 5 to include military and economic security, recognizing that the two are interdependent and one cannot be secured without the other. This approach may help to persuade far-right, Euro-skeptic minorities in Europe to put greater faith and trust in NATO.

NO-FLY ZONE SHOULD BE OFF THE TABLE

Neither NATO nor the United States should establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine. However, like the recommended heavy weapons deliveries to Ukraine, a no-fly zone might not be the escalatory action that everyone fears. Nevertheless, it is still not recommended. In a pre-workshop survey,1 participants nearly unanimously agreed (94.7 percent) that there should not be a no-fly zone.

1 A pre-workshop survey was given to all participants to gauge their views, opinions, and priorities on the topics that would be discussed during the panels.

The survey is designed to spark greater discussion and debate among participants throughout the workshop.

Panelists and attendees at the first panel of the workshop, focused on the invasion’s effect on Ukrainian and Russian politics and economics.
Workshop participants discussed recommendations for American and European policymakers on salient economic issues that have been significantly affected by, or activated in response to, the Russian invasion. These recommendations concern energy security, Russian sanctions, and financial solutions.

**END DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN ENERGY**

Europe should end, or significantly reduce, its purchases of Russian energy. In 2020, Europe led the world in importing Russian natural gas, including 17.2 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and 167.7 billion cubic meters in piped natural gas. Germany (52.5 billion m³), Italy (28.7 billion m³), and the Netherlands (18.1 billion m³) were the top European importers. Reducing European reliance on Russian energy will require a unified response and an acknowledgment that it would potentially lead to an economic recession, particularly if the 2022-23 winter is harsh. With political leaders likely to face public pressure to lower energy costs, this action is a difficult but necessary one.

**INCREASE LNG INFRASTRUCTURE**

Shifting away from Russian LNG is not only a supply issue but also an infrastructure issue. For example, Germany, the most Russian-energy-dependent country in Europe, has no LNG terminals. One short-term means of breaking Russian energy dependence is to install offshore, floating LNG storage units where there is access to a pipeline. Since the floating units can be installed within two to three months, this is a quick solution that could be implemented immediately.

**ACCELERATE THE USE OF DIGITAL CURRENCY**

The United States should accelerate the advancement of central bank digital currency. The crisis in Ukraine has provided an opportunity to leverage the technological benefits of cryptocurrency, while simultaneously managing controls of digital assets. With many financial institutions physically destroyed or rendered inoperable and millions displaced, decentralized financial systems can provide a solution that is interoperable with existing infrastructure.

**INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION FOR DEVELOPING CRYPTOCURRENCY REGULATIONS**

The increasing use of cryptocurrency, with over $100 million in crypto donations to the Ukrainian army, demands a coordinated approach to regulation across the financial sector. The Biden administration’s executive order (14067), calling for a whole-of-government approach to regulating cryptocurrency and digital assets, is a good start. This should be expanded and extended to international standard setting. As Managing Director of the Stevens Center for Innovation in Finance at the Wharton School Sarah Hammer wrote, “Without global standards, crime could flourish, and positive uses for the technology may be impeded. With consistent global standards, the international community will better be able to direct the positive impacts of crypto and NFTs to the socially impactful missions they are intended for.”

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5 As a part of the workshop, participants were asked to write draft papers for circulation addressing various themes and topics discussed at the workshop. Sarah Hammer, “The Significance of Digital Assets in the Ukraine Crisis,” April 2022.
GLOBAL FOOD AND AGRICULTURE SUPPLY CHAINS

Recognizing the impact of the war in Ukraine on global food and agriculture supply chains, workshop participants discussed recommendations for American and European policymakers. With 30 percent of global wheat exports and 60 percent of global sunflower oil exports coming from Russia and Ukraine, respectively, immediate responses are needed to help countries shift their sourcing and offset higher prices on the global market.

RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL SANCTIONS SHOULD REMAIN OFF LIMITS

The United States and Europe should remain committed to the free flow of trade for agriculture products and agricultural inputs around the globe. They should not implement export bans and should discourage other countries from doing so. Instead, importing countries should be assisted in shifting their food sources to countries with bumper crops of wheat, such as India, Australia, Brazil, and the United States. As states around the world struggle to feed their citizens and strengthen their domestic agricultural production, sanctions on Russia’s agriculture sector should continue to be off the table. Twenty-six countries around the world rely on Ukraine and Russia for 50 percent of their wheat and cannot easily shift away from this dependence. Keeping Russian agricultural sanctions off the table has been the policy approach to date, and it is essential to keep this policy in place to minimize further disruptions to global food and agriculture supply chains.

6 “The war in Ukraine is exposing gaps in the world’s food-systems research,” Nature, April 12, 2022, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-00994-8

INCREASED SUPPORT TO THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION’S (FAO) FOOD IMPORT FINANCING FACILITY (FIFF)

Wealthy countries should further invest in the FAO’s FIFF program to support low- and middle-income countries that are reliant on Ukraine and Russia for their food and fertilizer needs. The FIFF hopes to increase global agricultural production in a sustainable way, but the West should support the FAO’s call to help poorer countries deal with surging prices. The FAO estimates that up to 13.1 million more people may go hungry because of the conflict from 2022 to 2026 if urgent action is not taken.8

A “MARSHALL PLAN” FOR UKRAINE’S AGRICULTURE SECTOR

Panelists emphasized that significant investments will be needed to rebuild Ukraine’s depleted agricultural sector. Preparations should begin now for a “Marshall Plan” to restore Ukraine’s agricultural capabilities, including rebuilding schools, providing new equipment, demining agricultural fields, and rejuvenating the talent pipeline. Given Ukraine’s critical role in global food supply chains, this investment is important for both Ukraine and the wider world.

FRAMING AND INFORMATION WAR

In addition to tangible U.S. and European investments in Ukraine, both during and after the war, workshop participants discussed the importance of controlling the narrative about the causes of the Russian invasion and combating Russian disinformation that its invasion was in response to aggressive posturing by the United States.

“RUSSIA VERSUS THE WEST” TO “NATION VERSUS EMPIRE”

The U.S. government should actively seek to change the discourse of the war from “Russia versus the West” to “Nation versus Empire.” Russia’s narrative of Western aggression resonates with many Global South countries. However, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s grievances are not with NATO but with Russia’s reduced status as a superpower. Challenging this framing by presenting the war as the Ukrainian nation versus the Russian Empire makes Russia’s actions less defensible and gives more agency to Ukraine in its anti-colonial, anti-imperial fight for full independence as a post-Soviet nation. This decolonial lens will likely resonate with many countries currently neutral about the war and accentuate Ukraine’s status not as a puppet of the West but as a nation struggling against a dissolved empire trying to reassert itself.

Outside of the European theater, workshop participants discussed the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for U.S.-China policy. Panelists suggested there was room for cooperation but also prudence needed for possible parallels with Taiwan. They had specific recommendations for American policymakers regarding U.S. policy toward the PRC.

**INCLUDE CHINA IN DIPLOMATIC PROCESSES FOR ENDING THE WAR**

While it is not clear how much leverage the Chinese have with Putin, the United States and NATO should include the PRC in negotiating a postwar peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine. The United States should also work closely with the Chinese in establishing humanitarian corridors, increasing humanitarian aid, and investing in reconstruction support in Ukraine.

**HARDEN TAIWAN’S DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES TO DETER CHINA**

The United States should worry about its reputation for resolve when it comes to Taiwan. As a result, the United States should make Taiwan a tougher place to invade and occupy by providing it with asymmetric weapons and increasing military training efforts. As University of Pennsylvania Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law & Professor of Political Science Jacques deLisle wrote, “A cross-Strait invasion would be even more difficult than Russia’s overreaching attack on Ukraine. Ukraine has been a striking case study in the capacity and will of a people to defend what they see as their sovereignty, democracy, and nation against a much more powerful invader asserting its sovereignty over the targeted territory and its ethically, linguistically, and culturally kindred population.”

