Nuclear The Nuclear Discourse After the Invasion of Ukraine: Insights from the Philippines

Deryk Matthew N. Baladjay is a research manager at Amador Research Services. This article is a product of a Perry World House workshop on “The Future of Nuclear Weapons, Statecraft, and Deterrence after Ukraine”, which took place on April 4, 2023. This workshop was made possible in part by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York.

The author appreciates the assistance lent by Matthew Uy, Mikaella Punongbayan, and Rainiel Grimaldo in the review of the paper.

The Ukraine War as an Issue of Norm Regression

The states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have, much like Europe and the rest of the world, felt the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The region has faced issues of energy and food price fluctuations and, perhaps the more pressing, geopolitical impact on Chinese behavior.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a strong example of norm regression—deliberate actions that contradict or undermine longstanding expected behavior among international actors. What concerned ASEAN the most was not the invasion itself but the reasoning and justification behind it. Russia explicitly refrained from calling it an “invasion,” and instead described it as a “special military operation” aimed at achieving specific goals of correcting wrongs and protecting Russian nationals. Russia also invoked Article 51 of the United Nations Charter: the exercise of self-defense.

The cunning use of international law and the justifications cited could be used by other states to conduct their own acts of norm regression. For ASEAN, the focus is China.

The South China Sea has several overlapping claims by maritime member states of ASEAN and China. However, it is de facto under Chinese control due to its norm regression strategies. Such activities include the persistent pushing of the nine-dash line claim, reclaiming and militarizing land in contested territories, enacting the controversial Coast Guard Law which “allows” Chinese vessels authority over foreign vessels in jurisdictional waters (i.e. Chinese claimed territory in the South China Sea),  and, most notably, the conducting of gray zone operations. Gray zone operations particularly took the forefront of regional attention in recent years. In the West Philippine Sea in 2021, China swarmed Whitsun Reef with vessels from its maritime militia and instigated a water-cannon incident near Second Thomas Shoal when Philippine vessels were attempting to resupply the military outpost there.

With the war in Ukraine, fears grew in the region that China would follow suit with similar tactics, pursuing its desire to “reunify” with Taiwan through a cross-strait invasion. Tensions have spread toward the wider Indo-Pacific region. Most notably, the use of nuclear weapons has gained prominence. It began in 2021, which saw Japan speak out in support of Taiwan and China threatened to retaliate with a continuous strike of nuclear missiles, and the announcement of the trilateral AUKUS agreement (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), which would enable Australia to be outfitted with nuclear-powered submarines by the latter two nations.

Southeast Asia and Nuclear Policies

ASEAN states have largely taken the position of being against the use of nuclear weapons. While the onset of the US-China rivalry in the region has forced ASEAN to reevaluate its foreign policy positions, there appears to be no significant push for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, though this may change. However, there is no overarching consensus on nuclear weapons or nuclear energy among its members.

All ten ASEAN member states are party to the 1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (or the Treaty of Bangkok). All members are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,  with half having ratified and the other half having acceded. ASEAN is split on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Six of the ten ASEAN states have signed and ratified the treaty: the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

Individually, the stance against nuclear weapons varies in strength. Some states have made it a necessity to include anti-nuclear weapon provisions within their constitutions and domestic policies while accommodating non-military applications and uses. These states are:

1. The Philippines (Article II Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution & 2015 Strategic Trade Management Act against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction)
2. Malaysia (2010 Strategic Trade Act)
3. Singapore (Radiation Protection Act of 2007)
4. Cambodia (Article 54 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia)
5. Myanmar (provision in the 2008 Constitution to enact laws on nuclear energy)

Other states have made statements against the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons:

1. Thailand in 2012 released an article from its Foreign Ministry about the country’s support for disarmament and non-proliferation.
2. Indonesia at the 2010 Atomic Energy General Conference expressed support for the “peaceful use of nuclear technology.”
3. Laos at the 77th General Assembly at the UN in 2022 reiterated its “strong support” for a world free from nuclear weapons.
4. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW):
   1. Myanmar in 2021 praised the TPNW when it went into force as contributing to “making the world free of nuclear weapons.”
   2. Brunei expressed similar sentiments when it signed TPWN in 2018.
   3. As did Vietnam when it signed in 2017, expressing commitment to “upholding its obligations under all nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament, and prohibition instruments.”

