Do sanctions help combat corruption or contribute to it—or both?

Do sanctions help combat corruption or contribute to it—or both? Is corruption a by-product of sanctions, a target of sanctions, or a driver of sanctions? How should policymakers think about these overlapping and at times potentially conflicting interests?

On March 4-5, 2026, Perry World House convened a conference to analyze the nexus between sanctions and corruption with a goal of developing new approaches, strategies, and frameworks for more effectively coupling anti-corruption tools with sanctions measures. The conference brought together leading academics, experts, and policymakers who work on sanctions regimes and various forms of corruption.

Experts debated whether the current U.S. and international sanctions regimes are fit for purpose. They explored whether policymakers have the legal authorities, policy tools, and bureaucratic support they need to make sanctions effective. They also discussed how changing approaches to anti-corruption actions between U.S. administrations affect the overall effectiveness of efforts.  

Participants concluded that sanctions programs, when part of a broader anti-corruption strategy, can be effective. They noted, however, that they are hampered by an increasing lack of consensus in the United States on the proper use of anti-corruption sanctions as well as the absence of important legal authorities. For instance, officials have no way to target “enablers:” people and institutions that are essential conduits for corruption, money laundering, and other practices. Further, those designing these tools can do a better job tailoring their sanctions “packages” to maximize the effectiveness of sanctions. This is also difficult when robust anti-corruption sanctions have to compete with other foreign policy priorities within interagency negotiations–a regular feature of the policy process–because they often lose out.

Looking ahead, workshop participants discussed a plan for future research and convenings. This might include exploring recommendations for structural and legal reform and additional research on the factors that link broader sectoral sanctions regimes and the onset of corruption.