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9 As a part of the workshop, participants were asked to write draft papers for circulation addressing various themes and topics discussed at the workshop. Jacques deLisle, “Russia’s War on Ukraine: Implications for China and Indo-Pacific Regional Security,” April 2022.
FUTURE SCENARIOS

In addition to specific policy recommendations, workshop participants also discussed future scenarios that might play out in Ukraine, Russia, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific. Some of the scenarios are more likely than others, and there was debate about both timelines and feasibility.

POSTWAR SETTLEMENT

There was broad consensus that Ukraine, not the United States or NATO, should be the lead negotiator in any post-war settlement. The West could support their efforts by using its significant sanctions leverage to support Ukrainian demands.

SCENARIO 1. CONTINUED CONFLICT, DIPLOMACY UNLIKELY

A diplomatic solution is not likely. Peace is only possible if Ukraine can defeat Russia on the battlefield, but the next phase of the war will be more difficult for Ukraine. The Ukrainians will not make any territorial concessions, notably because it would be political suicide for any Ukrainian political leader.

SCENARIO 2. FROZEN CONFLICT

If Ukraine cannot defeat Russia in the next phase of the war, then the conflict is likely to be frozen and protracted. Putin cannot afford to admit that Russia has lost. NATO will continue to provide military support to Ukraine without directly intervening. If the fighting remains contained to the south and east, the stalemate could continue, as in the Donbas from 2014 to 2022.

SCENARIO 3. PEACE AGREEMENT

Ukraine and Russia finalize a negotiated peace agreement with territorial compromises. The starting point for the negotiations is Ukraine’s pre-February 24 borders, likely forcing it to cede parts of the Donbas and Crimea. The eastern parts of Ukraine, ceded to Russia, will become fully integrated into the Russian Federation.

SCENARIO 4. TEMPORARY PEACE

If there is a political settlement in the medium term, it will likely not last very long, possibly only several years. If Putin remains in power, Eastern European security—particularly in non-NATO countries—is still at risk. Putin may re-invade Ukraine (like he did in 2022 after the first incursion in 2014) or may invade a neighboring country like Moldova.

Scenarios 1, 3, and 4 would likely include security guarantees for Ukraine from NATO (more below on the prospects of Ukraine joining NATO). These guarantees will most certainly include more than what was outlined in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum,10 which (unsuccessfully) prohibited Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom from threatening or using military or economic force against Ukraine. The form of the security guarantees will likely include a basket of military support, provided on an open-ended basis that can be ramped up if Russia threatens, or attacks, Ukraine again. There was also significant agreement among workshop participants that in these scenarios, a Russia led by Putin would be very likely to attack Ukraine again in the future.

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Workshop participants also discussed possible scenarios of how the invasion might affect Russia’s domestic economy and politics, given—what has to date—been a disastrous war. These scenarios examined how international sanctions would or would not impact Russia’s decision making, as well as Putin’s prospects for maintaining political control of the state.

**Scenario 1. Economic Sanctions Are Ineffective**

In the short term, economic sanctions are not likely to inflict major damage to the Russian economy, particularly if Europe does not stop purchasing Russian energy. Even in the long term, as sanctions start to be effective, Putin has enough financial resources that the Russian war effort will not be impacted. Although the Russian war plan was poorly designed, Russia has updated its assumptions in response to the costs; the new shift in conflict should play to its strengths.

**Scenario 2. Economic Sanctions Harm Russian Economy**

If the war becomes protracted and sanctions remain in place, Russia’s economy will be seriously harmed. Sanctions on export controls are likely to be some of the most effective. These controls restrict Russia’s access to technology—including semiconductors, micro-electronics, and parts for car manufacturing and airplane maintenance—bringing key industries to a halt.

