Nuclear Leading by Norms? The Complex Role of Non-Nuclear Weapons States in Shaping the Global Nuclear Order

Francesca Giovannini is the Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center, at the Harvard Kennedy School.

The power hegemony held by nuclear weapons states (NWSs) has often eclipsed the non-trivial role played by non-nuclear weapons states (NNWSs) in forging norms and principles on which global nuclear diplomacy and governance have ultimately come to rest. These states have pioneered initiatives that seek to reformulate the nuclear narrative from one of power politics to one grounded in humanitarianism, global security, and international law. Yet, their leadership has gone frequently underappreciated. And although their record of success is mixed, it is worth exploring to understand the conditions that led them to establish some critically important benchmark nuclear institutions.

This short paper is organized into four main sections. The first section examines the three most consequential diplomatic achievements of NNWSs. The second section examines the conditions that have led these countries to be effective norm creators. The third section analyzes the impact of the Russian war on Ukraine on NNWs moral leadership. The conclusion discusses the impact of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and raises some questions about the future role of NNWSs amid an accelerating nuclear arm race.

Section One: Non-Nuclear weapons states as norm creators: historical examples

1.1 Banning nuclear tests: protecting local communities

The nuclear test moratorium today in force among all nuclear weapons states, except North Korea, should be significantly credited to the relentless efforts and leadership of NNWS in securing a complete ban on all nuclear test explosions. Protesting the objectionable and discriminatory nuclear test practices of nuclear weapons states, many Non-Nuclear Weapons States, particularly in the Global South, began to assert control over their territories, demanding respect, dignity, and ultimately, sovereignty.

At the early stages of the Cold War (1950-1967), nuclear weapons states conducted most of their nuclear tests in colonial territories deemed to be dispensable territories to advance national security interests. The Pacific region, for instance, became an unfortunate witness to the relentless pursuit of US nuclear supremacy. The United States conducted extensive testing in the Marshall Islands, from 1946 to 1958. This testing program entailed 67 nuclear tests, culminating in the detonation of approximately 108 megatons of nuclear yield over a period of 12 years, an amount equivalent to over 7,200 Hiroshima bombs. The human and environmental consequences of these tests were devastating and long lasting. Entire communities were dislocated, marine life, a vital component of the region’s biodiversity, was severely affected and land and soil turned radioactive and infertile. Similarly, the Soviet Union tested most of its arsenal from 1949 to 1989 at Semipalatinsk, a steppe region in Kazakhstan. Over these four decades, the region witnessed 456 nuclear tests, including 340 underground and 116 atmospheric explosions, exposing the land and its inhabitants to extensive nuclear fallout.

The soil, water, and air in the region bore the brunt of radioactive contamination, affecting flora and fauna alike. The local population, unaware and uninformed of the actual extent and gravity of the experiments, endured prolonged exposure to elevated levels of radiation which ultimately resulted in severe health complications, ranging from cancers to birth defects and neurological disorders.

France and the United Kingdom too conducted most of their nuclear tests in territories under colonization leaving a deep and lasting imprint of environmental degradation, human suffering, and political rage.

The reprehensible and unjust nature of nuclear testing, coupled with its devastating environmental and humanitarian repercussions on native communities, catalyzed a movement seeking to achieve a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions and compensation for all affected communities. In a passionate address at the United Nations in 1954, Indian Prime Minister Nehru advocated for a "standstill agreement" to halt nuclear test explosions.

As many leaders from non-aligned nations and countries of the Global South came to perceive the cessation of nuclear testing as fundamentally linked to the struggle to achieve the end of colonialism, support further grew to move beyond Nehru’s proposal to develop a comprehensive legal regime that could ban nuclear test everywhere and anywhere. Ultimately, NNWSs’ political commitment gained the support of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union to negotiate and ratify the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), the Outer Space Treaty (1967), and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1990). The NNWSs’ dream of a comprehensive regime remains incomplete as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not yet into force. Yet, NNWSs’ achievements in this area are undeniable and nothing short of extraordinary. 

1.2 Nuclear Weapons Free Zones as regional collective security

In the shadow of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers, Latin American nations spearheaded an initiative to insulate their region from the devastating consequences of a nuclear arms race in their backyard. Astute diplomacy, regional collaboration, and strong leadership (from Mexico in particular) led ultimately to the creation of Treaty of Tlatelolco, formally known as the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, which was opened for signature on February 14, 1967. The treaty established Latin America and the Caribbean as a nuclear weapons-free zone and formally bans any development, transfer, and transport of nuclear weapons in the region.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco was heralded as a groundbreaking initiative, setting a precedent for other regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia (Treaty of Bangkok), and Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba).

