Nuclear The Room Where It Happens - The Power of Being Present

Nomsa Ndongwe is a Research Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

UNGA and Nuclear Nonproliferation

Every September, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meets to hold its main session to take stock of the work done over the course of the year. The UNGA convenes sessions with the highest level of decision-makers for its 193 member states during the High-Level segment, an annual general debate where all Member States can express their views on issues of their choosing and share their views on the Secretary-General’s annual report on the work done. When that session is over, substantive discussions on social, political, economic, humanitarian, peace, security, and legal issues are held in the six thematic main committees. Those committees then draft resolutions to recommend to the UNGA for adoption.

Sometimes, Member States can call for the UNGA to convene special sessions or open-ended working groups to explore an issue further, as was the case with the creation of the Conference on Disarmament and the convening of the second Open-Ended Working Group on Taking Forward Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations that preceded the Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) 2017.

Nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament fall under the aegis of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee). We can thank the deliberations in the First Committee and the Special Sessions for some historic resolutions, frameworks, and recommendations on countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) such as the arms control instruments like the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 1968, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) 1973, Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 1993, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 1996.

Non-Nuclear Weapon States and the Conversation

There is no other global forum where all the countries in the world can get together and sometimes unanimously vote on a certain way of doing things. This universality also gives resolutions and decisions a huge normative effect. Since norms are “an accepted standard or a way of being or doing things”, it is clear to see why multilateral negotiations and decisions can and should have this impact.

The NPT, which is the cornerstone of the international nonproliferation regime, defines “nuclear weapon states” as the countries that conducted a successful detonation of a nuclear explosive device before 1967. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) happen to be those five. Since the NPT’s entry into force, there are four other countries that also possess nuclear weapons, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of  (DPRK orNorth Korea), and Israel (allegedly). South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons as a part of its accession to the NPT in 1991, and joining of the international community of nations at the end of apartheid. This means over 90 percent of the countries in the world, which are also categorized as “non-nuclear weapon states” under the NPT, have chosen not to pursue nuclear weapons or have had their efforts stymied.

My background in multilateral nonproliferation and disarmament is through the lens of a non-nuclear weapon state, from the African continent, so I will caveat that not all non-nuclear weapon states are the same. There is a sub-category of states that are called “umbrella states” because they are part of alliances (i.e. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) or nuclear security agreements, through which NWS guarantee protection that could include the deployment of nuclear weapons to “defend” their allies.

Most of this article will be centering countries that do not have such guarantees, like the ones found in the Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) of Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco), Africa (Pelindaba), Central Asia, Southeast Asia (Bangkok), Mongolia, and the Pacific (Rarotonga).  It is my belief that NWFZs have played a huge role in solidifying not only the norm against the pursuit of nuclear weapons as a national security strategy, but also the adherence to the NPT, and the reiteration of its importance to the nonproliferation architecture. This is vital to note as we look at the major sticking points plaguing nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament discourse today.

The World Stage

Other than the four countries mentioned above that possess nuclear weapons but are not parties to the NPT, the Treaty is almost universally subscribed to by UN membership. Since the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon), however, the NPT has failed to agree on a consensus document (that would effectively guide the intersessional process of the Treaty). It is no secret that the NPT Review Process has suffered some heavy blows and that the discord there is reflected in other fora of multilateral nuclear disarmament.

Having repudiated any aspirations to have nuclear weapons or make nuclear weapons a significant part of national security policies, NNWS have advocated for a more proactive approach to the goal of complete nuclear disarmament, access to technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, mitigation and reduction of nuclear risks, and implementation of action items and recommendations from the previous RevCons. NWS, on the other hand, decry the prevailing international security environment as an obstacle to the immediate attainment of these goals, and indicate that their priorities are different, as are their ideas for execution. This has been driven home by the modernization of nuclear arsenals, continued reliance on nuclear weapons in their security doctrines, and withdrawal from key treaties.   

This is particularly problematic when relations between the US and Russian Federation, who are the possessors of approximately 89 percent of global nuclear weapon stockpiles, are at an alarming low, in part due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but also due to suspension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) (2010), among others reasons.  Meanwhile, the DPRK continues to conduct nuclear tests and pursue a nuclear weapons program, the CTBT has not yet entered into force, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) might be increasing its nuclear arsenal, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) has rhetorically flirted with the idea of pursuing its own nuclear weapons program, and the Islamic Republic of Iran has withdrawn the designation of one third of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors.

Getting Serious About The Future

On nuclear disarmament, it is high time the UNGA convenes a 4th special session on disarmament; the CD format limits the countries in the room to 66 members and observers. This is important because four out of the nine countries on Earth that possess nuclear weapons are not a part of the NPT and it is unhelpful to keep them out of the conversation. Even with the TPNW, the points of divergence are not that we don’t need to get rid of nuclear weapons, it's how we get there. On the DPRK, for example, a multistakeholder dialogue on the way forward, including countries that have not been on bad terms with Pyongyang, is worth exploring to achieve lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. The special session mechanism, and emergency session mechanism need to be used now because there is no problem between States that has ever been solved by not talking about it.

We won’t find all the answers at the UN, but there is no better place to test ideas, identify potential partners that we would never have considered otherwise, hear each other out, and get collective buy-in which lends to political will and support at the highest levels of respective governments.