Informal Platforms for Inter-Presidential Diplomacy

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump will start his second term facing an international environment that is all too familiar. The multilateral institutions that he criticized and defunded in his first term continue to face crises that preceded Trump’s first four years in power. If anything, these same institutions were able to survive Trump’s presidency and have since become more resilient: what does not kill you makes you stronger! Thus, it is important to establish a few points: (1) the crisis of the multilateral system preceded the 2016 US presidential election; (2) Donald Trump’s first presidency did not do away with multilateralism; and (3) multilateral institutions have grown more resilient. 

Recent scholarship on intergovernmental organizations (IO) explores this apparent contradiction with respect to multilateral institutions. On the one hand, several indicators of IO resilience coincide in documenting the limited adverse consequences of the deliberate contestations of the multilateral system for IO survival. On the other hand, IO survival strategies often involved an expansion of their scope, with the unintended consequence of encroaching on the mandate of other IOs. The result is higher levels of institutional overlap—a phenomenon that has been coined “institutional complexity” by the literature. 

In a 2024 research manuscript, Jonas Tallberg, Stefanie Walter, and Michael Zürn set out to analyze the patterns, sources, and consequences of contestation of IOs. The authors mobilize data on two indicators of contestation: (1) state withdrawals from IOs, and (2) media coverage of public challenges to IOs. The picture for the years 1985–2022 is somewhat counterintuitive, as these two indicators do not reveal a noticeable upward trend. Moreover, there is a marked disconnect between the amount of media coverage and the actual number of public challenges to IOs, suggesting that the media inflate instances of contestation. This recent scholarly look at actual patterns of contestations directed at IOs indicates that the challenges inflicted by the first Trump administration did not succeed in upending multilateral governance. In fact, IOs survived and emerged more resilient than before. The mechanism behind IO survival appears to entail scope enlargement. In a 2022 article, Diana Panke and Soren Stapel documented the rise in overlapping scope among IOs entrusted with regional governance competencies. The authors demonstrate that, starting in 1995, overlap in competencies grew about twice as fast as overlap in membership. 

Thus, the second Trump administration’s foreign policy will unfold in a much denser international policy space, now inhabited by IOs that have tightened the grip on their respective mandates, which they “share” with other IOs. For multilateral institutions, this scenario raises the bar when it comes to effectiveness, efficiency, and impact. For states, this scenario brings an opportunity to choose among several negotiating venues, or to “forum shop,” or even to court. Given President Trump’s declared aversion for multilateral institutions, one wonders how his team of foreign policymakers will engage with their peers in order to address the questions that entail the promotion of global public goods. And there is no shortage of questions of this nature. From illegal immigration to the war on drugs, from international trade to climate change—even if the White House chooses to launch a race to the bottom—international dialogue is unavoidable. 

Historically, multilateral institutions were created to lower the transaction costs associated with deliberation and commitment within an international arena that lacks third-party enforcement. International organizations reduce costs by promoting transparency, monitoring, and technical assistance. Other external mechanisms contribute as commitment enforcers. Tit-for-tat policies and state reputation figure prominently among those. But once the crisis of the multilateral system established itself, during the 2010s, several states distanced themselves from IOs and reverted to inter-presidentialism—a practice at least as old as diplomacy itself. 

Unlike old-time diplomacy, 20th-century inter-presidentialism is permeated by the logic of alternation in power—a trait of contemporary democracy. This characteristic makes it harder to establish long-lasting international alliances, which are so important when it comes to delivering global public goods. Alternation in power also renders domestic politics a key feature of any leader’s agenda, and it is no different with a president’s foreign policy agenda. In the case of the U.S. president, the four-year mandate is marked halfway by the legislative elections and soon after by the campaign leading up to the following presidential election. Intervals to decompress and to lower the impact of domestic politics on the president’s foreign policy agenda are short. Domestic politics and foreign policy race side by side against the ticking clock of the number of votes required to remain in power. This shorter time horizon impacts the dynamic of international negotiations and imposes a higher bar on inter-presidentialism.  