The establishment of nuclear-weapons-free-zone treaties is particularly meaningful for two reasons. First, the decision of NNWSs to develop these institutions indicates a shift in the role that NNWSs were willing to play in the global nuclear order. From being merely dissenters of policies of the two superpowers, non-nuclear weapons countries became active participants in shaping global nuclear policies by building institutions that reflected their specific set of values and worldviews.

Second, the creation of nuclear-weapons-free zone treaties brought forth unprecedented opportunities for building civilian nuclear capacities in these regions. These treaties often incorporated mechanisms for monitoring and verification and therefore required technical expertise and intra-region coordination mechanisms. The collective efforts required to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones also spurred other avenues for collaboration, fostering deeper regional unity and alignment in foreign policy agendas.

1.3 Linking Climate Change and Nuclear Winter: nuclear disarmament as a humanitarian and planetary necessity

In the early 1980s, American scientists such as Carl Sagan and Richard Turco illustrated through a series of climatic modeling simulations, that a large-scale nuclear war could potentially bring about severe and extended global climatic cooling and reduced sunlight, a phenomenon they termed as a "nuclear winter." Among the many potential consequences, nuclear winter could also lead to a failure of agricultural systems and famine on an unprecedented scale.

The nuclear winter theory helped NNWSs in broadening and sharpening their stance on nuclear disarmament, capitalizing on the scientific grounding that the theory offered. Specifically, starting in the early 2000s, non-nuclear weapon states adopted a new advocacy strategy centered on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. This approach emphasizes civilian protection and the imperative to preserve ecological systems. The focus on the humanitarian implications of nuclear weapons also has allowed NNWSs to challenge the nuclear deterrence framework by questioning the capacity of governments to effectively safeguard the life of their citizens in the event of nuclear deterrence failure.

The involvement of leading humanitarian organizations like the International Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders has been key to illustrate the grim reality that even a limited nuclear strike would leave societies crippled, unable to offer even basic emergency assistance. Doctors and medical personnel involved in the campaign have discussed at length the damage that any nuclear strike would bring to vulnerable medical facilities, making government fundamentally unable to deliver even the most basic care during a crisis. Consequently, the argument posits, any government unable to support its population during a catastrophe should refrain from risking citizens' lives by pursuing or retaining nuclear capabilities.

Section 2: Conditions for success and limitations

In recent years, we have witnessed a wavering in the foundation that once solidified the position of non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) as powerful voices in the global sphere. The deterioration of the global landscape, the ramping up of competition between the United States and China, and the spread of COVID and global information warfare are reducing the avenues available for cooperation and diplomacy. In addition, a few key elements that once anchored NNWSs’ success appear to be changing in dramatic ways thereby diminishing the leadership stature of NNWSs in the global nuclear order. These factors include:

Solidarity and Cohesive Diplomacy: Traditionally, NNWSs have found strength in unity, forming cohesive alliances to echo their shared goals and concerns on the global platform. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), with its 120 countries, stood during the Cold War as a powerful voice in the promotion and advancement of nuclear disarmament. Despite deep-seated divisions and disagreements, NAM countries proved to be able to work together because a fundamental unity against major systemic challenges, including colonization, the risks of a nuclear arm race, poverty, and racism. Today, divisions over interests and identities have endured but unity over systemic challenges is gradually waning leaving the group often unable to make a mark on major political decisions at the global stage.  

A nuclear educated civil society: The memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have helped to keep the dangers posed by nuclear weapons at the forefront of both political and civil society discourses for decades. In that historical phase, the NNWSs were able to garner considerable public support, supplemented by substantial media coverage, fostering fertile grounds for potent advocacy and transformative actions. Today, the NNWSs find themselves navigating a more complex and distracted global stage. A plethora of other pressing global issues, such as climate change, pandemic response, and economic challenges, have diminished public attention and reduced the visceral impact of nuclear threats in the public consciousness.

A strong political alignment between left-wing political elites of the West and the South: The movement for nuclear disarmament has historically found fertile ground among left-wing political elites in the West, such as President Kennedy, who was profoundly disturbed by the human costs of nuclear test explosions and pledged to end above-ground tests during his political tenure. Although apparent political disagreements existed between these elites over the vision for a safer world, their willingness to engage in both dialogue and cooperation proved instrumental in galvanizing support and momentum for various nuclear diplomatic initiatives, including the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Today, the solidarity that once marked these efforts is unraveling because of multiple factors. Economic crises, demographic pressures, and persistent development challenges have taken center stage for many NNWSs in the Global South, weakening both the interest in and the attention to nuclear disarmament issues. Moreover, perceptions of Western hypocrisy on international development and fair resource distribution have sowed seeds of doubt and mistrust in Western leadership and the Global North's willingness to achieve an inclusive and safe world for all.

