**Abstract**: What effect does UN Security Council authorization have on public attitudes toward the use of force relative to other cues supplied by domestic partisan elites? Several studies in international relations have suggested that approval from international organizations generates higher levels of support for a president’s use of force. The precise mechanism by which approval from these institutions translates into support among public audiences, however, remains underspecified. Existing work remains insufficiently attentive to the manner by which partisan cues from domestic policymakers and other elites can offset the impact that international organizations have in influencing public opinion on military matters. To account for the relative effects that informational cues from international organizations and domestic partisan elites have in shaping public opinion toward war, this study analyzes the results of an online survey experiment asking more than 1,200 adults in the United States about their support for the deployment of American ground troops in response to a hypothetical crisis scenario in South Asia. Although public attitudes toward the use of force are shaped more heavily by cues from domestic political actors over international ones, UN Security Council authorization does nevertheless increase public support for a hypothetical deployment of American ground forces, even in the face of countervailing cues from partisan elites. The effect of Security Council authorization, however, can indeed be offset by the united positions of domestic partisan elites from both parties. When Democrats and Republicans are united in their support for the deployment of ground forces abroad, their bipartisan support offsets any increase in opposition resulting from a refusal of the UN Security Council to authorize such action.

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What impact does United Nations Security Council authorization have on public attitudes toward the use of force relative to other cues supplied by domestic partisan elites? Several studies in international relations have suggested that approval from international organizations generates higher levels of support for a president’s military action (Chapman and Reiter 2004; Thompson 2006, 2009; Fang 2008; Chapman 2011; Hayes and Guardino 2013). Much of this work has focused on the capacity for international organizations to engage in “strategic information transmission,” whereby actions taken by multilateral institutions reveal credible signals about the merits of a leader’s proposed military action to comparatively less well-informed domestic and foreign audiences. An endorsement by sufficiently independent international organizations, then, is expected to generate higher levels of support for a leader’s proposal to use force both at home and abroad.2

This study argues, however, that the precise mechanism by which approval from international organizations translates into support among the domestic public remains underspecified and insufficiently attentive to the impact of partisan cues from domestic elites in shaping public attitudes on the use of force. A considerable literature in American politics suggests that individuals look to informational cues from the political party with which they most closely affiliate when forming opinions about complex public and foreign policy issues (Zaller 1992; Brody 1991; Baker and Oneal 2001; Berinsky 2009).3 These partisan cues from domestic

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policymakers and other elites have the potential to offset the impact that international organizations and other cues from abroad have in influencing public opinion on military matters. When the positions of the UN Security Council and domestic partisan elites diverge, which cues are more salient in shaping public attitudes toward the use of force?

To assess the relative impact that informational cues from international organizations and domestic partisan elites have in shaping public opinion toward war, this study employs an original survey experiment administered in December 2016 asking a sample of more than 1,200 adults in the United States about their support for the deployment of American forces in response to a hypothetical military confrontation between India and Pakistan. After reading a short vignette explaining that the U.S. president planned to deploy ground troops to stabilize the situation, study participants were then randomly assigned into one of six treatment groups that varied across two dimensions: 1) the degree to which Democrats and Republicans in Congress supported the president’s plan; and 2) whether or not the UN Security Council had authorized such action. Participants were then asked about the degree to which they supported or opposed the president’s plan, and their responses were analyzed to assess how variation in the presence or absence of UN Security Council authorization, on the one hand, and the positions of domestic partisan elites in Congress, on the other, affected respondents’ attitudes toward the hypothetical deployment of American ground forces.

An analysis of the experimental results finds that although public attitudes toward the use of force are shaped more heavily by cues from domestic political actors, UN Security Council authorization does nevertheless increase public approval for a hypothetical deployment of

American ground forces, even in the face of countervailing cues from partisan elites. Both Democratic and Republican respondents proved equally more willing to support the use of force when authorized by the UN Security Council even when told that their respective partisan elites opposed such an operation. The UN Security Council’s impact in moving public opinion can nevertheless be offset by united opposition from domestic elites in both political parties. When Democratic and Republican leaders in Congress are united in their support for the deployment of ground forces abroad, their bipartisan support offsets any increase in opposition resulting from the refusal of the UN Security Council to authorize such action. Similarly, bipartisan opposition among Democratic and Republican elites to the use of force can overwhelm any additional support a president garners from the UN Security Council’s authorization of his or her proposed military action. In other words, the degree to which multilateral institutions like the Security Council can shape public opinion toward the use of force appears to be highly conditional on the public positions taken by domestic partisan elites on the same matter.

The survey experiment also provides tentative findings on reasons why UN Security Council authorization and domestic partisan cues have the impact they do in shaping public opinion. An analysis of the experimental data finds little evidence for suggestions that the UN Security Council alters public attitudes toward the use of force by changing the public’s perceptions of the likelihood of the mission’s success or the costs likely to be incurred by the United States in the course of fighting. Although respondents’ general attitudes toward international law and multilateral burden-sharing appear to have a direct effect on their level of support for the use of force, the impact of these considerations appears to be independent of and invariant to the actions taken by the UN Security Council in the hypothetical crisis scenario. Furthermore, the impact of the UN Security Council’s actions does not appear to depend on an
understanding of its voting procedures or prohibitions on the use of force under international law in the United Nations Charter. Although these findings are suggestive rather than conclusive for reasons discussed in later sections of this paper, they nevertheless call into question existing explanations that seek to account for the UN Security Council’s role in shaping public opinion.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, I review the literature on the role of international institutions in transmitting credible information to domestic audiences about the merits of proposed military operations. I argue the theoretical logic undergirding these studies relies on tenuous assumptions about the level of knowledge and familiarity the general public is presupposed to have about the procedural rules of international organizations and the divergent preferences of its members. Second, I draw on insights from the American politics literature to argue that although the actions of international organizations may ultimately influence public opinion toward the use of force, the impact of such actions is conditional on and can be offset by cues from domestic partisan elites, who ultimately exert relatively greater influence in shaping public attitudes toward war. I then test this argument by analyzing the results of the above-mentioned survey experiment by assessing the relative impact of partisan elite cues and the presence or absence of UN Security Council authorization on respondents’ support for the deployment of American ground forces in a hypothetical crisis scenario. In order to evaluate possible mechanisms through which these informational cues affect public opinion, I then evaluate the interaction of these cues with a variety of conditions thought to influence respondents’ receptiveness to positions taken by the UN Security Council and party elites in Congress. I conclude by discussing the implications for my findings and laying the groundwork for future extensions of this research.
Existing Explanations on the Influence of International Organizations on Public Opinion

In his classic treatise on American voter behavior, Anthony Downs (1957) suggested that the general public can best be understood as “rationally ignorant” when it comes to understanding and formulating opinions on complex public policy matters. The benefits that an active citizen may garner when developing well-informed perspectives on any number of political or economic issues, Downs suggests, are frequently outweighed by the costs of accumulating such information. This may be especially true in the context of foreign affairs, where, knowledge remains “abysmally low,” particularly in the United States. “Surveys not only repeatedly reveal that the public has a very thin veneer of factual knowledge,” writes Ole Holsti (2009 [1996], 323), “but also indicate that most Americans are poorly informed about the specifics of conflicts, treaties, negotiations with other nations, characteristics of weapons systems, foreign leaders and the like.” The vast informational asymmetries between the general public, on the one hand, and policymakers and international institutions involved in foreign and military affairs, on the other, makes it costly for members of the general public to independently and systematically evaluate the merits of a proposed policy.

As a result, individuals asked to form an opinion on a contemporary foreign policy matter will seek out informational shortcuts from sources they perceive to be especially credible in shaping their perspective on the subject. Despite his earlier laments, Holsti (2009 [1996], 55) suggests that “even in the absence of some factual knowledge, members of the general public use

4 Anthony Downes (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers). This is not to suggest that the collective opinions or preferences that public expresses are itself “irrational”; indeed, mass opinion on foreign policy matters at an aggregate level appears to be remarkably stable and changes in “rational” ways in response to international or domestic events. See Robert Shapiro and Benjamin Page (1988), “Foreign Policy and the Rational Public,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June): pp. 211-247. Shapiro and Page (1988, 211) note, however, movement of aggregate opinion in response to such events occurs through the framing of these developments by the mass media, policymakers and other elites.


some simple—perhaps even simplistic—cognitive shortcuts to make some sense of an increasingly complex world.”7 These informational cues—which, following John Bullock (2011), I define as “message[s] that people may use to infer other information and, by extension, to make decisions”8—are often processed heuristically, a kind of passive method of relying on simple rules or easily accessible associations that contrasts with a more active, “systematic” search for and scrutiny of relevant information when making social judgments.9

A growing body of work suggests that informational cues from abroad, particularly those conveyed through decisions made by international organizations, can influence public attitudes toward military operations. Several analyses evince a broad and sustained public preference for multilateralism and working cooperatively through international organizations to address foreign policy challenges. According to two different public opinion polls conducted in December 2016, overwhelming majorities of American voters believed the United States should remain actively engaged in NATO (89 percent) and the United Nations (88 percent).10 A smaller but still sizeable majority (61 percent) had a favorable impression of the United Nations overall and ranked it higher in terms of favorability than other multilateral organizations like NATO (56 percent) and domestic actors like Barack Obama (58 percent) and the United States Congress (37 percent).11

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11 McIntuff, Harrington, and Garin (2016), “Better World Campaign,” p.3-5. It should be noted that respondents to this survey were those already identified to be active registered voters and therefore more likely to be better informed than the general public in ways that bias the results in favor of these institutions. However, the high
Sources of UN Security Council Influence: Legitimacy or Strategic Information Transmission

Why do international security organizations enjoy such widespread support among the general public, and what effect do their decisions have in moving public attitudes toward the use of force? A normative-based perspective in international relations and international law scholarship suggests that international organizations possess and accrue legitimacy and symbolic importance that is independent of formal enforcement authority to constrain state behavior but nevertheless compels compliance with its tenets. In contrast to realist and rational-functionalist explanations, which suggest, respectively, that international institutions are “epiphenomenal” to state power or matter only to the extent that they enable cooperation necessary for the realization of states’ rational self-interests, this normative perspective argues that international institutions exert authority through the legitimacy they cultivate among audiences who come to believe normatively that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed. According to Ian Hurd (1999), such legitimacy “is a subjective quality, relational between actor and institution, and defined by the favorability ratings the United Nations enjoys appears to be consistent with the results of multiple opinion surveys conducted across more representative samples, according to a 2012 digest of more than a decades worth of polling data on international organizations conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations. See Council on Foreign Relations (2012), “Public Opinion on Global Issues, Chapter 10: U.S. Opinion on International Institutions,” Program on International Institutions and Global Governance (March), pp. 1-65.

actor’s perception of the institution.”\textsuperscript{15} This perception, in turn, is often shaped by the procedural fairness through which an institution arrives at decisions, the inclusivity of its membership, or its degree of impartiality and autonomy from the influence of any one of its member states.\textsuperscript{16} According to Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (1999), the prestige and legitimacy international organizations accrue over time allows them to “fix meaning” that establishes the boundaries of appropriate action and thereby exert influence that can extend beyond that envisioned by the member states that gave rise to them.\textsuperscript{17} As these principles of appropriate action diffuse through repetition and socialization, states and other actors seeking legitimation in the international sphere will modify their behavior to bring their actions into conformity with these normative practices.\textsuperscript{18}

From this perspective, the capacity of decisions by the UN Security Council to influence public opinion depends upon the extent to which the general public perceives consultation with and authorization by the Council as desirable or even necessary to confer legitimacy on uses of military force. Those who perceive the United Nations Security Council as a legitimate and authoritative arbiter in deciding matters of war and peace will be more likely to view its decisions as especially informative cues in shaping their own opinions on the subject. Similarly, the absence of authorization or the UN Security Council’s outright refusal to endorse a proposed military action should generate higher levels of opposition (or at the very least lower levels of

\textsuperscript{15} Hurd (1999), “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” p. 381.
support) for the use of force in the absence of the legitimating symbolism that authorization from the institution confers.