**Scenario 3. Russia Cracks Down at Home and Becomes Further Isolated**

In the last 20 years, Putin has tried to balance integration with the world with an increasingly strident patriotic, nationalist rhetoric at home, pummeling internal opposition while projecting Russia as a “modern democratic nation.” This period is over. Russia is now cleaved off from the world. It is likely to shift toward much more oppressive domestic policies. It is an open question about the extent to which Russia will, or will be able to, seek integration with the rest of the world after the war. As University of Pennsylvania Edmund J. and Louise W. Kahn Term Professor in the Humanities Kevin Platt wrote, “Intensification of repressive politics is a far more likely outcome.... Ultimately, such a wave of political repression may result in the increased regime stability that it is intended to achieve, as dissenters are imprisoned, fall silent, or depart the country.”

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11 As a part of the workshop, participants were asked to write draft papers for circulation addressing various themes and topics discussed at the workshop. Kevin M. F. Platt, “Russian Domestic Politics: The Coming Spiral of Repression,” April 2022.
SCENARIO 4. END OF THE PUTIN REGIME

The least likely, but nevertheless possible, scenario is that the combination of military losses and economic contraction will lead to the failure of Putinism and the removal of Putin from power by the Russian elite. If this happens, the West would likely demand that Russia contribute to Ukrainian reconstruction efforts by making sanctions reductions contingent on contributions.

Nearly every scenario addresses Putin’s hold on power. In the pre-workshop survey, participants were asked about Putin’s political future. A near majority (47.4 percent) thought he would be reelected in 2024, whereas only 15.8 percent thought he would be removed in an internal coup. Others had more varied responses, ranging from Putin’s resignation, death, or retirement, to the cancelation of elections, or “too hard to tell.”

Regardless of Putin’s political fate, respondents to the survey believed that the Russian economy would be negatively affected by the conflict, with 73.1 percent believing it would be six or more years before Russia’s economy would reach 2019 levels and another 5.2 percent stating it would never recover to prewar levels. Over 20 percent said that it would take at least five years for Russia’s economy to reach prewar levels.

Figure 3. How long will it take Russia’s economy to reach its GDP level in 2019 (1.687 trillion USD), considering the full effect of Western sanctions?
FUTURE POLITICS IN UKRAINE

Since its independence, Ukraine has been a relatively weak state. The absence of a strong government has allowed oligarchs, civil society, and international actors to have greater influence throughout the country. Workshop participants argued that the war is strengthening Ukrainian civil society and that, in many ways, the war is actually being fought by civil society: the information war, via social media; the refugee and internally displaced response effort; and the territorial defense forces. As University of Pennsylvania Professor of Russian and East European Studies Mitchell Orenstein wrote, “They [civil society] have also formed the backbone of its territorial defense forces and volunteer battalions. It is hard to imagine that civil society will allow itself to be marginalized from Ukrainian governance and reconstruction in the future. Civil society has the power and legitimacy to play a greater role now.”

One likely scenario is that civil society emerges from the conflict with increased strength, legitimacy, and power. It was a powerful actor during the Orange Revolution (2004) and Maidan (2014), but it lost momentum in the subsequent years. The 2022 war has revitalized civil society efforts. However, in addition to a strengthened civil society in the postwar environment, oligarchs will also be strengthened due to the tremendous costs of rebuilding. International organizations will also be heavily involved in both development and construction efforts.

Left to right: Mitchell Orenstein, Professor and Chair of Russian and East European Studies, University of Pennsylvania, and Kimberly St. Julian-Varnon, Ph.D. Student and Penn Presidential Ph.D. Fellow, University of Pennsylvania, discuss how the invasion has affected Ukrainian and Russian politics and economics.