The Philippines’ Nonproliferation Position

The Philippines on the international stage has upheld the need for and protection of the current rules-based order and has reaffirmed its policies against nuclear weapons. In 2019, then-Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana cited the Philippines’ membership to nuclear treaties as reasoning behind its inability to develop nuclear weapons. In 2021, at the onset of AUKUS, then-Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin praised the trilateral as a security pact in the region rather than argue the implications of nuclear-powered submarines. The following year, Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Carlos Sorreta attended the tenth Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty High Level Summit to maintain Philippine opposition to the use of nuclear weapons.

The Philippines’ stance against nuclear weapons is also evident in its 1987 Constitution. Article II Section 8 states: “The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.” This clearly embodies the goals of the country to maintain a stable and peaceful international and regional environment, promote the establishment of a non-nuclear weapons world, and ensure the country’s safety from other countries' usage of these weapons.

Consistent with the above article and the Philippines’ binding commitment to UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 (2004), 1718 (2006), and 2231 (2015), Manila has enacted Republic Act No. 10697, or the 2015 Strategic Trade Management Act (STMA). This act aims “to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by managing strategic goods” in accordance with international standards and best practices. It also declares the country’s support to counter terrorism, control crime, and safeguard public safety. Moreover, it provides the establishment of domestic controls preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery and prevents the country from being a potential hub for trafficking.

The STMA also provides an outline regarding the definition of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its scope of coverage such as export, import, transit and transshipment of strategic goods, and the establishment of a National Strategic Goods List for the description of the strategic goods subject to authorization. The act also includes the central authority which is the Strategic Trade Management Committee under the National Security Council that focuses on “the country’s international commitment towards the promotion of a secured and safe environment for trade in strategic goods.” Lastly, it also empowers the Department of Justice to facilitate international legal cooperation on matters concerning strategic goods entering Philippine territory.

A Domestic Push to Explore “Nuclear”

On top of the Philippines’ nonproliferation commitments is an added layer of complex domestic pushes, mainly its race to find alternative energy sources, which is inherently tied to its survival. About 30 percent of the Luzon sub-archipelago’s energy supply is extrapolated from the almost-depleted Malampaya Gas Field, a deepwater gas-condensate reservoir located 80 km off the coast of Palawan Island. The Philippines aims to be self-sufficient by 2030 with an energy portfolio mix of fossil fuels and renewable energy to meet a projected forty-three gigawatts increase in energy demand come 2040. The government is also pushing for oil and gas explorations in some of its potential reserves along its exclusive economic zones. However, the political repercussions from Beijing’s activities in the South China Sea, and more recently the COVID-19 pandemic, has stifled Manila’s energy security timeline. Because of these, energy security is very much a political issue in the Philippine polity.

Nuclear energy places very high among the policymakers’ choice of alternative and clean energy. The Philippines initially took a chance at nuclear power in the 1970s. The late President Marcos Sr., father of the incumbent President Marcos Jr., approved the construction of a nuclear power plant in response to the 1973 oil crisis which would supply about 621 megawatts of energy. The power plant never saw the light of day. Today, the Philippines is exploring two viable options: either revive the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant or construct a small modular reactor. The opposition to the nuclear energy routes has long been muffled due to other pressing issues (such as the potential joint exploration of oil in the West Philippine Sea) besetting the country and the push for nuclear energy is gaining momentum.

The Philippine Constitution outright bans the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or any armaments that weaponizes nuclear material. But the constitutional limitation does not extend to nuclear material. This affords the government to pursue non-military applications of nuclear material, i.e., nuclear energy. The Philippine government’s amiability to nuclear-related agreements may be construed as a signal to its allies and likeminded partners of its interests to learn from the process, the best practices, and if possible, from technological and/or knowledge transfers that facilitate and accommodate its energy needs.

Responding to norm regression in the nonproliferation regime

The war in Ukraine demonstrated a decline in upholding norms and international law. The nuclear threats made by Russian President Vladimir Putin must be taken seriously and with caution, as this likely plays into the erosion of norms in the affected region. To be sure, non-nuclear (neutral) states like the Philippines are committed to nonproliferation, consistent with their standing in international law and foreign policy pronouncements in recent memory. But non-nuclear states should not be without contingencies.