An alternative perspective suggests that the UN Security Council can convey especially informative information to domestic and foreign audiences not because of the perceived unbiasedness of its actions and decision-making procedures (as the normative arguments outlined above would suggest) but precisely because of the biased nature of the institution and its member states. Because the UN Security Council is predisposed to avoid authorizing the use of force given the stringent requirement for consensus among all five permanent member states, Alexander Thompson (2006; 2009) suggests that its approval can provide reassurance to other international actors about the limits of a belligerent’s intentions and the scope of capabilities that will be brought to bear in using military force. In light of the capacity of major powers like the United States to wage war unilaterally, their reassurances that they intend to limit the purpose and scope of their contemplated military actions are not credible, since other states cannot independently distinguish a priori between justifications for force that are intended to achieve limited objectives and those that are offered as a pretext for aggression. By consulting with and securing the authorization of the UN Security Council for their contemplated military actions, major powers can ameliorate these concerns. Given the divergent preferences of veto-wielding member states, obtaining the approval of the Council’s five permanent powers transmits a especially credible signal to allies and adversaries alike about an actor’s benign intentions and the necessity or desirability of the proposed action.¹⁹ In this way, Erik Voeten (2005) suggests, the UN Security Council operates as a kind of “elite pact” among the superpowers whose

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agreement despite their often conflicting interests transmits especially credible information about the justification for and desirability of a proposed military operations.20

A similar argument has been developed to account for the increase in domestic support for the use of force among the general public accompanying UN Security Council authorization. In their study of presidential “rallies” – sharp but often temporary increases in presidential approval ratings during international disputes – Chapman and Reiter (2004) find that presidents who obtain UN Security Council authorization prior to using force experience substantially higher increase in approval ratings (nearly 9 percentage points) than do presidents whose actions have not been authorized by the Council. Furthermore, the magnitude of this rally effect is larger and more significant than support from regional organizations like NATO or other UN organs, indicating that actions taken by UN Security Council have a uniquely strong impact on American public opinion relative to other international bodies.21

The differential impact various multilateral security organizations have in moving public opinion on the use of force, Chapman (2007; 2009) suggests, is conditional on the general public’s perceptions of the interests of the institution’s member-states and the “height” of the procedural hurdles that must be surmounted in order to garner the institution’s approval. The more reluctant an individual perceives a multilateral organization to be in authorizing the use of force, Chapman suggests, the more likely that approval from that entity will generate broader support among the general public. Because the ideological distance between the United States and other Security Council member states is greater than the distance between the United States

and its NATO allies, for example, the Security Council’s authorization is perceived to be an especially convincing signal about the military action’s merits and translates into higher levels of public approval compared to an affirmative commitment in favor of the same mission from NATO allies.\(^2\)

An inverse logic governs the absence of approval – or outright opposition – expressed by these institutions. When an entity like NATO that is perceived to be more closely aligned with the United States does not take affirmative action in favor a proposal to use force, a failure to secure approval from even one’s closest allies would reveal that such a campaign is ill-advised and thereby generate higher levels of opposition domestically. By contrast, a multilateral institution perceived to be more conservative in granting approval for the use of force is less likely to affect public opinion, since the withholding of its endorsement reveals little information about the merits of the proposed action. Opposition from such organizations, Chapman (2009) suggests, is a “noisy” signal that could merely be interpreted as a reflection of the procedural difficulty of achieving consensus among member states with disparate interests rather than reveal any substantive information about the actual policy.\(^3\)

This logic assumes that ordinary individuals have, at the very least, some general familiarity or prior perception of the procedures and the distributive preferences of pivotal member states across different multilateral organizations. This assumption stands at variance, however, with the notion of a “rationally ignorant” public whose lack of knowledge and comparative informational disadvantage regarding foreign affairs compels them to seek out credible information cues to shape their views in the first place. Chapman (2009, 744-45) acknowledges the stringency of this assumption upfront, but he suggests the burden this

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informational argument places on the public is minimal since it requires only that the public have “some perception of the general foreign policy preferences of an institution, based on its most prominent members.” However, in order for Chapman’s argument on the differential effects that different multilateral institutions have in moving public opinion to hold, it must be the case that the general public who perceives these differences has a relatively sophisticated understanding of the specific membership and voting procedures of multilateral organizations beyond the minimum level of generality that Chapman suggests is sufficient.

Furthermore, if, as Chapman (2009) argues, the UN Security Council’s decisions shape public opinion only when affirmative decisions to authorize the use of force are undertaken (but not when it refuses to authorize such action) then we should expect presidents to consult the UN Security Council on all potential uses of force regardless of the likelihood of securing the Council’s authorization and to face little consequence for failing to obtain such authorization. If the public perceives the UN Security Council as biased against the use of force or the singular interests of the United States more generally, as the strategic information transmission logic suggests, then failure to obtain its authorization should have little impact in shifting their level of support for the president’s proposed military action. A president, then, faces few political risks, and only the prospect of political dividends, from seeking the approval of the UN Security Council, regardless of whether it offers or withholds such authorization. This logic stands at variance with the fact that leaders do not seek UN Security Council authorization when they do not expect to obtain it and a wealth of opinion data suggesting that “Americans not only think

that the United Nations provides greater legitimacy for military actions, but also that, in some instances, UN approval is essential.”

*Domestic Politics and Partisan Elite Cues in Shaping Opinion on the Use of Force*

Perhaps more significantly, existing work examining the impact of UN Security Council authorization on public opinion remains insufficiently attentive to the effects of domestic cues from partisan elites in shaping public attitudes toward the use of force. A robust literature in American politics suggests that partisanship influences public perceptions of and attitudes toward political events and proposed policies. In the realm of foreign policy, John Zaller (1992) finds that the opinions of ordinary individuals are shaped largely by their exposure to elite discourse and that relatively more informed voters will be more responsive to the arguments made by those who share their political predispositions when forming their own opinions on the matter. When elites are united in support of a foreign policy, Zaller (1994, 186) suggests, politically aware Americans will support that policy; however, when “elites divide along partisan or ideological lines, politically attentive citizens are more likely than the inattentive to align their opinions with segment of the elite which shares their party or ideology.”

In his study of public opinion and war, Adam Berinsky (2007; 2009) extends Zaller’s analysis to suggest that all citizens – regardless of their level of political awareness – will form


their opinions with reference to the positions taken by elite co-partisans, irrespective of the particular content of the messages these elites use to justify their positions. Citing a number of studies showing poorly informed citizens follow the cues of politicians who share their political views, Berinsky (2009, 69) argues that “citizens use the position of a prominent elite as a reference point and decide whether to support or oppose a policy based on that position, even in the absence of explicitly contradictory messages.” He validates this argument by analyzing public opinion during the 2003 Iraq War, where both Democrats and Republicans could use President George W. Bush’s strong advocacy for the war as a reference point for forming their own opinions on the matter even in the absence of clear opposition from Democratic leaders in Congress.

The relative degree to which these partisan cues are sufficiently informative to shape mass opinion can depend in part on the public’s prior perceptions of the positions they expect partisan elites to take on the matter. William Baker and John Oneal (2001) argue that because members of the president’s opposition party have known electoral incentives to oppose his policies, their backing of the president’s proposal to use force can send an especially credible signal about the merits and likelihood of success for that policy. Similarly, Baum and Goeling (2008; 2010) find that criticism from members of the president’s own political party can be

30 Berinsky (2007), “Assuming the Costs of War,” p. 984. These findings are broadly consistent with studies showing how patterns of elite discourse can influence the size of rallies that presidents enjoy at the onset of hostilities. In contrast to John Mueller’s (1973) original argument that surges of patriotism accompanying the first deployment of troops abroad manifest themselves in higher levels of presidential approval ratings, Brody (1991) suggests that the size and scope of a presidential rally depends in large part on how political elites from both parties frame their positions on the president’s proposed policies. See John Mueller (1973), War, Presidents and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley & Sons), and Brody (1991), Assessing the President.
especially damaging to support for his contemplated use of force. Because of the novelty of expressions of support from the opposition party and dissent from within the president’s own party, the news media is more likely to privilege these “against-type” cues in their reporting.

Under some conditions, the presence and availability of policy-relevant information can attenuate the effect that party cues have on shaping public opinion. In a series of survey experiments, John Bullock (2011) and Cheryl Boudreau and Scott MacKenzie (2014) find that when individuals are supplied with both information about a policy’s likely consequences and the positions of partisan elites, their attitudes will be shaped at least as much by the policy information they receive as by partisan politics, particularly when this information compels them to depart from their preferred party’s position. It remains unclear, however, if these effects hold when such information is not so readily accessible. Furthermore, James Druckman, Erik Peterson and Rune Slothuus (2013) find that increased levels of elite polarization toward certain domestic policies can compel individuals revert back to partisan cues in shaping their opinions on these matters. High degrees of polarization, they write, “intensifies the impact of party endorsements on opinions, decreases the impact of substantive information, and, perhaps ironically, stimulates greater confidence in those – less substantively grounded – opinions.” These findings appear to apply equally well to the foreign policy arena, where Alexandra Guisinger and Elizabeth Saunders (2017) find through a series of survey experiments that individuals appear more responsive to partisan cues over highly polarized issue areas like cap-and-trade environmental

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programs and Iran’s nuclear program relative to other, less polarized matters such as Chinese currency manipulation and the World Trade Organization.  

**UN Security Council Actions or Domestic Partisan Cues: Which Prove More Salient?**

Despite persistent evidence that partisan cues shape public opinion on domestic and foreign policy matters, few studies that investigate the impact of UN Security Council authorization on public attitudes toward the use of force sufficiently account for the possibility that partisan cues can compete with and offset the effect its authorization has in generating higher levels of support for a proposed military action. Although Chapman and Reiter (2004) control for the level of bipartisan support the president enjoys when evaluating the impact of UN Security Council authorization on the size of presidential rallies, they overlook the possibility that the Council’s effect in boosting the president’s approval ratings is conditional on the level of elite consensus they observe among both political parties.  