Building on Core Systemic Issues: The initiatives of NNWSs towards nuclear disarmament increasingly became intertwined with other significant systemic movements, including anti-colonial efforts, endeavors for more equitable and racially inclusive societies, and movements advocating for broader developmental opportunities, predominantly in the Global South. In this context, nuclear weapons emerged as symbols of persistent power imbalances in the international arena, and, in certain perspectives, as an extension of Western imperialism. The interconnections among these various normative movements substantially contributed to the mainstream acceptance of nuclear disarmament, framing it as a fundamental value in the pursuit of a more just world.

Today, however, the cohesive fabric that once united these systemic efforts appears to be fraying at the edges. The global landscape is evolving rapidly, with fresh challenges and priorities continually emerging. The unity and solidarity that once marked the NNWS movements are being tested as member states grapple with various diverging concerns, from economic development to geopolitical tensions. Moreover, the anti-colonial narratives and human rights campaigns that used to be at the forefront of global discourse are changing as newer narratives around climate justice, digital rights, and other contemporary issues are taking center stage. Consequently, the NNWS movements find themselves at a crossroads, tasked with integrating their longstanding objectives with the demands and realities of the new world order.

Effective Diplomacy and Remarkable Leadership: Historically, NNWSs have exhibited adept diplomacy and remarkable leadership while maneuvering through the complex geopolitical terrain associated with nuclear weapons. Through the establishment of strategic alliances and the pursuit of dialogues, they have successfully safeguarded their interests and played a significant role in global nuclear disarmament initiatives. However, in the present day, many of these nations lack the presence of towering historical figures such as Alfonso García Robles (the chief architect of the Tlatelolco Treaty), Jawaharlal Nehru (a fervent advocate of the nuclear test ban), and Kwame Nkrumah (who represented African nations in championing a world without nuclear weapons). Furthermore, the dynamics of diplomacy have evolved, becoming more rigid and formalized. Many of the most important venues for nuclear diplomacy are stalled due deep-seated ideological divergences and contrasting strategic viewpoints, as evident in venues like the UN Conference on Disarmament. These critical debates and dialogues, once fertile grounds for progress and consensus-building, often devolve into arenas of ideological stalemate, where advancement is stifled by entrenched positions and conflicting national interests.

Furthermore, there seems to be a noticeable reticence in taking bold steps or risks in modern diplomacy. Countries are becoming increasingly cautious and even seasoned diplomats often act as mere spokespeople at public venues, with limited authority to negotiate or deviate from pre-defined national stances. This cautious approach has, to an extent, stifled the innovative spirit and flexibility that was once the hallmark of diplomatic negotiations.

Section 3: The Russian war on Ukraine: A blow to NNWSs moral stand?

The timid and sometime contradictory position taken by many non-nuclear weapons states (especially in South America, Asia, and Africa) over the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine has left many commentators in the West perplexed and concerned. Amid a war conducted by a nuclear weapons state over a non-nuclear weapons state, these countries had best proposed vague statements about peace and diplomacy but often offered just puzzling silence. Richard Gowen from International Crisis Group observed recently:

“Whereas European ministers travelled in droves from capitals to Turtle Bay to speak on Ukraine’s behalf, almost all their counterparts from other regions stayed away, leaving it to the permanent representatives in New York to comment. Many did not speak at all. Only twelve members of the 54-strong African group, and fourteen of the 55 Asian countries, offered statements about Ukraine in either the General Assembly or the Security Council. The Latin American and Caribbean group was more outspoken – with twelve of its 33 members speaking – but as in September, a good part of the UN membership preferred to keep a low profile over the war.”

Even more shocking is the position that some of the NNWSs are explicitly embracing. South Africa, which for years stood as a beacon of nuclear disarmament—voluntarily dismantling its nuclear arsenal—is now participating in military exercises alongside China and Russia. Meanwhile, nations like Brazil, which have long challenged the hypocrisy of nuclear weapons states and the injustice of the international system, have been framing Russia's aggressive actions as an act of self-defense against provocations from the West. This shift in stance not only muddies the moral stance of these nations but also raises questions regarding the effectiveness of the NNWSs' collective voice in global nuclear politics.

