Asia-Pacific, Defense, International Relations Rattling the Nuclear Saber: What Russia’s Nuclear Threats Really Mean
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May 4, 2023
By
Lauren Sukin | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Lauren Sukin is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and an assistant professor of international relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. This article was written for Perry World House's 2023 workshop "The Future of Nuclear Weapons, Statecraft, and Deterrence after Ukraine."
On March 23, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev warned that the “nuclear apocalypse” is drawing “closer.” This threat, however oblique, is one of several that Russian officials have made that imply the threat of nuclear use against Ukraine and the NATO states supporting Kyiv. Moscow has spouted this dangerous rhetoric since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war in early 2022, making threats that are loud, frequent, and extreme.
Some commentators have suggested that Russian nuclear threats are little more than cheap talk. Moscow may hope its threats convince NATO states and Ukraine to accept Russia’s territorial gains; Russia may even intend to use threats to deter NATO states and Ukraine from fighting harder. But threatening to use nuclear weapons doesn’t necessarily mean Russia plans to use them. To this camp of thinkers, that the threats emanating from Moscow have become increasingly commonplace makes them seem even less grave. After all, if bellicose threats are a normal part of politics, doesn’t that suggest they are mere bluffs?
To answer this critical question, it is important to remember that Russia is not alone in brandishing its nuclear saber—and that there are lessons to be learned from how nuclear threats are used elsewhere. In particular, North Korea, a frequent issuer of nuclear threats, bears key similarities to Russia today. Both countries are isolated, with few allies and an ocean of sanctions through which to wade. In turn, both rely heavily on nuclear weapons. Both North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin are highly personalistic leaders and surrounded by ideological “yes men.” Neither has many checks against their power. Both men are deeply anxious about their legacies and beholden to unlawful and, increasingly, unrealistic foreign policy ambitions. With these similarities in mind, it is precisely because of and not in spite of the fact that Moscow and Pyongyang have repeatedly held their nuclear arsenals over Western heads that leaders should take these threats seriously.