Although these findings are suggestive, they cannot definitively establish a link between these cues absent further testing. Researchers have increasingly turned to the use of experimental methods to overcome the drawbacks of observational studies in establishing and clarifying causal relationships between variables of interest to international relations scholars. A number of recent experiments have separately investigated the impact of UN Security Council authorization (Grieco, Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver 2011; Chapman 2011; Tingley and Tomz 2012) and the

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37 A replication of their observational study to account for this conditionality conducted by the author does in fact suggest that the impact of UN Security Council authorization on the size of presidential rallies can be offset by bipartisan opposition to the president’s proposed military action. Replication results on file with author.  
influence of domestic partisan cues (Berinsky 2009; Trager and Vavreck 2011; Levendusky and Horowitz 2012; Guisinger and Saunders 2017; Saunders 2016) on public attitudes toward the use of force, but few have assessed the relative effects of each informational cue simultaneously or systematically.  

Although experimental studies by Chapman (2011) and Tingley and Tomz (2012) find that UN Security Council decisions do indeed shape respondents’ support for the use of force, the external validity of their findings are limited by the relatively substantial pre-treatment priming that methodically exposed subjects to the institutional rules and membership in ways that individuals would be unlikely to encounter outside of experimental settings. Tingley and Tomz (2012) provide their respondents with a summary of the history, membership and voting procedures of the UN Security Council and then verify their understanding of this material before being treated. Although this design allows them to test competing hypotheses about why UN Security Council’s decision might move public opinion, the pre-treatment priming of their subjects calls into question the substantively large and statistically significant increase in support that they find accompanies UN Security Council authorization. Chapman (2011) maintains that

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40 Tingley and Tomz (2012), “How Does the UN Security Council Influence Public Opinion?” p. 12-14. In terms of reasons why UN Security Council action might move public opinion, Tomz and Tingley find little evidence to support the claims that the UN Security Council galvanizes support by revealing information about the merits of the
when primed to perceive the UN Security Council as biased against authorizing the use of force, respondents were more willing to support the use of force when told it had been authorized by the Council than were respondents primed to believe the Council was predisposed to endorse such a mission. The external validity of these findings are limited, however, not only by the pretreatment priming effects just mentioned but also by the fact that Chapman’s convenience sample of undergraduate students is not sufficiently representative of the broader population.

In contrast to Chapman (2011) and Tingley and Tomz (2012), Grieco et al. (2011) make no effort to prime their respondents with information about the UN Security Council before assessing the effects of multilateral authorization on support for the deployment of American forces in response to a hypothetical conflict in East Timor. Drawing inferences from their results is hampered, however, by the simultaneous administration of theoretically independent treatment conditions in their experimental design. Their 2x2 factorial design randomly assigns respondents into one of four treatment groups that vary across two dimensions: 1) whether members of Congress in both parties are united in support or opposition of the president’s proposed use of force; and 2) whether “the UN Security Council and NATO allies” both support or both oppose the engagement. Although Grieco et al. (2011) find that authorization by these multilateral institutions does indeed generate higher levels of support for the use of force, in all treatment groups the decisions of both the UN Security Council and NATO allies coincided; either both supported the military campaign, or both opposed it. This hampers any effort to disaggregate whether levels of support were higher because of an endorsement from the UN Security Council,

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NATO, or both simultaneously, despite the fact that Chapman (2009) expects each of these institutions to have differential effects on support for war.

A similar problem manifests itself in the manner with which Grieco et al. (2011) administer their elite consensus treatment. Although the co-authors find that bipartisan support in Congress increases support by roughly the same magnitude as multilateral authorization by the UN Security Council and NATO, in all treatment groups the positions of both parties coincided: either Democrats and Republicans in Congress both supported the operation, or Democrats and Republicans in Congress both opposed the operation. The framing of this treatment manipulation prevents the co-authors from disaggregating the effects of cues from either party individually and the heterogeneous treatment effects that these partisan cues might have on individuals who identify with different political parties.

Guardino and Hayes (2017) design a survey experiment that accounts for both of these limitations, but in so doing they introduce the possibility of potentially confounding factors that can bias their results. The co-authors present their respondents with a short vignette about Iran’s nuclear program and inform them that President Obama is considering launching air strikes against suspected weapons facilities. Subjects are then randomized into four treatment groups where they are told whether 1) House Speaker John Boehner supports or opposes the strikes; and 2) whether “members of the United Nations Security Council” support or oppose the strikes.44

Any experiment that too closely resembles well-known external circumstances introduces the possibility of bias and confounding factors into the analysis, thereby forfeiting some of the advantages of an experimental setting to demonstrate causality through predictable manipulation. Although survey experiment was administered in the fall of 2012, years before Iran signed an

agreement with a multinational coalition of states to freeze its nuclear program, the issue had long been a high profile foreign policy issue.\textsuperscript{45} It is likely that at least some respondents had already formed strong opinions on the matter. Although the premise that President Obama would consider air strikes is certainly possible at that time, the scenario would be at variance with what any informed respondent would understand about President Obama’s likely position on such a matter. More implausible is the scenario given to a quarter of respondents suggesting that President Obama would support, but Speaker Boehner would oppose, air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Finally, although the identities of these individuals were provided to serve as proxies for the positions of their political parties, it is not clear whether subjects responded to the party positions these figures were meant to represent or if respondents were influenced by their own prior attitudes toward the specific individuals or institutions in question.\textsuperscript{46}

**Expectations and Hypotheses**

In order to evaluate the relative impact of UN Security Council authorization and partisan cues from domestic elites on public attitudes toward the use of force, I conducted an original survey experiment involving 1,212 adult respondents located in the United States about their willingness to support the use of force in response to a hypothetical crisis scenario in South Asia. Consistent with previous observational and experimental studies, I expect to find that a decision by the UN Security Council to authorize the use of force would generate higher levels of public

\textsuperscript{45} In a national Gallup poll taken in November 2012 at the time that Guardino and Hayes (2017) fielded their survey experiment, nearly 8 in 10 of respondents (79 percent) indicated that it was “extremely” or “very important” for President Obama to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon during his second term. See Lydia Saad (2012), “Economy, Entitlements, Iran Are Americans’ Top Priorities,” Gallup Politics (15 November).

\textsuperscript{46} At the time Guardino and Hayes’ survey experiment was fielded just after the 2012 presidential election, President Obama enjoyed a 52 percent approval rating, whereas Speaker Boehner enjoyed only 36 percent favorability rating. Only 18 percent of respondents approved of Congress’ overall performance. See Lydia Saad (2012), “Congress Approval Rating at 18%, Stuck in Long-Term Low Streak,” Gallup Politics (26 November).
support than would conditions when authorization is withheld. This leads me to my first hypothesis:

H1: Support for the use of force will be higher when the UN Security Council authorizes military action than when it refuses to authorize such action.

I also expect to find that subjects remain at least as responsive to partisan cues from domestic elites in shaping their attitudes toward the use of force. As previously mentioned, Grieco et al. (2011) found that informing subjects that the president enjoyed bipartisan support in Congress increased support by roughly the same magnitude as multilateral authorization by the UN Security Council and NATO. Whereas their argument was largely agnostic about the impact of their Congressional cue on support for the use of force, I maintain that respondents’ support for force will be at least as responsive to changes in domestic partisan cues as they are to changes in the verdict of UN Security Council in light of the substantial impact these partisan cues are expected to have on complex domestic and foreign policy matters. Furthermore, I expect to find that a bipartisan consensus in support or opposition to the president’s plan will generate effect sizes that are larger in magnitude than those transmitted by a UN Security Council decision to withhold or provide authorization. These expectations are summarized by the following hypotheses:

H2: Support for the use of force will increase when leaders from at least one political party in Congress express support for the president’s plan to use force.

H2a: Support for the use of force will be higher when leaders from both parties in Congress are united in their support for the president’s plan to use force than when leaders are divided on the matter or united in their opposition to the use of force.

H3: Support for the use of force will be highest when leaders from both parties in Congress are united in their support for the president’s plan to use force and when the UN Security Council has authorized such action.

H4: When party leaders in Congress are unified in their opposition to the president’s plan to use force, the magnitude of the decline in support accompanied by this domestic-level cue will offset any increase in support that might result from the concomitant authorization of the president’s plan by the UN Security Council.

I also expect that subjects’ partisan identification will differentially impact their responsiveness to various informational cues in shaping their attitudes toward the use of force. I expect Democrats and those independents who lean toward the Democratic Party to express lower levels of support for the use of force than Republicans and those independents who lean toward the Republican Party (H5). I also expect Republicans and Republican identifiers to be more likely to support the use of force when informed that Republicans in Congress support the president’s plan (H6). Similarly, I expect Democrats and Democratic identifiers to be more likely to support the use of force when informed that Democrats in Congress support the president’s plan (H7). Finally, given traditionally higher levels of support Democrats ascribe to multilateral action through the United Nations, I expect that UN Security Council authorization will generate greater support among Democrats for the use of force than similarly situated Republicans (H8).

In addition to analyzing changes in public support across the different treatment conditions described above, I also plan to evaluate why UN Security Council authorization has the impact I expect it to have in generating higher levels of support for the use of force. In order to test the assumptions underlying Chapman’s (2009; 2011) strategic information transmission argument, I assess subjects’ general knowledge of the UN Security Council’s voting procedures to determine whether their understanding of the consensus requirement of the Council’s five veto-wielding members influences their perception of the UN Security Council cue. If Chapman is correct, we should expect those with higher levels of understanding of UN Security Council procedures to be more responsive to the cues provided by the UN Security Council’s decision to authorize or not authorize the use of force. I then evaluate this hypothesis against alternative
arguments that locate the UN Security Council’s influence in perceptions of its normative legitimacy by asking respondents about their general attitudes toward multilateralism, international law, and the necessity of obtaining Security Council approval before using force.

**Methodology and Experimental Research Design**

Randomized experimentation offers several advantages for assessing the hypotheses outlined above. The principle of random assignment helps reduce the impact of unobserved confounders that affect differences between groups that receive a treatment and those that do not. This randomization procedure in turn helps ensure that the effect of the treatment under study is isolated in ways that can facilitate causal inference. The administration of treatments through survey vignettes in particular makes it possible to manipulate multiple independent experimental factors simultaneously, which allows me to test the impact of the granting or withholding of UN Security Council authorization on support for the use of force relative to various domestic cues supplied by partisan elites in a controlled setting.

This approach, however, is not without its drawbacks. Concerns about external validity outside of a tightly controlled experimental setting can limit the generalizability of a study’s findings. Vignette treatments have the advantage of mitigating some of these concerns by being less obtrusive in studying the effects of treatments on subjects than more direct survey methods and sufficiently complex enough that they can more closely approximate real-world conditions over more traditional laboratory settings. At the same time, increasing the complexity of a vignette design can reduce the respondents’ ability to focus on any one treatment condition and thereby reduce the likelihood that they “receive” such treatments. I attempt to address this

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50 Mutz (2011), *Population-Based Survey Experiments*, p. 64.
concern by including a verification check at the end of my survey to ensure that respondents read and properly internalized information embedded in the vignette, though the formulation of the question did not directly test for successful administration of the treatment manipulations.\textsuperscript{51}

A second potential source of concern stems from the fact that my sample of respondents may not be sufficiently representative of the broader population being studied. The survey experiment was fielded in December 2016 to 1,212 adults in the United States who were recruited Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, an online marketplace of workers who consent to complete tasks for modest payments. Social scientists have increasingly turned to Mechanical Turk as a quick and relatively inexpensive mechanism for generating data. In their evaluation of this online marketplace, Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz (2012) find that Mechanical Turk respondents tend to be less representative of the general population compared with nationally representative samples recruited through traditional survey methods, but comparatively more representative than other standard samples of convenience, such as undergraduate students.\textsuperscript{52} Given that this is an initial probe of my theory, the lack of representativeness of my sample is less of a concern than the need for balanced demographic characteristics across treatment groups.