12 As a part of the workshop, participants were asked to write draft papers for circulation addressing various themes and topics discussed at the workshop. Mitchell Orenstein, “The War’s Impact on Russia’s Economy and Ukrainian Politics,” April 2022.
EUROPE

If the conflict becomes protracted, and continues into the winter of 2022-23, there will be intense competition between Europe and Asia for gas. Energy diplomacy will be essential in managing this competition. Countries with LNG storage capacity will need to be convinced to send some of their supply to countries in Europe where the storage capacity does not exist. Europe must continue to prioritize diversifying its energy sources, including augmenting renewable energy sources, but this is a long-term process. This war has been a wake-up call for Europe on the effects of globalization on supply chains, as well as the fact that economic interdependence with Russia failed to prevent the war. As Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Fellow Paul Stronski wrote, “The EU’s long-standing approach of trying to build good ties and stabilize the security situation by building economic ballast with its most difficult interlocutors—China and Russia—is proving far less successful than initially envisioned.” Europe has realized the perils of relying on Russian gas, but it has yet to take dramatic steps to reduce its reliance.

INDO-PACIFIC

Workshop participants agreed that Beijing got “snookered” and “bamboozled” by Putin regarding the Russian invasion. China was surprised, like many other countries, by the Ukrainian resistance, the ability of the Ukrainians to use more advanced weapons, the poor performance of the Russian military, the unanimity of the Western alliance, and the popular support—among individuals, civil society, and businesses—for Ukraine. Participants discussed various scenarios affecting the Indo-Pacific region.
SCENARIO 1. DEMOCRACY VS. AUTHORITARIANISM

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine further divides the world along democratic and authoritarian lines. This is not good for China because it is dependent on so many liberal economies. Economically, the war is a “net bad” for China. Russia is the biggest debtor country under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, alongside Ukraine and Belarus, which are two other large debtor countries.

SCENARIO 2. INCREASED GLOBAL SUPPORT FOR TAIWAN

The war pushes the United States to further support Taiwan and increases global sympathy for Taiwan. The United States must worry about its reputation for resolve. Leaders like Japan’s former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo have called for the United States to have an “unconditional commitment” to Taiwan and end its policy of strategic ambiguity. However, unconditional commitments from the United States to Taiwan are unnecessary because Beijing expects the United States to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf.

SCENARIO 3. REDUCED LIKELIHOOD OF TAIWAN INvasion

Russia’s war in Ukraine makes the invasion and occupation of Taiwan much less attractive to China. The Russian military’s lack of success is cause for concern in China. It confirms the risks of waging a war of aggression against a democratic, self-identifying nation. Xi Jinping must be worried that his military advisors are not giving him the true picture of China’s military capacity just as Putin overestimated the Russian military’s capacity to achieve a fait accompli in Ukraine. But it does not eliminate the Chinese government’s willingness to use force if provoked. Furthermore, China has other significant military options besides invading and occupying Taiwan, including a devastating economic blockade.

SCENARIO 4. PRC QUESTIONS U.S. REPUTATION FOR RESOLVE

China is likely to emphasize to Taiwan that the United States is weak and unreliable since it has not directly intervened in assisting Ukraine. Beijing will use this framing to convince Taiwan that the United States will not defend it in a conflict with China. Elements within Taiwan, such as former President Ma Ying-jeou, have exploited this idea in an effort to double down on building asymmetric capabilities. There are hints of the Putinization of Xi Jinping in terms of pushing an ethnonationalist, irredentist agenda and insulating himself from the rest of the world. As Paul Tsai China Center Senior Fellow Susan Thornton wrote, “Depending on what happens in Ukraine, however, China may conclude that the U.S. and Western countries are more likely to try to use sanctions than use troops in a military conflict.”

Figure 4: How will the war in Ukraine affect China’s own security decisions?

- It will make China more aggressive towards its neighbors: 44.4%
- It will make China less aggressive towards its neighbors: 16.7%
- It will make China seek out compromise on its territorial issues with its neighbors: 16.7%
- It will have no effect on China’s security decisions: 22.2%

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14 As a part of the workshop, participants were asked to write draft papers for circulation addressing various themes and topics discussed at the workshop. Susan Thornton, “Effects of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine on the Indo-Pacific: Will Russia Sanctions Change Chinese Calculus on Taiwan?,” April 2022.
SCENARIO 5. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

China’s democratic neighbors—especially South Korea and Japan—are more likely to develop nuclear weapons. China will also invest more in its nuclear capabilities. This would be a major breaking point in non-proliferation history.

