Priorities for the Next President: Managing the Nuclear Competition with Russia

Addressing Emerging Nuclear Challenges

The Trump administration takes office in a security environment that presents the United States with growing challenges from nuclear-armed competitors. As the outgoing Biden administration recently noted, the United States “confronts multiple nuclear competitors, with each adversary presenting unique challenges for U.S. strategists to confront, stressing strategic stability in diverse ways, and complicating deterrence challenges around the globe.” In response to these challenges, the United States is currently modernizing its nuclear forces, planning for possible growth in that force, and adjusting its nuclear posture to bolster nuclear deterrence. 

The United States has long combined efforts to strengthen nuclear deterrence with bilateral and multilateral arms control endeavors to manage nuclear competition, limit nuclear threats to the United States and its allies, and strengthen international peace and security. But the Trump administration may face few opportunities to use these tools. The People’s Republic of China has shown little interest in engaging in arms control or risk-reduction discussions with the United States, and the U.S.-Russian bilateral arms control process has collapsed. Russia has suspended its participation in the New START Treaty, which limits the numbers of nuclear warheads deployed on long-range missiles and bombers, and has refused to discuss either a framework for a follow-on treaty or separate measures to reduce the risks created by an expanding nuclear competition. The expiration of New START in February 2026 could mark the end of negotiated limits on nuclear forces and, possibly, usher in an era of unconstrained competition.  

The Biden administration has stated that the United States will “continue to abide by New START limits for the duration of the Treaty, so long as Russia does the same” and that it will “remain committed to arms control and risk reduction measures with our nuclear-armed competitors, should circumstances permit and responsible partners emerge.” Nevertheless, the administration has also affirmed that the United States will modernize and possibly expand its nuclear forces and supporting infrastructure as it prepares “for a [possible future] where constraints on nuclear weapons arsenals disappear entirely.” 

The Trump administration will likely continue to place a priority on the modernization and expansion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, with some potential advisers advocating for the United States to “maintain technical and numerical superiority to the combined Chinese and Russian nuclear stockpiles.” At the same time, the new administration will probably show little interest in arms control or cooperative efforts to mitigate the risks of nuclear war. During his first term, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from several arms control agreements, both in response to evidence of Russian violations and to free the United States from restraints on its forces and operations. He may continue to draw on the advice of those who see little value in arms control and oppose negotiated restraints on U.S. nuclear capabilities. Yet, by placing a high priority on nuclear modernization with little regard for arms control, the Trump administration could overlook opportunities for the United States and Russia to cooperate in managing their nuclear competition and reducing the risk of nuclear war.  

Managing the Nuclear Competition with Russia

Limiting deployed nuclear forces

The United States and the Soviet Union, then subsequently Russia, signed several treaties that limited their numbers of deployed nuclear warheads and restricted the deployment of some types of delivery systems. These agreements helped the two nations ensure a stable balance of forces between them, while offering transparency into their force postures and predictability about their future plans.  

In 2021, the United States and Russia established a strategic stability dialogue to “lay the groundwork” for future agreements. But they stopped meeting in this dialogue after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Even if talks resume early in the Trump administration, the two nations probably could not conclude negotiations on a new treaty before New START expires. President Trump, could, however, initiate an informal exchange with Russia to maintain some limits on nuclear weapons. He could reiterate the U.S. pledge to continue to observe the New START limits, then encourage Russian President Vladimir Putin to adopt the same pledge. He could also suggest that the two nations continue to exchange data and provide transparency into their plans for future deployments. 

This approach would not limit the U.S. plans to modernize and replace its aging nuclear forces. But it could limit the U.S. ability to expand its existing forces to address growing challenges from other nuclear-armed competitors. Moreover, it assumes that both sides believe that nuclear restraint and transparency serve their national security interests. Yet a growing number of experts in the United States, including many who might join the Trump administration, argue that the United States should expand, rather than restrain, its nuclear force posture. Recent changes in Russia’s nuclear doctrine and Russia’s development of new nuclear-capable systems suggests that Russia may also reject this assumption.  

Addressing emerging risks

A second pathway to U.S.-Russian cooperation could focus on measures designed to reduce nuclear risks without limiting the numbers of nuclear warheads, missiles, and bombers. Some of these measures seek to increase transparency and communications, while others are designed to restrain dangerous military operations.  

