Nuclear , Climate Change The Promise and Peril of Nuclear Energy in a Climate Changed World
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January 19, 2024
By
Erin Sikorsky | Perry World House
Erin Sikorsky is the Director of the Center for Climate and Security.
Introduction
As each summer passes warmer than the last, and the urgency toward cutting carbon emissions grows, there is increasing demand for an “all options on the table” approach to the transition away from fossil fuels. To that end, few serious net-zero scenarios exclude nuclear power. For example, in most of the scenarios in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report 1.5, the IPCC models an increase in nuclear power—ranging from a 59 percent to 106 percent increase by 2030, depending on the model. For its part, in its Net Zero by 2050 roadmap, the International Energy Agency (IEA) calls for a doubling of nuclear power generation from 2020 to 2050, with “with construction of new plants needed in all countries that are open to the technology.”
These ambitious pathways come at a time of innovation in nuclear energy as well such as small modular nuclear reactors, an increased role for additive manufacturing and new fuels that can perform more efficiently at higher temperatures, as well as more accident-tolerant fuels.
Despite higher demand signals and new, potentially revolutionary nuclear technologies, the path forward for robust nuclear energy deployment is bumpy. Continued high costs and public skepticism are just two hurdles. Another challenging hurdle is climate change itself. As temperatures rise and climate hazards, such as drought, sea level rise, and extreme precipitation intensify, nuclear infrastructure is put at risk. At the same time, indirect, compound risks of climate change, such as political instability and increased geopolitical competition, also threaten the expanded, safe deployment of new nuclear energy technologies.
Direct Risks
Too Little Water
A 2021 IPCC report found with high confidence that as temperatures rise due to global warming, the frequency and severity of droughts in some geographies will rise as well. Already, according to the report, extreme drought events that previously occurred once every 10 years are now 1.7 times more likely than in pre-industrial times.
Take Europe as an example. The region has faced consecutive summers of droughts and heatwaves from 2022 to 2023. In June 2023, the European Drought Agency assessed that one-third of the continent was in drought conditions, with 10 percent of European countries in “crisis.” One crisis country is France, which in 2022, faced the worst drought ever recorded, making the record-temperatures of 2023 that much harder for the country to handle. A France 24 report argued the water crisis in the country is becoming “almost permanent.”
Such a crisis has serious implications for France’s nuclear power. France has one of the largest nuclear power fleets in the world, which can provide around 70 percent of the country’s energy. However, in 2022 the country’s nuclear power output dwindled to 40 percent, at a time when Europe overall was facing an energy crunch due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This decline was due to a combination of reasons, including climate change-driven drought and heatwaves. According to a French Court of Auditors report from March 2023, the country’s nuclear fleet will be increasingly threatened by lack of water availability as well as rising water temperatures in local rivers. For now, climate-driven water related hazards have forced plant shutdowns only briefly and in the summer, but the Auditors warned it is likely to happen more frequently under current climate trajectories.
These dynamics illustrate the self-reinforcing, cyclical nature of the current climate crisis for France, though the country is not alone in facing these kinds of challenges. Climate hazards such as extreme heat and droughts both increase demand for energy (i.e., air conditioning) while threatening the ability of the country to meet that demand through nuclear power. In 2022, France addressed just this situation by increasing its importation of natural gas—in other words, it turned to a carbon-intensive fuel that then increases global warming, setting the stage for further strain on its nuclear fleet in the future. This outcome underscores the fact that nuclear power is unlikely to be the sole, or perhaps even primary, clean energy solution for countries facing extreme climate driven heat stress in the future.
Too Much Water
An ironic cruelty of the climate crisis is that extreme heat not only fuels drought, or too little water, but also drives increases in extreme precipitation. Warmer air and warmer ocean water increase the intensity of precipitation events, resulting in unprecedented downpours. The 2021 IPCC report reported the scientific consensus that heavy rainfall events, “have likely increased at the global scale over a majority of land regions with good observational coverage.” Already, the world is seeing records broken regularly, with “once in a lifetime” floods becoming much more frequent. In 2023, countries around the world—including countries with nuclear power infrastructure such as Brazil, the United States, China, India, Pakistan, and Sweden—faced historic flooding events.
Obviously, nuclear power plants are often built near rivers and coasts due to their need for water. The majority of plants currently in service were built well before the concept of climate resilience was widely adopted, and many are built just above sea level. Coastal areas are doubly at risk to climate change-driven flooding hazards due to the combination of storm surge and sea level rise. Such dynamics threaten existing nuclear power facilities, including in the United States. A 2020 Moody’s analytic report found that climate change-induced rain storms and flooding at plants along the East and Gulf Coast may “inundate” the facilities and “damage transmission lines or substations, hindering a plant’s ability to deliver power.” Already in 2012, Hurricane Sandy caused the shutdown of three nuclear plants in New York and New Jersey due to high water levels and the storm’s impact on the electrical grid.
The combination of sea level rise, subsidence, and storm surge also threatens the development of new nuclear facilities, and it is not always clear these dynamics are being taken into account.
A 2019 study from the Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) examined Egypt’s plans for the El Dabaa nuclear plant, slated for construction near Alexandria on the Mediterranean Sea. The site was first selected in 1980 for a nuclear plant, yet due to halting, uneven progress in regulation, planning, funding, and execution, initial construction was begun only in 2021. The CSR report found:
Indirect Risks
As a large body of climate security analysis and literature has explored, the direct risks of climate change can intersect with and compound existing security threats, particularly in already fragile countries. In countries with poor and/or exclusionary governance, high inequality, and the presence of non-state armed groups or extremists, climate-driven hazards can exacerbate internal instability and conflict risks. At the same time, many countries are under pressure to decarbonize, and nuclear power is an attractive option, yet one that can come with risk as well. This intersection—climate-driven instability, energy transition demands, nuclear power investment—pose a range of potential converging risks.
To illustrate these nexus dynamics, take the case of Nigeria—Africa’s largest economy with increasing energy demands that has been exploring nuclear energy for decades, most recently in talks with Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation. A report from the Council on Strategic Risks found that, “...the interactions among subnational and terrorist groups, environmental change, population displacement, and more will mean that Nigeria will require unique approaches to security regarding its nuclear energy sector.” The CSR reported noted that Nigeria’s own Nuclear Energy Commission identified homegrown extremism and the potential for insider threats as a risk to domestic nuclear energy development.
Further complicating the matter are current geopolitical dynamics, including the Russian invasion of Ukraine and heightened competition between the United States and China. Currently, Russia and China are leaders in exporting nuclear reactors and building nuclear power plants. Since 2017, 27 of the 31 reactors under construction worldwide are of Chinese or Russian design. Beyond the potential security issues associated with Russia and China’s prominent role in the nuclear power arena, they may also attempt to leverage this position to ding the United States on the international stage, especially as tensions rise between the Global North and the Global South over climate finance investments. They may try to argue they are doing their part for other countries to help manage the energy transition while the United States is uninvolved.
A Way Forward
The challenges outlined above do not necessarily argue for the deprioritization or abandonment of nuclear power as a component of the net-zero transition. Instead, they underscore the need for innovative approaches that integrate the direct and indirect climate risks into nuclear policies. Better understanding the systemic risks posed by the climate crisis—and the feedback loops between water security, climate hazards, and clean energy demand—will lead to more sustainable and secure approaches in the years to come.