Workshop participants were asked how the war in Ukraine will affect China’s own security decisions. The plurality of respondents (44.4 percent) said that it “will make China more aggressive toward its neighbors,” while 22.2 percent said that it would “make China less aggressive toward its neighbors.” Others believe it would push China “to seek out compromises on territorial issues” (16.7 percent) or would have “no effect on China’s security decisions” (16.7 percent).

China’s central focus is on U.S.-China competition. The United States being bogged down in Europe provides some relief for China. While the U.S. government claims it can “walk and chew gum at the same time,” the administration is fully focused on Ukraine and Russia, which leads to diminished attention toward the Indo-Pacific. From the perspective of the PRC, U.S. efforts to solicit Chinese support to end the conflict in Ukraine are perceived as: “Can you help us fight your friend right now… you are next.”

Thomas J. Christensen, Interim Dean and James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations, Columbia University, discusses the invasion’s effect on the Indo-Pacific.

Jacques deLisle, Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science and Director, Center for the Study of Contemporary China, University of Pennsylvania, talks about how the invasion has affected the Indo-Pacific.
POSSIBLE OUTCOMES

This section explores the longer-term consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Workshop participants discussed the war’s effects on NATO and EU expansion as well as China-Russia relations. While the long-term effects are even more difficult to predict than those in the short or medium term, there is no question that this conflict will change the composition of both NATO and the EU, their mandates, and the larger pattern of alliances on both sides of the war.

NATO EXPANSION

Workshop participants were split on whether, and when, Ukraine might join NATO. In the pre-workshop survey, 42.1 percent of respondents said that Ukraine would never join NATO, whereas the majority (57.9 percent) said Ukraine would join NATO at some point in the future. Among those who believe Ukraine would join the organization, the timeline for its accession ranged from zero to five years (5.2 percent) to six to ten years (21.1 percent) to more than 11 years (31.6 percent). Different scenarios were discussed about the future of Ukraine’s possible NATO membership.

OUTCOME 1. UKRAINE DOES NOT JOIN NATO

Ukrainian membership in NATO was unlikely before the war and will continue to be an unlikely option. It would be challenging for the United States to agree to admitting Ukraine to the organization, which would entail a commitment to putting American troops on the ground in Ukraine and even placing American troops at risk of fighting a war against Russia.

OUTCOME 2. UKRAINE JOINS NATO

Depending on how the conflict unfolds, NATO may open the door to Ukrainian membership. This outcome becomes more likely if Ukraine defeats Russia on the battlefield or if Russia collapses in on itself, like the Soviet Union did in the 1990s.

OUTCOME 3. UKRAINE DOES NOT JOIN NATO BUT RECEIVES INCREASED SUPPORT

NATO does not admit Ukraine as a new member, but it significantly increases its troop presence on the Eastern flank, including the possibility of German troops in Lithuania.

Left to right: Honorary Consul of Ukraine Iryna Mazur, Counsellor Serhii Dvornyk, and Ukraine’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN Sergiy Kyslytsya take part in discussions of how the invasion has affected NATO and the EU.
Regardless of Ukraine’s fate in NATO, it was agreed that Russia’s invasion has reinvigorated NATO and renewed its purpose to ensure European territorial security and the containment of Russia. As European School of Management and Technology in Berlin’s Director of the Digital Society Institute Heli Tiirmaa-Klaar wrote, “NATO will become a much more important organization than it was perceived as during the post-Cold War years. It will be a central international organization guaranteeing European security and ensuring unity among the Euro-Atlantic security community. NATO’s growing strength is manifested, for example, by the current discussions of Finland and Sweden joining NATO.” As a result, NATO will pay much more attention to territorial defense as well as to nuclear deterrence and modern warfare. The United States is also, for the moment, recommitted to European security. Finland and Sweden’s eventual entry into NATO will stabilize northern Europe. However, states outside of NATO, such as Moldova and Georgia, are particularly vulnerable to Russian aggression. Short of territorial invasion, Moldova and Georgia face the risk of regime change with pro-Russian governments coming into power, dashing hopes for EU integration. In the postwar period, panelists argued that the West should reorient away from Russia and focus more of its attention on Eastern European countries.