\textit{Experimental Design}

After consenting to participate in the survey, respondents were instructed to read a short vignette about the president’s plan to deploy American ground forces in a hypothetical military confrontation between India and Pakistan in the contested Kashmir region. Study participants

\textsuperscript{51} Over 90 percent of respondents correctly answered this verification question, which increases my confidence that respondents read and properly understood the vignette and embedded treatment conditions.

were then randomly assigned to one of six treatment groups that manipulated two informational cues that the subjects would receive simultaneously: 1) the degree to which Democratic and Republican leaders in Congress support or oppose the president’s plan to deploy American ground forces; and 2) whether or not the UN Security Council authorizes such action. Within this first cue, subjects were told one of the following three pieces of information: a) “both Democratic and Republican leaders in Congress support the president’s plan” (*bipartisan support* condition); b) “Republican leaders in Congress support the president’s plan, but Democratic leaders in Congress oppose the president’s plan” (*partisan split* condition); or c) “both Democratic and Republican leaders in Congress oppose the president’s plan” (*bipartisan opposition* condition). These two factors combined to form 3x2 factorial design with a total of six different treatment groups (Figure 1). Respondents were then asked to indicate whether they supported or opposed the president’s plan to use ground forces by choosing one option from a 5-
point ordinal scale ranging from “Strongly Oppose” to “Strongly Support.”

The vignette scenario was designed to provide a “hard test” of my theory. By asking respondents to consider the deployment of American troops to the contested Kashmir region to stabilize a military confrontation between India and Pakistan, I sought to select a mission that would be sufficiently low profile to minimize the possibility that subjects would respond to the scenario with well-entrenched prior positions on the subject yet still resemble a hypothetical scenario into which the United States would plausibly intervene. By providing respondents with background information on the longstanding territorial dispute over Kashmir and the fact that both countries possessed nuclear weapons, I increased the possibility that subjects would respond to the particular issues at stake in the dispute rather than any cues that might come from partisan elites (Bullock 2011; Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014). Finding that respondents remained responsive to the partisan cue treatments embedded in the survey in spite of this additional policy-relevant information would therefore offer especially compelling evidence on the salience of such cues in shaping attitudes toward a hypothetical intervention.

In order to isolate the effect of a purely partisan cue treatment on respondents, I sought to unobtrusively signal the distribution of elite support among partisan leaders in Congress without providing a concomitant justification for their positions. Departing from Grieco et al. (2011), I also opted to concentrate these cues within a single domestic institution (Congress) rather than spread their variation across two institutions (Congress and the executive) by assigning a partisan

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53 In answering this question, respondents were asked to choose one option along a five-point ordinal scale: 1-“Strongly Oppose”; 2-“Oppose”; 3-“Neither Oppose nor Support”; 4-“Support”; 5-“Strongly Support.” To minimize bias that might emerge as an artifact of the survey design, answer choices were ordered from “Strongly Support” to “Strongly Oppose” when respondents were told the UN Security Council had authorized the president’s plan, and from “Strongly Oppose” to “Strongly Support” when respondents were told the UN Security Council had refused to authorize the president’s plan. This differential ordering biases respondents to react to the UN Security Council cue, thus providing a harder test of my theory on the ultimately more consequential effects of domestic partisan cues.
identity to the president. Doing so allowed me to minimize differential responses to these cues that might be traced to the variation in institutional authority between Congress and the president in foreign policy matters.\textsuperscript{54}

I also opted to streamline the “partisan split” condition such that all respondents receiving this treatment were told that Republican leaders supported, but Democrats opposed, the use of force. Although this choice greatly simplified the analysis, it excluded an evaluation of the impact of the reverse partisan split: having Democratic leaders supporting the president’s plan to use force in the face of Republican opposition. This potentially limits the scope of my findings given that a “Democratic support” cue is provided only when Republicans are also supportive of the president’s plan, making it difficult to determine if respondents were reacting to a signal of Democratic support or the bipartisan consensus in favor of the president’s policies. Since Republicans are on balance more likely to favor the use of military force, I opted to define the partisan split in a manner that would appear more realistic to respondents and make them less likely to object to the implausibility of the treatment itself. I leave an examination of this alternative configuration of this treatment condition to future work.

In delivering the UN Security Council cue, I departed from previous experimental studies by excluding other multilateral organizations from the analysis and by substantially limiting the amount of information supplied about the Security Council to avoid priming respondents and thereby biasing my results. All respondents were randomly assigned to receive one of the following two manipulations differentiated only by the text highlighted in bold:

\textsuperscript{54} It is also possible, however, that leaving the president’s identity and partisan affiliation ambiguous may have introduced uncertainty in the way respondents interpreted the vignette. Given that the survey was fielded in December 2016, it is possible that some respondents would have envisioned the president to be Barack Obama and others to imagine that the hypothetical scenario would arise under Donald Trump, who was imminently about to assume office. This uncertainty was not sufficiently accounted for in the original survey design and will need to be addressed in future iterations of this research.
Members of the United Nations Security Council are debating a resolution that would authorize UN member states to use “all necessary means” to restore international peace and security in the area. After considerable debate, the UN Security Council [adopts/does not adopt] the resolution, effectively [authorizing/refusing to authorize] the president’s plan to deploy American ground troops to the Kashmir region.

Beyond linking the UN Security Council’s action with the president’s proposed use of force in the last clause of the sentence, this specification avoids unduly influencing respondents’ interpretation of this cue in ways that allow for subsequent, less obtrusive testing of reasons why multilateral authorization (or lack thereof) might have the impact it does on public attitudes toward the use of force.

Just as the partisan cue treatment conditions do not assess the full range of possible configurations for partisan elite support in Congress, the UN Security Council treatment condition excludes consideration of a more neutral, “non-consultation” cue whereby the Council would abstain from formally voting on a resolution in anticipation of its defeat. Such an outcome more closely conforms to the behavior of member states who, anticipating the defeat of a resolution, will withdraw it from consideration rather than risk a formal vote striking it down.55 Although the inclusion of such a cue would have perhaps enhanced the generalizability of this study outside of its experimental setting, it would have also likely increased the complexity of the survey so greatly as to render this cue unintelligible for a lay audience. Furthermore, the wording was carefully chosen to mimic such an occurrence as closely as possible (“not adopt” the resolution as opposed to “vote down”) without risking a failure to treat subjects with this manipulation.

55 This was what transpired in February 2003 when the United States and the United Kingdom abandoned an effort to secure a follow-up resolution to Resolution 1441 that would have formally authorized the use of force in the 2003 Iraq War. See Thompson (2009), Channels of Power, Ch. 6.
Subjects were then asked a free response question to explain in a sentence or two why they supported or opposed the president’s proposal to use military force. They then turned to a series of 18 post-treatment questions designed to capture demographic data and their general attitudes toward different institutions involved in foreign policymaking. Some of these questions were designed to control for different covariates that are expected to influence the impact that the effects of the main cues of interest have in shaping public attitudes toward force, such as respondents’ partisan identification and their expectations for the mission’s success. Others were crafted to test different mechanisms and hypotheses that seek to account for why these cues have the effect they do in moving public opinion, such as respondents’ attitudes toward multilateralism, international law, and the necessity of working through the United Nations when faced with a security threat. The order of these questions was randomized across respondents in order to avoid bias that might result from the structure and administration of the survey itself.

The fact that these questions were asked of respondents post-treatment significantly limits conclusions that can be extrapolated from this data. It is possible, for example, that exposure to a particular UN Security Council treatment influenced subjects’ responses to a subsequent question asking whether the United States should always seek UN Security Council authorization before deploying military forces. Ideally these kinds of general questions are administered a separate, pre-treatment survey on a different but similarly representative sample, but resource constraints prevented me from being able to conduct a separate survey administration. Another way to avoid potential post-treatment bias would have been to ask these questions prior to the administration of the vignette and treatment conditions, but it seemed even more likely that asking respondents about their general views on the UN Security Council, Congress, and the Republican Party would have significantly biased these subjects toward
Table 1: Support for Deployment of Ground Forces in Kashmir Conditional on Elite Cues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UN Security Council Does Not Authorize</th>
<th>UN Security Council Authorizes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bipartisan Opposition ((d_{00}))</td>
<td>Partisan Split ((d_{01}))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strongly Oppose</strong></td>
<td>64 (31%)</td>
<td>46 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oppose</strong></td>
<td>94 (46%)</td>
<td>93 (46%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neither Sup./Opp.</strong></td>
<td>22 (11%)</td>
<td>28 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support</strong></td>
<td>19 (9%)</td>
<td>33 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strongly Support</strong></td>
<td>6 (3%)</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ((N))</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rounded to the nearest percent responding to the cues embedded in the survey. Although asking these questions afterward helped avoid this concern, any findings drawn from an analysis of these questions is necessarily suggestive rather than definitive absent further testing.

**Experimental Results**

An initial descriptive analysis of the experimental results is displayed in Table 1. It is worth noting that a majority of respondents across all treatment groups remain opposed to the deployment of American ground forces regardless of the treatment cues they received. The share of respondents who remained opposed or strongly opposed to the use of force ranged from 50 percent to 77 percent. The share of respondents who supported or strongly supported the use of force remained as low as 12 percent and never reached above 30 percent across any of the treatment groups.

Consistent with H1, the results presented in Table 1 demonstrate that UN Security Council authorization increase respondents’ support for the use of force regardless of the domestic cues supplied by partisan elites in Congress. Specifically, the share of respondents who supported the use of force increased by as much as 7 percentage points when respondents were
told that the UN Security Council authorized the president’s plan holding all other factors constant. Consistent with H3, support for the use of force is highest when leaders from both parties in Congress support the president’s plan and the Security Council authorizes that action.

The domestic partisan cues from elites in Congress also appear to have had their expected impact. Consistent with H2, the share of respondents who support or strongly support the use of force increases by roughly 5 percentage points when told that Republicans in Congress support, but Democrats oppose, the president’s plan to deploy American ground forces. Consistent with H2a, the share of respondents who support the use of force increases by roughly another 6 percentage points over the partisan split condition when told that Democrats and Republicans in Congress are united in support of the president’s action.