Certainly, it cannot be ignored that the history of NNWSs has been punctuated by contradictions, the pursuit of national interests, and ideological posturing. Indeed, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, a noticeable rift was evident among many non-Western NNWSs as they grappled with whether to condemn Soviet actions.

Nevertheless, the current hesitance of the non-nuclear-weapon-state community to take a firm stance in the ongoing conflict poses a substantial threat to its moral authority, potentially having far-reaching implications. This is primarily because the Russian onslaught on Ukraine fundamentally questions the viability and desirability of a nuclear-weapon-free world, essentially undermining the core agenda of the NNWSs.

Firstly, Ukraine willingly relinquished its nuclear stockpile in 1994, placing its trust in the security assurances provided by the United States, the UK, and the Russian Federation. At its crux, the Russian incursion possibly affirms the notion that nuclear arsenals might be the ultimate safeguards against potential aggressions, thereby challenging the very foundations of nuclear disarmament.

Secondly, the inability of the global community to unite and impose substantial repercussions on Russia brings into question the efficacy of international law and multilateral governance—tools that have been fervently advocated for and relied upon by NNWSs in the past.

Thirdly, the Russian Federation's persistent threat of using nuclear weapons has been met with an alarming silence from the NNWSs, tacitly normalizing nuclear threats and potentially altering the dynamics of international relations.

As the Russian assault on Ukraine threatens to reshape the existing nuclear order radically, it is indeed startling to witness the limited leadership demonstrated by the NNWSs during this critical juncture.

Conclusion: A return to leadership? The meaning of the Treaty on the Prohibition of nuclear weapons

Non-nuclear states were at the forefront of the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. This treaty, ratified exclusively by non-nuclear states, aims to unequivocally renounce the principles of nuclear deterrence and outlaw the possession of nuclear weapons permanently.

More than any previous endeavor, the NNWSs who engaged in the discussions and ratification of the TPNW were guided by two primary interrelated convictions:

1. Incremental diplomatic approaches will never lead to a world free of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons states will always use incremental diplomacy to maintain the status quo in their favor
2. Therefore, the only viable path forward is to delegalize nuclear weapons once and for all.

While depicted often by NNWSs as the most consequential diplomatic achievement in global nuclear diplomacy, the TPNW entry into force might ironically further undermine, limit, and weaken the ability of NNWSs to influence and shape the global nuclear landscape.

By design, the TPNW was intended to serve as a groundbreaking institution marking a dramatic change in the strategy of the NNWS from cooperation with the NWSs to hard bargaining. Yet, the TPNW’s inevitable limitations (in terms of membership, resources, and power) will also force NNWSs to complex and costly political tradeoffs. Most specifically:

1. With limited resources, not all NNWSs will be able to operate across multiple venues:

Now that the TPNW has come into existence, for instance, most of the resources of NNWSs are likely to be channeled towards advocating for its ratification and facilitating the implementation of its provisions. But for countries with limited resources, investing in the TPNW might also lead them to reduce activities in other forums, including the NPT Review conferences or the UN First Committee on Disarmament. While the TPNW is an important tool, most of the success that NNWSs accrued historically was due to their ability to engage across multiple diplomatic channels and at different levels of governance.

2. Restricting diplomatic space, heightening tensions

Since its entry into force, the TPNW has been a cause of frustration and tension between NNWSs and NWSs. In multiple diplomatic forums (including the NPT Rev Conf, the CTBT Prep-Com, the IAEA Board of Governors), the TPNW is raised sometimes inappropriately by diplomats causing frictions and frustration on both sides or intentionally to sour prospects for cooperation. NNWSs face a critical tradeoff between advocating for the TPNWs and pursuing a more accommodating strategy vis-à-vis NWSs. NNWSs have historically succeeded in bringing nuclear-armed states to the negotiation table to discuss crucial principles of peaceful coexistence. The TPNW, however, represents a fundamental departure from the Cold War appeasement strategy.

The TPNW is still a new institution, and it would be unfair to try to draw too many lessons learned at this stage. What is however clear already is that this Treaty born out of a fundamental dissatisfaction with the diplomatic strategies that NNWSs have employed in the past is today a deep source of tension between the two groups and has very limited prospects to be ever accepted by the nuclear weapons states.

The rift caused by the TPNW is occurring amidst a fast-paced nuclear arms race, the decline of arms control agreements, and escalating geopolitical tensions. Historically, NNWSs have served as a pillar of moral leadership, offering a glimmer of hope and reason in tumultuous times. The wavering stance concerning Ukraine and the divide created by the TPNW could potentially strip us of this vital leadership at a time when it is sorely needed.