Although Russia has rejected recent U.S. proposals to engage in a dialogue on risk-reduction measures, Trump might find some success if the United States and Russia can identify specific programs and activities that create security risks for both nations. They could then identify specific measures that the two nations might adopt, either unilaterally or together, to mitigate these specific risks.  

Nuclear weapons in space

U.S. concerns about Russia’s development of a nuclear-armed, space-based anti-satellite system might provide an opening for this kind of dialogue. As one American expert noted, if a nuclear weapon exploded in space, it would inflict incalculable damage to “civilian communications, surveillance from space and military command-and control operations by the United States and its allies.” Such an explosion would also damage or destroy other nations’ satellites operating in low-earth orbit. Russia has denied that it has such a program and has accused the United States of trying to “demonize Russia” and create “superiority for itself in outer space.” 

The United States has tried to mobilize support in the international community to strengthen norms against nuclear weapons in space. It cosponsored a UN Security Council resolution reiterating support for the principles of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which forbids the basing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in space, and introduced a resolution in the First Committee of the General Assembly calling for “states not to develop nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction specifically designed to be placed in outer space.” Russia objected to these initiatives, arguing that they were a “cynical ploy” by the sponsors to “camouflage their lack of interest in outer space in principle being free from any kinds of weapons.” 

While U.S. efforts to strengthen norms against nuclear weapons in space have garnered wide-spread support in the international community, they have not given the United States and Russia a way to engage directly about the threats from a nuclear-armed satellite system. Yet, these weapons could also threaten Russia’s security. As one expert has noted, the danger “isn’t just that Moscow might actually use them. It’s that Washington knows Moscow might actually use them. As a result, the United States might attack Putin’s space nukes before he can push the button—which, in turn, might incentivize Putin to jab his finger as fast as he can.” 

Thus, a dialogue between the United States and Russia would serve both nations’ national security interests, even if they did not agree on the existence and scope of Russia’s program, if it focused on the potential dangers of instability and escalation in a crisis. If the Trump administration could draw Russia into this conversation, the two nations might then be able to identify cooperative measures to reduce the risks. They might, for example, be able to agree that the risks of nuclear explosions in space affect both nations, and they could, potentially, pledge to refrain from deploying such weapons in a way that might undermine peaceful uses of space. 

Ballistic missiles in Europe

The Trump administration might also engage Russia in a dialogue on the presence and use of medium- and intermediate-range missiles in Europe. After President Trump withdrew the United States from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the United States began to develop new types of intermediate-range missiles for deployment in Asia and Europe; it has recently announced plans to begin episodic deployments of conventionally armed INF-range missiles to Germany. Russia has employed cruise missiles and ballistic missiles in its war against Ukraine. It unveiled a new intermediate-range missile, known as Oreshnik, in a “test” launch against a target in Ukraine. President Putin described the Oreshnik as a direct response to “U.S. plans to produce and deploy intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.” 

Although the United States almost certainly will not accept limits on its ability to develop and deploy these types of missiles, the United States and Russia might still be able manage their competition if they can agree on the risks that these weapons pose to military stability in Europe. For example, both nations might recognize, as they did during the INF negotiations in the 1980s, that these missiles’ short flight times can create crisis instabilities and a risk of preemption or prompt response from the other nation. To reduce the risk, they could provide prior notice of test launches so that they would not be confused with actual attacks. In addition, if these missiles can carry nuclear and conventional warheads, they might agree to segregate the two variants at different bases, so there would be no confusion, or pressure for a prompt response to a potential nuclear attack, during a conventional conflict. Moreover, even if they did not agree to take these steps together, each nation could pledge to increase transparency around its deployments to mitigate the risks of misunderstandings and inadvertent escalation. 

Conclusion

Recent discussions about U.S. nuclear weapons programs and arms control policy tend to consider the two topics as separate, competing pathways to address emerging nuclear challenges. But arms control, or, more specifically, cooperative efforts to manage nuclear competition and mitigate the risk of nuclear war, can also reduce risks to U.S. security. While the examples identified here would put just a small dent in the nuclear challenges facing the United States, the Trump administration would be well-served if it sought out opportunities for the United States and Russia to find common ground on the types of weapons and activities that challenge both nations’ security and then identify steps each could take to ease the risks of nuclear war. 

Amy F. Woolf is a consultant specializing in nuclear-weapons and arms-control policy, was a Visiting Fellow at Perry World House from 2023 to 2024.