The statistical significance of these results is verified by the differences-in-means analysis presented in Table 2. This analysis treats as a baseline the average level of support expressed by those randomized into the treatment group in which both parties oppose and the

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**Table 2: Difference in Means Analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partisan Elites in Congress Cue</th>
<th>United Nations Security Council Cue</th>
<th>Not Authorize</th>
<th>Authorize</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republican Leaders Oppose,</strong>&lt;br&gt;Democratic Leaders Oppose&lt;br&gt;<strong>(Bipartisan Opposition)</strong></td>
<td>-- <em>(Baseline)</em></td>
<td>$\mu_{00} = 2.0683$&lt;br&gt;(0.0717)</td>
<td>$\mu_{10} = 2.3317$&lt;br&gt;(0.1036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republican Leaders Support,</strong>&lt;br&gt;Democratic Leaders Oppose&lt;br&gt;<strong>(Partisan Split)</strong></td>
<td>+ 0.1990*</td>
<td>$\mu_{01} = 2.2673$&lt;br&gt;(0.1015)</td>
<td>+ 0.3921**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republican Leaders Support,</strong>&lt;br&gt;Democratic Leaders Support&lt;br&gt;<strong>(Bipartisan Support)</strong></td>
<td>+0.3674**</td>
<td>$\mu_{02} = 2.4356$&lt;br&gt;(0.1065)</td>
<td>+0.6151**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p* $< 0.05$; **p** $< 0.01$. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests indicate differences among treatment groups are statistically significant and different from zero.
UN Security Council does not authorize the use of force ($\mu_{00}$). The values captured in each of the five remaining cells reports the average treatment effect as a measure of the change in support for the use of force from the baseline condition. Following Allan Gerber and Donald Green (2012), I estimate the average treatment effect for each experimental condition using a simple ordinary least squares regression model of potential outcomes (that is, level of support for the use of force) on each of the five non-baseline treatment groups. As a first cut, it is worth noting that the average treatment effects are statistically significant and that the mean levels of support increase monotonically across treatment groups in ways that are consistent with expectations. As expected, the largest single increase in average levels of support from the baseline condition occurs when Democrats and Republicans are united in support of the president’s plan to use force and the UN Security Council authorizes such action ($\mu_{00}$ to $\mu_{12}$).

Consistent with H4, a comparison of the magnitudes of the average treatment effects of the bipartisan consensus condition ($\mu_{02}$) with that of the UN Security Council authorization condition ($\mu_{10}$) relative to the baseline seems to suggest that the impact of UN Security Council authorization in generating support for the use of force can indeed be offset changes in the balance of partisan elite discourse. The three panels in Table 3 present an initial comparison of the relative impact that the UN Security Council cue, on one hand, and the domestic partisan elite cue, on the other, have in moving public opinion on the use of force. Whereas the share of respondents who supported the use of force increased by as much as 5.63 percentage points when told that the UN Security Council had authorized this action (Table 3C), an almost equivalent increase (5.13 percentage points) occurred in the share of respondents who supported the use of force when told that Republicans in Congress supported the use of force (Table 3B).

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Table 3: Changes in Proportion of Respondents Supporting and Opposing Use of Force

A. Effect Size of Shifting Domestic Partisan Cue from Bipartisan Opposition ($d_{00}$) to Bipartisan Approval ($d_{02}$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Reaction to Bipartisan Opposition Cue (%)</th>
<th>Public Reaction to Bipartisan Support Cue (%)</th>
<th>Differences in Opinion (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.20 (7.68 to 16.71)</td>
<td>23.26 (17.39 to 29.14)</td>
<td>+ 11.07 (3.72 to 18.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neither Support/Oppose</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.73 (6.46 to 15.00)</td>
<td>14.85 (9.91 to 19.79)</td>
<td>+4.12 (-2.36 to 10.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oppose</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77.07 (71.27 to 82.88)</td>
<td>61.88 (55.13 to 68.63)</td>
<td>-15.19 (-24.02 to -6.36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Effect Size of Shifting Domestic Partisan Cue from Bipartisan Opposition ($d_{00}$) to Partisan Split ($d_{01}$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Reaction to Bipartisan Opposition Cue (%)</th>
<th>Public Reaction to Partisan Split Cue (%)</th>
<th>Differences in Opinion (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.20 (7.68 to 16.71)</td>
<td>17.32 (12.06 to 22.95)</td>
<td>+5.13 (-1.75 to 12.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neither Support/Oppose</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.73 (6.46 to 15.00)</td>
<td>13.86 (9.06 to 18.67)</td>
<td>+3.13 (-3.25 to 9.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oppose</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77.07 (71.27 to 82.88)</td>
<td>68.81 (62.37 to 75.26)</td>
<td>-8.26 (-16.86 to 0.34)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Effect Size of Shifting UN Security Council Cue from No Authorization ($d_{00}$) to Authorization ($d_{10}$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Reaction to UN Not Authorize Cue (%)</th>
<th>Public Reaction to UN Authorize Cue (%)</th>
<th>Differences in Opinion (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.20 (7.68 to 16.71)</td>
<td>17.82 (12.50 to 23.14)</td>
<td>+5.63 (-1.30 to 12.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neither Support/Oppose</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.73 (6.46 to 15.00)</td>
<td>14.36 (9.48 to 19.23)</td>
<td>+3.62 (-2.80 to 10.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oppose</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77.07 (71.27 to 82.88)</td>
<td>67.82 (61.32 to 74.31)</td>
<td>-9.25 (-17.89 to -0.61)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More significantly, the share of respondents who supported the use of force increased by 11.07 percentage points when told that both Democrats and Republicans in Congress supported the president’s plan (Table 3A), almost double the 5.63 percentage point increase in support
accompanying UN Security Council authorization (Table 3C). This finding appears to suggest that respondents were just as responsive (if not slightly more so) to domestic partisan cues as they were to those supplied by the UN Security Council and that the impact of multilateral authorization can indeed be offset by shifts toward bipartisan consensus in support or opposition to the president’s use of force.

_Treatment-Covariate Analysis_

The relative sizes of these different treatment effects do not reveal the mechanism that explains why these cues have the impact they do in moving public opinion on the use of force. To explore these mechanisms and control for possible covariates that might account for the effect sizes observed above, I conduct a multivariate ordered logistic regression analysis of the support respondents expressed for a hypothetical deployment of American ground troops in the Kashmir region. To account for the effect of UN Security Council authorization on respondents’ support for the use of force, I construct a dummy variable (“UN Security Council cue”) that is assigned a value of 1 when respondents were told that the Council authorized the use of force and 0 otherwise. To measure the effect of domestic partisan cues on support for the use of force, I construct a three-level ordinal variable (“Domestic partisan elite cue”) that assigns a score of 0 if respondents are told that both Democrats and Republicans in Congress oppose the use of force (bipartisan opposition condition); a score of 1 if respondents are told Republicans support but Democrats oppose the use of force (partisan split condition); and a score of 2 if respondents are told both Democrats and Republicans support the use of force (bipartisan support condition).  

57 I assume here that there is an ordinal linear relationship that is monotonically increasing across each of the three specifications of the partisan elite cue treatment condition. That is, I assume that the value of bipartisan support is higher than either of the other two specifications (partisan split or bipartisan opposition). This assumption is broadly consistent with the monotonically increasing average treatment effects along this treatment condition observed in Table 2.
## Table 4: UN Security Council Action, Domestic Partisan Elite Cues, and Support for the Use of Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Security Council cue</td>
<td>0.4402***</td>
<td>0.4347*</td>
<td>0.5340**</td>
<td>0.5402**</td>
<td>0.0766</td>
<td>0.4234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.1620)</td>
<td>(0.1699)</td>
<td>(0.1691)</td>
<td>(0.1688)</td>
<td>(0.1792)</td>
<td>(0.4660)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic partisan elite cue</td>
<td>0.3399***</td>
<td>0.2668**</td>
<td>0.2816**</td>
<td>0.1761*</td>
<td>0.1792*</td>
<td>0.1835^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0929)</td>
<td>(0.0972)</td>
<td>(0.0976)</td>
<td>(0.1056)</td>
<td>(0.1060)</td>
<td>(0.1061)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Security Council cue x domestic partisan elite cue</td>
<td>-0.0443</td>
<td>-0.0028</td>
<td>-0.0432</td>
<td>-0.0532</td>
<td>-0.0553</td>
<td>-0.0685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.1290)</td>
<td>(0.1332)</td>
<td>(0.1339)</td>
<td>(0.1340)</td>
<td>(0.1342)</td>
<td>(0.1349)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification (Republican)</td>
<td>0.2336*</td>
<td>0.0389</td>
<td>-0.2456</td>
<td>-0.5591**</td>
<td>-0.5606**</td>
<td>-0.5659**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.1158)</td>
<td>(0.1179)</td>
<td>(0.1491)</td>
<td>(0.2031)</td>
<td>(0.2033)</td>
<td>(0.2234)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan elite cue x party identification (Republican)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.3092*</td>
<td>0.3044*</td>
<td>0.3015*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Male)</td>
<td>-0.3720**</td>
<td>-0.4269**</td>
<td>-0.4744**</td>
<td>-0.4851**</td>
<td>-0.4931**</td>
<td>-0.4873**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.1078)</td>
<td>(0.1151)</td>
<td>(0.1148)</td>
<td>(0.1151)</td>
<td>(0.1155)</td>
<td>(0.1160)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.0220**</td>
<td>-0.1177*</td>
<td>-0.1174*</td>
<td>-0.1155*</td>
<td>-0.1148*</td>
<td>-0.1131*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0460)</td>
<td>(0.0407)</td>
<td>(0.0477)</td>
<td>(0.0476)</td>
<td>(0.0478)</td>
<td>(0.0479)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.0028</td>
<td>0.0088</td>
<td>0.0211</td>
<td>0.0251</td>
<td>0.0247</td>
<td>0.0237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0476)</td>
<td>(0.0491)</td>
<td>(0.0485)</td>
<td>(0.0486)</td>
<td>(0.0487)</td>
<td>(0.0488)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military/veteran status</td>
<td>0.0290</td>
<td>0.0216</td>
<td>-0.1135</td>
<td>-0.0993</td>
<td>-0.0920</td>
<td>-0.0732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.2755)</td>
<td>(0.2743)</td>
<td>(0.2756)</td>
<td>(0.2738)</td>
<td>(0.2733)</td>
<td>(0.2750)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in 2016 election</td>
<td>0.2058</td>
<td>0.1045</td>
<td>0.1869</td>
<td>0.1756</td>
<td>0.1767</td>
<td>0.1697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.1379)</td>
<td>(0.1467)</td>
<td>(0.1497)</td>
<td>(0.1493)</td>
<td>(0.1498)</td>
<td>(0.1503)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected casualties</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.0249</td>
<td>-0.0137</td>
<td>-0.0220</td>
<td>-0.0257</td>
<td>-0.0256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0609)</td>
<td>(0.0623)</td>
<td>(0.0625)</td>
<td>(0.0627)</td>
<td>(0.0629)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected success</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.8160**</td>
<td>0.7248**</td>
<td>0.7252**</td>
<td>0.7249**</td>
<td>0.7286**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0540)</td>
<td>(0.0561)</td>
<td>(0.0563)</td>
<td>(0.0565)</td>
<td>(0.0566)</td>
<td>(0.0566)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of UN Security Council endorsement value</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.1486**</td>
<td>0.1482**</td>
<td>0.0970^</td>
<td>0.0604</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0453)</td>
<td>(0.0451)</td>
<td>(0.0574)</td>
<td>(0.0611)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateralism value</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.1800**</td>
<td>-0.1764**</td>
<td>-0.1746**</td>
<td>-0.1252*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0432)</td>
<td>(0.0430)</td>
<td>(0.0431)</td>
<td>(0.0612)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International law value</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.1229**</td>
<td>-0.1215**</td>
<td>-0.1229**</td>
<td>-0.0934^</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0435)</td>
<td>(0.0433)</td>
<td>(0.0435)</td>
<td>(0.0552)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress endorsement value</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.2128**</td>
<td>-0.2154**</td>
<td>-0.2190**</td>
<td>-0.2136**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0573)</td>
<td>(0.0574)</td>
<td>(0.0577)</td>
<td>(0.0577)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in Republican party</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.0952*</td>
<td>0.0996*</td>
<td>0.0999*</td>
<td>0.1008*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0440)</td>
<td>(0.0441)</td>
<td>(0.0441)</td>
<td>(0.0442)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Security Council cue x UN Security Council endorsement</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.1011</td>
<td>0.1690*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0740)</td>
<td>(0.0863)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Security Council cue x multilateralism value</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.0923</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0833)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Security Council cue x international law value</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.0646</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0810)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Security Council cue x UN Security Council knowledge</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.0414</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.2833)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>1212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-$R^2$</td>
<td>0.1049</td>
<td>0.1043</td>
<td>0.1270</td>
<td>0.1285</td>
<td>0.1277</td>
<td>0.1301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ^ $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$. Entries are ordered logistic regression coefficients (robust standard errors).
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 4. Model 1 re-estimates the treatment effects of both the UN Security Council cue and the domestic partisan elite cue while controlling for a variety of demographic characteristics of respondents, including their partisan identification, gender, age, highest level of education, military/veteran status and levels of political participation as measured by whether they voted in the most recent presidential election.