Panelists and attendees at the third panel of the workshop, looking at how the invasion has affected NATO and the EU.

15 As a part of the workshop, participants were asked to write draft papers for circulation addressing various themes and topics discussed at the workshop. Heli Tiirmaa-Klaar, “How the War in Ukraine Is Affecting NATO’s Future Trajectory and Cohesion,” April 2022.
Figure 5: What is the timeline for Ukraine to join NATO?

Figure 6: What is the timeline for Ukraine to join the European Union?
EUROPEAN UNION EXPANSION

Workshop participants were much more optimistic about the likelihood that Ukraine would join the EU than they were about Ukraine joining NATO. Nearly 95 percent believed that Ukraine would join the EU at some point, although they diverged in the timeline for accession: 42.1 percent said Ukraine would join within one to five years, 47.4 percent six to ten years, and 5.3 percent in more than 11 years.

One of the dramatic early outcomes of the war is the overwhelming support among Ukrainians for joining the EU as a foreign policy priority, with an estimated 91 percent supporting that position.16 Before Russia’s invasion, Ukraine’s foreign policy oscillated between pro-Russian and pro-Western orientations. Now, the country has set itself up for liberal democratic-style reforms, including a respect for human rights, deliberative democracy, market economy, horizontal society, strong civil society, and strong local governance. It was argued that through its fierce resistance to Russian aggression, Ukraine has “relaunched itself” as a multiethnic, democratic, militarily powerful nation. Regardless of if or when Ukraine joins the EU, it was agreed that the EU and the United States should be prepared to develop and implement a “Marshall Plan” for Ukrainian reconstruction efforts. An economically strong Ukraine is an important counterweight to Russian influence in the former Soviet sphere.

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The two things that China most fears are the overthrow of authoritarian regimes around the globe and the growth and expansion of democratic alliances. These fears draw Russia and China together. Xi Jinping does not want Putin to fail. Therefore, while it may be politically costly for China to support Russia in the short term, the PRC is willing to bet that Russia will either win the war or will be able to rebound in five to ten years. Chinese scholars argue that Russia rose from the ashes following the collapse of the Soviet Union and could do so again.

Most workshop participants (73.7 percent) believed that the war would bring China and Russia politically and economically closer together. Only 11 percent said that it would push them further apart, and less than 16 percent said that it would have no effect on the relationship. As the conflict continues, the importance of China for Russia will only increase. Moscow will likely need Beijing to support it economically—even though China will work to appear as if it is abiding by Western sanctions.

The Chinese ambassador to Russia has advised Chinese companies—particularly small, private companies, not state-owned enterprises—to seize economic opportunities in Russia. Beijing needs to maintain the appearance that state-owned enterprises are abiding by sanctions, but smaller businesses have freer reign. Since China does not have a convertible currency, it is beholden to the global financial system to clear trade, thus it must be cautious in not violating Western sanctions against Russia.

Figure 7: What effect will the war have on the Sino-Russian relationship?
The workshop concluded with a keynote address by Ukraine’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations Sergiy Kyslytsya, followed by a moderated discussion with Trudy Rubin, Perry World House Visiting Fellow and Worldview Columnist for *The Philadelphia Inquirer*. Many have criticized the United Nations (UN) for its weak response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, highlighting the deficiencies of the organization in addressing the behavior of P5 members. Kyslytsya has firsthand experience dealing with the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the UN General Assembly (UNGA), and the challenges of getting the 193-member body to act. He bluntly described the UNSC as “a very toxic environment.” Yet, despite his frustrations, Kyslytsya was optimistic that the United Nations has an important role to play. He quoted former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, who said, “It is when we all play safe that we create a world of utmost insecurity.” Kyslytsya emphasized what Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the UNGA in a virtual address earlier this year: “Criticism of the UN is often heard, but we criticize ourselves. The UN is not a building; the UN is leaders.” When the United Nations fails, it is because its leaders fail to act.