In the 21st century, inter-presidentialism has gained momentum as a tool to organize the promotion of global public goods. Needless to say, it is also an essential mechanism to prevent global disasters and to mitigate the aftermath of catastrophes. In the context of creeping multilateralism, presidential diplomacy takes center stage. However, it is imperative to equip presidential diplomacy to maximize the chances of producing good decisions for all. In this context, what role may IOs and other forums play in foreign policymaking, especially when it comes to the second Trump administration? Loosely organized fora, such as the G7 and the G20, constitute spaces to anchor inter-presidential diplomacy. Along the same lines, formal organizations that have lenient rules of procedure or a culture of deliberation that privileges inclusiveness might play an important role as hosts as well. The Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are good examples of the latter. 

These organizations can be analyzed through their life cycle. This framework points to the dynamic aspects of these IOs and the ecosystem within which they operate. Let’s take the G20 as an example. If, on the one hand, the G20 is limited in membership, increasing numbers of observer states have been invited to take part at the summits. In 2024, the African Union was formally admitted as a member. Aside from a broader membership, the increase in scope has marked the Brazilian presidency—confirming the expectations of the scholarship. The 2024 G20 Leaders Declaration is divided into four sections, addressing (1) the international economic and political situation; (2) social inclusion and the fight against hunger and poverty; (3) the reform of global governance institutions; and (4) inclusiveness and effectiveness in the G20. Within these headings, one will find topics ranging from the regulation of artificial intelligence to cooperation on countering tax evasion, to multilateral trade. 

The life-cycle approach sees international organizations as living organisms—much like firms and biological beings. To paraphrase Julia Gray, IOs are not static but rather evolving entities that mature and go through their own individual stages of life. Their evolution reflects a fundamental political process, not always linear, that seeks to accommodate changes in preferences and power dynamics. The resulting configuration may not be ideal when measured against the principles of the liberal international order that constitute the backbone of the post–World War II international architecture. Nevertheless, this configuration reflects a key aspect of the liberal order, according to David Lake, Lisa Martin, and Thomas Risse, that of “principled multilateralism.” 

Take the case of the OAS. Formally created in 1948, with the adoption of the Charter of the Organization of American States, the OAS was preceded by a patchwork of international organizations dating back to the 1889–1890 First International Conference of American States. From 1948 onward, the OAS expanded its mandate to encompass the promotion of democracy, the defense of human rights, legal cooperation, security, and development. More recently, with the rise of the radical right and increased political polarization, the OAS is undergoing a retreat from its pro-rights agenda.  

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, an organ of the OAS, is elected by the General Assembly for a four-year term. Recently, it has been the stage of a conservative shift in response to member states’ preferences. This phenomenon illustrates presidential diplomacy at work, as each member of the OAS has the prerogative to nominate three candidates leading up to the election by the General Assembly. The OAS is porous to political influence and thus a candidate to anchor inter-presidential diplomacy under the new Trump administration. Civil society organizations should watch closely as sensitive topics such as free speech on social media and the protection of minorities come under scrutiny. It should come as no surprise if some of the conservative topics on Trump’s electoral platform reappear on the Inter-American Commission’s agenda—just another cycle on this IO’s long life. 

In sum, Donald Trump’s foreign policymakers will likely take advantage of multilateral institutions in order to broker their agenda on trade, security, immigration, et al. IOs and informal platforms that are inclusive and malleable, such as the OAS, the G20, and the OECD, constitute natural venues to share information and to promote transparency, while reducing transaction costs associated with the crafting and implementation of foreign policy. It will be a new cycle in the lives of these organizations, with the potential to launch a research agenda on the role of multilateralism when it comes to inter-presidential diplomacy. Needless to say, this can also initiate a new chapter in the history of international cooperation and the reform of the multilateral system. 

Cristiane Lucena Carneiro is an Association Professor at the International Relations Institute at the University of São Paulo.