The magnitude, direction and statistical significance of the two informational cues of interest appears to conform with (and therefore support) the findings discussed in the previous section. The effect size of UN Security Council authorization is slightly larger than the effect size of the domestic cue when the positions of elites split along partisan lines (Domestic partisan elite cue=1), but the domestic partisan cue effect size doubles (0.3399*2=0.6798) when Democrats and Republicans are united in support behind the president’s proposal to use force (Domestic partisan elite cue=2). I also introduce a treatment-by-treatment interaction term to assess whether the impact of UN Security Council authorization depends on the degree of partisan consensus that respondents observe across each of their treatment groups. The lack of statistical significance of this interaction term suggests that the impact of each of the two informational cues of interest are independent of one another and simply additive in shaping respondent’s support for the use of force.

Both age and gender appear to have a statistically significant and independent effect on levels of support for the use of force. The model predicts that younger respondents would be expected to be more likely to oppose the use of force, which is broadly consistent with expectations. Curiously, men are expected to be less likely to support the use of force compared with women, a finding that appears inconsistent with traditional conceptions of the gender gap between men and women in support for war. This could be an artifact of the MTurk sample, but
this finding is also consistent with recent work by Deborah Brooks and Benjamin Valentino (2011), who find that the gender gap actually reverses when a war has the approval of the United Nations. That is, men are less likely to the support the use of force when the UN authorizes such action, a finding that is consistent with my own analysis and merits further investigation.

Partisan identification also appears to impact support for the use of force in ways that are independent of the elite partisan cues conveyed through treatment, but its effect is weakly significant. Partisan identification is coded as a dummy variable that assigns a value of 1 to respondents who identify as Republicans or Republican leaning independents, whom Bruce Keith and colleagues (1992) suggest behave like committed partisans. Model 1 therefore predicts that those who identify as Republicans will be more likely to support the use of force than those who do not.

Model 2 introduces three covariates that previous research suggests should impact levels of support for the use of force. A number of studies have shown that public support for war is highly sensitive to increases in casualty rates of U.S. soldiers. As casualties climb, Mueller (1994) suggest, public support for the war decreases. More recently, Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver and Jason Reifler (2005/2006) have shown that the public’s sensitivity to causalities is conditioned on its expectations for and perceptions of success in the military mission. Americans will be willing to tolerate higher levels of casualties, this research suggests, so long as the mission for which soldiers fight appears likely to succeed.

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60 John Mueller (1994), Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press);
In order to control for these effects, all respondents were asked post-treatment to estimate the number of American troops they expected would be killed or wounded if the president were to deploy American ground forces to Kashmir and how likely they believed it was that the United States would succeed in achieving its military mission.\footnote{62 “Estimated Success” was measured on a 5-point ordinal scale ranging from a value of 1 (“Extremely unlikely to succeed”) to a value of 5 (“Extremely likely to succeed”).} Consistent with previous research, those who expected the United States to suffer higher troop casualties are predicted to be less likely to support the use of force, but the effect lacks statistical significance. Expectations of success also appear to have a large and statistically effect, with those who expressed greater confidence in the successful outcome of the United States’ mission being more likely to support the use of force. The model predicts that substantive size of this effect will be almost twice as large as the impact of UN Security Council authorization in shaping public attitudes toward the use of force.

The high correlation between levels of support for the use of force and expected success, however, may be an artifact of the post-treatment evaluation of the mission’s prospects. In order to avoid priming respondents to consider the likelihood of success when assessing their support for the hypothetical deployment of American forces, I opted to ask them this question after respondents had been treated and settled on their opinions regarding the conflict. It seems likely that respondents would be motivated to estimate the likelihood of the mission’s success in ways that were consistent with their own support or opposition for the mission overall. In other words, it seems likely that those who had already expressed support for the mission would be motivated to view the mission as having a high likelihood for success, and those who had already expressed opposition for the mission would be motivated to view the mission as having a lower likelihood for success.
The final variable in model 2 seeks to account for the impact that knowledge of the UN Security Council’s voting procedures would have in shaping subjects’ responsiveness to the cue supplied by UN Security Council action. As discussed previously, Chapman (2009; 2011) suggests that the public perceives the actions taken by the UN Security Council as especially credible and uniquely informative because it has at least some general sense of its predisposition against authorizing force in light of its stringent consensus requirements of the permanent five powers and the divergent preferences of its member states. If Chapman is correct, we should expect to see that the effects of the UN Security Council cue to be conditional on one’s level of understanding with the UN Security Council’s voting procedures. Those with greater knowledge of the Security Council’s procedures should be more likely to support the use of force when the UN Security Council authorizes such action.

In order to assess respondents’ familiarity with UN Security Council procedures, I asked respondents to answer two true/false questions about the Council’s voting requirements. If Russia votes against a United Nations Security Council resolution, the resolution will still be adopted so long as it has support from all other members of the UN Security Council.” (Correct answer: False); and “A United Nations Security Council resolution will not be adopted if the United States votes against it.” (Correct answer: True). About 28.55 percent of respondents answered the first question correctly, and 34.41 percent answered the second question correctly.

I also tested alternative specifications of the model that assigned a score of 1 to respondents who answered at least one of the knowledge-based questions correctly. This alternative specification was not meaningfully different from the results generated above.
Model 3 introduces into the analysis a number of possible mechanisms that seek to capture why the UN Security Council or the domestic elite cues have the impact they do in shaping public opinion. Respondents were asked post-treatment about their general attitudes toward multilateralism, international law, and the necessity of securing the approval of the UN Security Council and Congress before a president deploys forces abroad. As model 3 suggests, almost all of these covariates are statistically significant and point in the expected direction. Those who have a stronger preference for multilateralism and respect for international law are predicted to be slightly less likely to support the use of force, as are those who believe that the president should seek the approval of Congress before sending troops overseas. Surprisingly, those who believe that the UN Security Council’s authorization is a necessary prerequisite for the use of American force abroad are expected to be more likely to support the use of force abroad. This counterintuitive finding could perhaps be understood as consistent with a general preference for engagement abroad, in which case such attitudes would also be correlated with higher levels of support for the use of force.

In order to test whether UN Security Council moves public opinion because of its capacity to facilitate multilateral burden-sharing or because of its role in fortifying international law, I interact these covariates with the UN Security Council cue but find that neither

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65 Respondents were asked about the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with the following statement on a seven-point ordinal scale: “The United States should be willing to act alone without the help or support of other countries when using military force abroad.” Responses were recoded such that higher levels of “disagreement” with this statement reflected a greater preference for multilateralism.

66 Respondents were asked about the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with the following statement on a seven-point ordinal scale: “The United States should take all actions necessary for its security, even if those actions are not consistent with international law.” Responses were recoded such that higher levels of “disagreement” with this statement reflected a greater respect for international law.

67 Respondents were asked about the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with the following statement on a seven-point ordinal scale: “The United States should always seek and receive approval from the United Nations Security Council before launching a military action.”

68 Respondents were asked about the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with the following statement on a seven-point ordinal scale: “The president should obtain the support of members of Congress before launching a military action.”
Table 5: Changes in Proportion of Democratic Respondents Supporting and Opposing Use of Force

A. Effect Size of Shifting Domestic Partisan Cue from Bipartisan Opposition ($d_{00}$) to Bipartisan Approval ($d_{02}$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public Reaction to Bipartisan Opposition Cue (%)</th>
<th>Public Reaction to Bipartisan Support Cue (%)</th>
<th>Differences in Opinion (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support</strong></td>
<td>11.81 (6.12 to 17.50)</td>
<td>19.70 (12.82 to 26.57)</td>
<td>+7.89 (-0.92 to 16.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neither Support/Oppose</strong></td>
<td>11.81 (6.12 to 17.50)</td>
<td>15.91 (9.59 to 22.23)</td>
<td>+4.10 (-4.29 to 12.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oppose</strong></td>
<td>76.38 (68.89 to 83.87)</td>
<td>64.39 (56.11 to 72.67)</td>
<td>-11.98 (-23.00 to -0.97)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Effect Size of Shifting UN Security Council Cue from No Authorization ($d_{00}$) to Authorization ($d_{10}$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public Reaction to UN Not Authorize Cue (%)</th>
<th>Public Reaction to UN Authorize Cue (%)</th>
<th>Differences in Opinion (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support</strong></td>
<td>11.81 (6.12 to 17.50)</td>
<td>17.46 (10.74 to 24.18)</td>
<td>+5.64 (-3.04 to 14.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neither Support/Oppose</strong></td>
<td>11.81 (6.12 to 17.50)</td>
<td>15.87 (9.40 to 22.34)</td>
<td>+4.06 (-4.43 to 12.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oppose</strong></td>
<td>76.38 (68.89 to 83.87)</td>
<td>66.67 (58.32 to 75.01)</td>
<td>-9.71 (-20.77 to 1.35)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explanation appears to account for how UN Security Council authorization (and its absence) influence public opinion on the use of force (see results in model 6). It does appear, though, that those who believe the Security Council’s authorization is necessary before using force abroad are more likely to be supportive of the use of force when the UN Security Council authorizes such action. This finding is perhaps indicative of the normative legitimacy the Council retains independent of its coordinative burden-sharing or its international legal functions. Because the possible post-treatment effects in influencing measurement of these covariates, these findings are no more than suggestive. But they do suggest some promising avenues for future research.
Table 6: Changes in Proportion of Republican Respondents Supporting and Opposing Use of Force

A. Effect Size of Shifting Domestic Partisan Cue from Bipartisan Opposition (d_{00}) to Bipartisan Approval (d_{02})

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public Reaction to Bipartisan Opposition Cue (%)</th>
<th>Public Reaction to Bipartisan Support Cue (%)</th>
<th>Differences in Opinion (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>12.82 (5.23 to 20.40)</td>
<td>27.48 (19.73 to 35.22)</td>
<td>+14.66 (4.01 to 25.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Support/Oppose</td>
<td>8.97 (2.49 to 15.46)</td>
<td>13.74 (7.77 to 19.71)</td>
<td>+4.77 (-3.89 to 13.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>78.21 (68.84 to 87.57)</td>
<td>58.78 (50.24 to 67.32)</td>
<td>-19.43 (-31.88 to -6.98)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Effect Size of Shifting UN Security Council Cue from No Authorization (d_{0a}) to Authorization (d_{1a})

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public Reaction to UN Not Authorize Cue (%)</th>
<th>Public Reaction to UN Authorize Cue (%)</th>
<th>Differences in Opinion (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>12.82 (5.23 to 20.40)</td>
<td>18.42 (9.50 to 27.34)</td>
<td>+5.60 (-5.85 to 17.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Support/Oppose</td>
<td>8.97 (2.49 to 15.46)</td>
<td>11.84 (4.41 to 19.27)</td>
<td>+2.87 (-6.78 to 15.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>78.21 (68.84 to 87.57)</td>
<td>69.74 (59.17 to 80.30)</td>
<td>-8.47 (-22.27 to 5.34)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing Heterogenous Treatment Effects Across Party Lines

The statistically significant interaction term in models 4-6 of Table 4 between the domestic partisan elite cues that respondents received and their party identification indicates that the responsiveness of individuals to various informational cues will differ by party. In Tables 5 and 6 I repeat the above analysis to determine whether and to what degree Democrats and Republicans respond differently to partisan cues from domestic elites and actions taken by the UN Security Council.