The likelihood of the Philippines going nuclear within the next decade under peacetime conditions, even if threatened with the use of nuclear power, is very slim. Manila will continue to use international channels to voice its concerns and disapproval of nuclear weapons. Its priorities are likely to be:

Prioritize overseas Filipino workers in affected countries.

The Philippines boast a large diaspora population globally, even in countries directly and indirectly affected by the Ukraine War and North Korea’s nuclear provocations. The Philippine Government places great importance on the safety of its nationals abroad and will work toward this first and foremost, as it did when the invasion of Ukraine first erupted.

Adopt nuclear energy, but not weaponize it.

The likelihood of Manila adopting nuclear energy is very high in the next five to ten years. The present administration has already stated that energy security is among its national priorities. Nuclear power and current methods of harnessing this power can provide a safe, secure, and clean source of energy,  a viable option as the Philippines looks to renewable sources of energy. While there are criticisms for the use of nuclear energy, particularly due to their linkages and similar problems in maintenance,  there are strict standards for operating nuclear plants and the resources required for them are difficult to acquire, even for rogue states. Advancing in and advocating for the peaceful use of nuclear energy can themselves be steps in non-proliferation. There are already steps taken to convert weapons into fuel.

Strongly denounce the threat and use of nuclear weapons and urge the use of diplomacy.

The Philippines will continue to maintain its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. If efforts to stave off conflict through diplomacy will aid in the process, Manila will pursue and exhaust any means necessary without raising arms. Manila will also encourage involved parties to do the same. Incumbent President Marcos Jr. and Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky made an historic phone call, the first in Philippine-Ukraine bilateral relations, early this year.

Consistently pursue the modernization of its military forces

Defensively armed is the new norm and the peace dividend has indeed ended. However, this has been the case for the Philippines for the last ten years. Manila had adopted a re-implementation of its armed forces modernization in 2013, following an initially lackluster 15-year modernization program that began in 1995-96. The discussion to modernize the Philippines’ coast guard fleet is starting to take shape.

Maximize its alliance with the United States to set-up defensive deterrence 

The push and pull dynamics between Manila and Washington have resulted in a rollercoaster relationship. While initial criticisms raise that both sides are making things up as they go along, the strategic needs of Manila and Washington’s strategic regional positioning are slowly coalescing and can potentially involve Tokyo and Canberra in the next decade and with Seoul in the foreseeable future. The propping up of new planned Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites interspersed throughout the Philippine archipelago is a signal in this direction. If no roadblocks are to be expected, the U.S. will not only have reinforced its alliances in Asia, but also secured the first and second island chains through prepositioning alone.

Maintain steady relations with Beijing

The sole objection to the quick strides in Philippines-US relations came from Beijing. The Philippines continues its practice of a  balancing policy between the two major powers in East and Southeast Asia. Manila is undertaking every measure to reassure its counterparts in Beijing through open channels. Recently, the Philippines met with Chinese diplomats to hold discussions on the proposed EDCA sites and strained ties due to maritime disputes.

Conclusion

The future of nuclear nonproliferation is far from certain. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has spurred multiple crises in energy, food prices, and security. It even has geopolitical implications for ASEAN and is rapidly affecting the global economy. Russia’s aversion to the timeless principles of the UN Charter, and its subsequent threats to use nuclear weapons has bolstered norm regression. The invasion has amplified the centrality of nuclear weapons in the 21st century strategic landscape and discourse, even in ASEAN and in the Philippines.

What is certain, however, is the Philippines’ commitment against the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear states exploring the nuclear option, prompted by complex domestic needs, now face the extreme challenge of assessing the benefits and pitfalls of an advanced technology. Great care must be taken to ensure energy security over these weapons. In the case of the Philippines, its amenability to explore nuclear energy requires a level of economic resilience and readiness, supported by its alliance with the US and like-minded partners in the region. Such an endeavor must be consistent with the principles of the UN and with international legal standards. The exploration of nuclear energy is indeed possible without compromising a steadfast commitment against nonproliferation.

The statements made and views expressed in this article are solely the responsibility of the author.