Kyslytsya argued that one of the main challenges at the United Nations in addressing Russia’s actions is the compounding silence toward its continuously aggressive behavior. He compared the Putin regime to a “toxic mold … planted on the UN building 20 years ago.” Instead of addressing its “toxic” aggressions in Transnistria, Georgia, Syria, Crimea, the Donbas, and now the wider war in Ukraine, Kyslytsya said that each time “we are putting a fresh layer of paint on the mold.” Kyslytsya warned that “if we do not take action, one day the UN will collapse.” Despite the body’s inaction, Kyslytsya said he continued to defend the United Nations “because destroying the UN is what evil wants.”

In the moderated conversation with Rubin, Kyslytsya was asked what victory looked like in Ukraine. While he openly stated that his country needed more weapons, he said that victory was not just about a military triumph over the Russian army. Instead, victory would be “putting Russia back at the very beginning of the long path toward democracy.” He argued that the most dangerous scenario would be if Russia was militarily defeated, but then the international community returned to business-as-usual, with countries receiving delegations from Putin’s government. The ultimate victory would be “the moment when the Russian people decide to return to the path of democracy.” Kyslytsya challenged the narrative that Russians do not have access to information about the war and that their ignorance of their government’s atrocities was the reason for inaction. He said that Russians still have access to the internet, VPNs, and relatives abroad. If they do not have information about the war in Ukraine, it is because they “simply do not want to be educated, do not want to digest critically the information.” He emphasized that even in the restrictive times of the Soviet Union, people would listen to the *Voice of America* or *Radio France Internationale*. He raised the point that not a single Russian diplomat had yet...
defected around the world, saying: “It’s not about having or not having access to information; it’s about the collective complacency of the society.”

Kyslytsya also addressed the effect of economic sanctions on Russian society. He reminded the audience that at least 26 percent of Russian households do not have running water and that most ordinary Russians have not had a chance to experience a Western standard of living. Therefore, he contended that the sanctions were unlikely to affect regular folks, but instead the Russian oligarchs and Putin himself. However, with Europe still purchasing Russian oil and gas—to the tune of 1 billion Euros in daily payments—Putin has plenty of money to offset sanctions and insulate the effects on ordinary Russians.

Near the end of the conversation, in response to a student query about what people should do to help the people of Ukraine, Kyslytsya urged the audience to “lobby your elected officials” to continue to support Ukraine and keep the invasion as a priority. Kyslytsya further reminded the audience, “Putin will not stop if Ukraine fails.”
CONCLUSION

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has evolved since February 24. Since the Global Order After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine workshop took place on April 14, the United States and NATO countries have implemented some of the recommendations highlighted in this report, including providing increased heavy weapons to the Ukrainian armed forces. However, many of the other recommendations are still very relevant, regarding U.S. and NATO defense policy, economic policy, and policy toward the Indo-Pacific, particularly regarding Taiwan. Workshop participants echoed Kyslytsya’s warning that the international community neglects Ukraine at its own peril. Participants emphasized the critical role that Ukraine’s defeat of Russia on the battlefield has for democracies around the world.

RECOMMENDED READINGS

Workshop participants recommended the following books to learn more about Ukraine, Russia, or NATO:

- Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Fiona Hill, 2015)
- Winter is Coming: Why Vladimir Putin and the Enemies of the Free World Must Be Stopped (Garry Kasparov, 2015)
- The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin (Steven Lee Myers, 2014)
- The Lands in Between: Russia vs. the West and the New Politics of Hybrid War (Mitchell A. Orenstein, 2019)
- The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine (Serhii Plokhy, 2015)
- The Frontline: Essays on Ukraine’s Past and Present (Serhii Plokhy, 2021)
- Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare (Thomas Rid, 2020)
- Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest (Angela Stent, 2019)
- Russia vs. the EU: The Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States (Jakob Tolstrup, 2014)
- Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West (Andrew Wilson, 2014)