A comparison of the results in Table 5A and 6A suggests that Republican respondents are nearly twice as likely to be responsive to partisan cues from domestic elites than are their
Democratic counterparts. As Table 5A suggests, the share of Democratic respondents who supported the use of force increased by 7.89 percentage points when they were told that both Democrats and Republicans in Congress supported the president’s hypothetical plan to deploy ground forces. For Republican respondents, by contrast, the share of Republicans who supported the use of force increased by 14.66 percentage points when told that both parties supported the use of force abroad. This is perhaps not surprising given that Republicans are generally predisposed to favor the use of force more consistently than Democrats.

Interestingly, partisan identity appears to have no effect on the degree to which UN Security Council action can move public opinion on the use of force. As Table 5B suggests, the share of Democratic respondents who supported the use of force increased by an average of 5.46 percentage points when told that the UN Security Council had authorized such action. This increase in the share of support for the use of force is almost identical to that observed among Republican respondents. This result stands in contrast to a well-documented antipathy by the Republican Party towards international organizations in general and the United Nations in particular. Although the subsample of Republicans within the MTurk population may be more inclined to view international organizations more positively than the broader population of Republicans at large, these findings nevertheless suggest that partisanship may have no effect on how informational cues revealed through UN Security Council actions affect respondents’ attitudes toward the use of force.

**Explaining Attitudes Toward the Use of Force: Direct Reporting from Respondents**

In order to more accurately identify the factors that influenced respondents’ attitudes toward the use of force in the hypothetical military confrontation between India and Pakistan, I asked participants to “write a sentence or two explaining why you support or oppose the
Table 7: Free Response Explanations Offered for Level of Support for Use of Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>UN Security Council Does Not Authorize</th>
<th>UN Security Council Authorizes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bipartisan Opposition (d_{00})</td>
<td>Bipartisan Support (d_{02})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partisan Split (d_{01})</td>
<td>Partisan Support (d_{11})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakes</td>
<td>40 (20%)</td>
<td>49 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolationism/Anti-Intervention</td>
<td>55 (27%)</td>
<td>57 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Est. Success &amp; Est. Casualities/Costs</td>
<td>39 (19%)</td>
<td>33 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures Short of Force/Anti-War</td>
<td>17 (8%)</td>
<td>13 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burden Sharing/ Multilateralism</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>8 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations/ International Law</td>
<td>16 (8%)</td>
<td>5 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Partisan Cues in Congress</td>
<td>15 (7%)</td>
<td>3 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty/Moral Obligation</td>
<td>5 (3%)</td>
<td>7 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient Evidence/ Miscellaneous</td>
<td>15 (7%)</td>
<td>16 (8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

president’s plan to deploy American military ground troops to the Kashmir region.” I manually reviewed each of the 1,212 responses, which varied in length from a few words to a short paragraph, and categorized them into the nine categories displayed in Table 7. When individuals cited multiple factors in explaining their support or opposition to the deployment of ground forces, I catalogued the response according to which factor featured most prominently in the response.

A cursory glance at the results in Table 7 reveals that the plurality of respondents in all treatment groups expressed isolationist or anti-intervention sentiments as their primary justification for their position on the matter. Across five of the six treatment groups, the proportion of respondents who expressed isolationist sentiments hovered between 27 and 30...
percentage points; only when respondents were told that leaders from both parties in Congress supported the use of force and that the UN Security Council authorized this action did the share of expressions of isolationism fall to 23 percent. “America is not the world police,” one respondent wrote in a sentiment echoing many others in this category. “We have no business in the conflicts of other nations.”

A large proportion of respondents (between 20 and 27 percentage points) pointed to the stakes at hand in the dispute as a justification for their position. Some respondents pointed to the fact that both India and Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons as necessitating American intervention. “It is important to help facilitate peace in the region to avoid nuclear war,” wrote one respondent. “Deploying ground troops to convince Pakistan to go back to their side of the region could help broker peace and avoid further conflict.” In other cases, the relative absence of direct U.S. interests in the dispute led some respondents to oppose the use of force. “There is no justifiable reason for the US to engage in any military conflict unless our national interests are attacked directly or if there is a first strike against our country,” wrote one respondent. Other responses grouped into this category included references to the particular circumstances surrounding the India-Pakistan rivalry. Some respondents indicated that the United States should intervene in light of its allied commitment to India while still other suggested the United States should remain on the sidelines in order to retain its neutrality.

Consistent with the literature on casualty sensitivity and expectations for military success, nearly a fifth of all respondents pointed what they anticipated to be a costly conflict in terms of blood and treasure in announcing their opposition. “I don’t believe that American ground troops should be put at risk in order to restore peace to the region,” one such respondent wrote. “I fear that too many lives would be lost.” Others suggested that the mission had a low likelihood of
success in light of the United States’ most recent track record of costly interventions that appear to have garnered few benefits. “This is not a conflict that can be solved militarily,” writes one respondent, who had been told that the UN authorized the use of force and that leaders from both parties supported the president’s action. “There are centuries of issues between these two groups, and America deploying its military does not help them in any way.”

The fact that respondents appeared to justify their opinions on the use of force with reference to the policy information embedded in the vignette on the stakes or likelihood of success in war lends partial support to the argument by Boudreau and MacKenzie (2014) suggesting that individuals’ attitudes will be shaped at least as much by the substantive information made available to them relative to partisan cues or other informational shortcuts.\(^{69}\)

The comparatively smaller number of respondents who cited either the United Nations Security Council cue (between 2 and 11 percent) or the domestic partisan cue (between 2 and 7 percent of respondents) suggests that in fact this vignette treatment did indeed provide a “hard” test of my theory.

Nevertheless, these cues appear to have had a substantial effect in shifting the opinions of some who might otherwise have opposed the use of force. “I generally oppose use of American military force in foreign territories,” wrote one respondent, “but the strong support of this measure from the UN pushes me to support this action.” In another instance, one respondent recognized the vast informational asymmetries between lay individuals and better informed foreign policy actors. “[My] knee jerk reaction is to oppose,” wrote the respondent, “However I do trust the judgment of the UN Security Council they [sic] are privy to much more information than I am.” In other cases, the absence of UN Security Council authorization led respondents to withhold their support. “I am neutral,” one respondent wrote. “I think it would be good for the

US to help try to maintain the peace, but if it does not have the support of the UN, I am hesitant to also support.” Others offered explanations that were consistent with the multilateral burden-sharing argument that UN Security Council authorization appears to embody. “I [would] support if other nations join in the UN Security Council decision,” wrote one respondent.

The domestic partisan cues also appear to have proven consequential in ways that are reflected in the quantitative analysis. Some respondents indicated they followed the leads of the political party with which they identified in shaping their opinions on the use of force. “I oppose [the president’s plan] because the Democrats of Congress oppose it and I am a Democrat,” wrote one respondent. “As a Republican, I go along with my party,” wrote another. The elite consensus signaled when Democrats and Republicans in Congress were united in support of the president’s policies appears to have had an especially powerful effect in shifting opinion in favor of supporting the use of force. “I have faith that our government knows better than I do,” wrote one respondent. “If both sides are in support of stepping in then it must be for serious reasons.” In other cases, the elite consensus around opposition to the president’s plan also proved especially salient to many individuals. “I think that if the leaders in Congress of both parties oppose the plan, then they must have good and valid reasons to do so,” wrote one respondent. “Both parties rarely agree on anything at all, so if they both agree this should not happen, it must be important.”

Conclusion: Implications and Extensions for Future Research

Building on previous observational and experimental studies on the effect of UN Security Council authorization in shaping public support for the use of force, this study finds that although public attitudes toward the use of force are shaped more heavily by cues from domestic
political actors, UN Security Council authorization does ultimately increase public approval for a hypothetical deployment of American ground forces, even in the face of countervailing cues from partisan elites. Both Democratic and Republican respondents proved equally more willing to support the use of force when authorized by the UN Security Council even when told that their respective partisan elites opposed such an operation. The UN Security Council’s impact in moving public opinion can nevertheless be offset by united opposition from domestic elites in both political parties. When Democratic and Republican leaders in Congress are united in their support for the deployment of ground forces abroad, their bipartisan support offsets any increase in opposition resulting from the refusal of the UN Security Council to authorize such action. Similarly, bipartisan opposition among Democratic and Republican elites to the use of force can overwhelm any additional support a president garners from the UN Security Council’s authorization of his or her proposed military action. In other words, the degree to which multilateral institutions like the Security Council can shape public opinion toward the use of force appears to be highly conditional on the positions taken by domestic partisan elites on the same matter.

This paper also makes some suggestive contributions about the mechanisms that influence the impact UN Security Council authorization has in moving public opinion that can set the stage for future research. The experimental data in this study appears to cast doubt on arguments that suggest the UN Security Council’s influence stems from its capacity to coordinate multilateral burden-sharing or inform the public about the merits of a proposed action in light of the known predispositions of its member states.\(^70\) Nevertheless, the persistent effect the UN Security Council’s decisions appears to have on public attitudes toward the use of force

\(^70\) These findings are consistent with those of Tingley and Tomz (2012).
might be better accounted for by normative arguments that root its authority in the legitimacy it has accrued over time in matters of war and peace.

Future experimental research is needed in this area to verify the results presented here and to discover whether they are robust across a number of different specifications. Future experiments might vary the stakes at hand in the particular vignette scenario to see whether differences in the type of mission undertaken change the degree to which subjects respond to informational cues from at home or abroad. Other studies might seek to evaluate more closely the normative arguments on the Council’s legitimacy as the source of its authority, a finding that would have important implications for international legal scholarship in this area. Perhaps most significantly, the finding that Democrats and Republicans proved equally responsive to informational cues from the UN Security Council merits further investigation into commonly held assumptions about partisan identification and support for the UN Security Council.\footnote{This is especially true in light of a similarly puzzling finding by Guardino and Hayes (2017) in their own experiment, where Republican respondents appeared willing to defy their co-partisans in Congress when the UN Security Council recommended the use of force.}

Finally, this paper’s findings have important implications for international relations scholarship by encouraging scholars to examine more closely the influence of partisan politics on decisions regarding the use of force. In particular, the influence of partisan politics and international institutions has been largely underexplored in the scholarship on domestic audience costs, where public opinion is assumed to be shaped largely by attitudes toward the president, consistency between threat and actions, and the particular issue at stake.\footnote{An important exception is the work of Kenneth Schultz (1999, 2001), which evaluates how electoral incentives that opposition parties have to challenge a sitting executive’s policies can influence the public’s perceptions of the merits of proposed military actions. When the executive’s political opponents announce their support for the president’s policies, Schultz argues, the information revealed by such actions are especially credible in signaling to the public the merits of the executive’s policies. See Kenneth Schultz (1999), “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War,” \textit{International Organization}, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Spring): pp. 233-266; and Kenneth Schultz (2001), \textit{Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). For the core arguments on domestic audience costs, see James Fearon (1994),}
partisan politics and the decisions of multinational institutions can influence and offset such perceptions will integrate an important but neglected literature on the formation of public opinion and the use of force.

Appendix

Text of Survey Instrument

[All Respondents:] Please read carefully the following news article. Press the next button to finish reading the rest of the article and then answer some questions.

After exchanging gunfire with Indian troops, Pakistani soldiers crossed into Indian-controlled territory last week in the disputed Kashmir region between India and Pakistan. Several Pakistani and Indian soldiers were killed or injured in the fighting. The Indian prime minister has demanded that Pakistani soldiers return to their side of the border, but so far Pakistan has refused to call back its troops.

A 1972 ceasefire agreement divided the disputed Kashmir province into two separate territories, one administered by India and one administered by Pakistan. Leaders on both sides have nevertheless claimed the entire province belongs on their side of the border. Both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons.

The President of the United States has announced plans to deploy American military ground troops to the disputed region to compel Pakistani troops to withdraw from Indian-controlled territory in Kashmir and stabilize the situation.

[Respondents Randomized into One of the Following Six Treatment Groups]

[Treatment Group d₁₁]

Both Democratic and Republican leaders in Congress support the president’s plan to deploy American ground troops to the Kashmir region.

Members of the United Nations Security Council are debating a resolution that would authorize UN member states to use “all necessary means” to restore international peace and security in the area. After considerable debate, the UN Security Council adopts the resolution, effectively authorizing the president’s plan to deploy American ground troops to the Kashmir region.

Do you support or do you oppose the president's plan to deploy American military ground troops to the Kashmir region?

- Strongly support (5)
- Support (4)
- Neither support nor oppose (3)
- Oppose (2)
- Strongly oppose (1)

Please write a sentence or two explaining why you support or oppose the president's plan to deploy American military ground troops to the Kashmir region.
Republican leaders in Congress support the president’s plan, but Democratic leaders in Congress oppose the president’s plan to deploy American ground troops to the Kashmir region.

Members of the United Nations Security Council are debating a resolution that would authorize UN member states to use “all necessary means” to restore international peace and security in the area. After considerable debate, the UN Security Council adopts the resolution, effectively authorizing the president’s plan to deploy American ground troops to the Kashmir region.

Do you support or do you oppose the president’s plan to deploy American military ground troops to the Kashmir region?

- Strongly support (5)
- Support (4)
- Neither support nor oppose (3)
- Oppose (2)
- Strongly oppose (1)

Please write a sentence or two explaining why you support or oppose the president's plan to deploy American military ground troops to the Kashmir region.

Both Democratic and Republican leaders in Congress oppose the president’s plan to deploy American ground troops to the Kashmir region.

Members of the United Nations Security Council are debating a resolution that would authorize UN member states to use “all necessary means” to restore international peace and security in the area. After considerable debate, the UN Security Council adopts the resolution, effectively authorizing the president’s plan to deploy American ground troops to the Kashmir region.

Do you support or do you oppose the president’s plan to deploy American military ground troops to the Kashmir region?

- Strongly support (5)
- Support (4)
- Neither support nor oppose (3)
- Oppose (2)
- Strongly oppose (1)

Please write a sentence or two explaining why you support or oppose the president's plan to deploy American military ground troops to the Kashmir region.
Both Democratic and Republican leaders in Congress support the president’s plan to deploy American ground troops to the Kashmir region.

Members of the United Nations Security Council are debating a resolution that would authorize UN member states to use “all necessary means” to restore international peace and security in the area. After considerable debate, the UN Security Council does not adopt the resolution, effectively refusing to authorize the president’s plan to deploy American ground troops to the Kashmir region.

Do you support or do you oppose the president’s plan to deploy American military ground troops to the Kashmir region?
- Strongly oppose (1)
- Oppose (2)
- Neither oppose nor support (3)
- Support (4)
- Strongly support (5)

Please write a sentence or two explaining why you support or oppose the president's plan to deploy American military ground troops to the Kashmir region.

Republican leaders in Congress support the president’s plan, but Democratic leaders in Congress oppose the president’s plan to deploy American ground troops to the Kashmir region.

Members of the United Nations Security Council are debating a resolution that would authorize UN member states to use “all necessary means” to restore international peace and security in the area. After considerable debate, the UN Security Council does not adopt the resolution, effectively refusing to authorize the president’s plan to deploy American ground troops to the Kashmir region.

Do you support or do you oppose the president’s plan to deploy American military ground troops to the Kashmir region?
- Strongly oppose (1)
- Oppose (2)
- Neither oppose nor support (3)
- Support (4)
- Strongly support (5)

Please write a sentence or two explaining why you support or oppose the president's plan to deploy American military ground troops to the Kashmir region.
Both Democratic and Republican leaders in Congress oppose the president’s plan to deploy American ground troops to the Kashmir region. Members of the United Nations Security Council are debating a resolution that would authorize all UN member states to use “all necessary means” to restore international peace and security in the area. After considerable debate, the United Nations Security Council does not adopt the resolution, effectively refusing to authorize the president’s plan to deploy American ground troops to the Kashmir region.

Do you support or do you oppose the president’s plan to deploy American military ground troops to the Kashmir region?
- Strongly oppose (1)
- Oppose (2)
- Neither oppose nor support (3)
- Support (4)
- Strongly support (5)

Please write a sentence or two explaining why you support or oppose the president's plan to deploy American military ground troops to the Kashmir region.

[All Respondents]

If the president deploys American military ground troops to the Kashmir region, how many United States troops do you expect are likely to be killed or wounded in the course of the military campaign?
- 0 American troops (1)
- 1-50 American troops (2)
- 51-500 American troops (3)
- 501-5,000 American troops (4)
- 5,001-50,000 American troops (5)
- More than 50,000 American troops (6)

If the president deploys American military ground troops to the Kashmir region, how likely do you think it is that the United States would succeed in its mission?
- Extremely likely to succeed (5)
- Somewhat likely to succeed (4)
- Neither likely nor unlikely to succeed (3)
- Somewhat unlikely to succeed (2)
- Extremely unlikely to succeed (1)
[All Respondents]: Please answer the following multiple-choice questions based on your personal experiences and general knowledge. Please answer these questions to the best of your ability and do not consult any resources except for the information provided in this survey to answer these questions.

[Question Order Randomized]

To what extent do you agree with or disagree with the following statement? “The United States should always seek and receive approval from the United Nations Security Council before launching a military action.”

- Strongly disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Somewhat disagree (3)
- Neither disagree nor agree (4)
- Somewhat agree (5)
- Agree (6)
- Strongly agree (7)

To what extent do you agree with or disagree with the following statement? “The president should obtain the support of members of Congress before launching a military action.”

- Strongly disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Somewhat disagree (3)
- Neither disagree nor agree (4)
- Somewhat agree (5)
- Agree (6)
- Strongly agree (7)

To what extent do you agree with or disagree with the following statement? “Republicans are more effective than Democrats in handling military affairs and matters of national security.”

- Strongly disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Somewhat disagree (3)
- Neither disagree nor agree (4)
- Somewhat agree (5)
- Agree (6)
- Strongly agree (7)
To what extent do you agree with or disagree with the following statement? “The United States should take all actions necessary for its security, even if those actions are not consistent with international law.”
- Strongly disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Somewhat disagree (3)
- Neither disagree nor agree (4)
- Somewhat agree (5)
- Agree (6)
- Strongly agree (7)

To what extent do you agree with or disagree with the following statement? "The United States should be willing to act alone without the help or support of other countries when using military force abroad.”
- Strongly disagree (1)
- Disagree (2)
- Somewhat disagree (3)
- Neither disagree nor agree (4)
- Somewhat agree (5)
- Agree (6)
- Strongly agree (7)

Is the following statement true or false? “If Russia votes against a United Nations Security Council resolution, the resolution will still be adopted so long as it has support from all other members of the UN Security Council.”
- True (-1)
- False (1)
- Don't know (0)

Is the following statement true or false? “A United Nations Security Council resolution will not be adopted if United States votes against it.”
- True (1)
- False (-1)
- Don't know (0)

Is the following statement true or false? “Except when acting in self-defense, it is illegal under international law for the U.S. president to use military force without the approval of the United Nations Security Council.”
- True (1)
- False (-1)
- Don't know (0)
What is your gender?
- Male (1)
- Female (0)

What is your age?
- 18-24 years old (1)
- 25-34 years old (2)
- 35-44 years old (3)
- 45-54 years old (4)
- 55-64 years old (5)
- 65-74 years old (6)
- 75 years old or older (7)

What is the highest level of education you have completed?
- Less than high school (grades 1-8 or no formal schooling) (1)
- Some high school (no diploma) (2)
- High school diploma (or degree-equivalent) (3)
- Some college (4)
- Bachelors or associate degree (5)
- Some graduate or professional schooling (no degree) (6)
- Graduate or professional degree (e.g. MA, MS, JD, MD, PhD) (7)

In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, or an independent?
- Democrat (1)
- Republican (2)
- Independent (3)

[If Selected “Independent” in Response to Previous Question. If not, skip]

As of today, do you lean more towards the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?
- Democratic Party (1)
- Republican Party (2)

In general, would you describe your political views as:
- Very liberal (1)
- Liberal (2)
- Moderate (3)
- Conservative (4)
- Very conservative (5)
Are you currently serving, or have you ever served, in the United States military?
☑ Yes (1)
☐ No (0)

Did you vote in the most recent presidential election this November?
☑ Yes (1)
☐ No (0)

Which of the following is most similar to the president’s plan to use military force in the news article outlined at the beginning of this survey?
☑ Deployment of naval forces to compel Indian troops to withdraw across the border (0)
☑ Deployment of ground forces to compel Pakistani troops to withdraw across the border (1)
☐ Deployment of naval forces to compel Pakistani troops to withdraw across the border (0)
☐ Deployment of ground forces to compel Indian troops to withdraw across the border (0)