Asia-Pacific, Power & Security Taiwan’s Response to the Potential Crisis in the Korean Peninsula

The author’s views expressed in this paper are entirely his own (unless otherwise stated) and do not, in any way, represent the official policies or position of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any other institutions he is affiliated with. 

The Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula are listed as two flashpoints that may lead to conflict and are rated as a “Tier 1 contingency” in a 2024 report by the Council on Foreign Relations. While Taiwan has a new presidential administration in sight, the Kim Jong-un regime in North Korea has begun to adopt more aggressive behavior against South Korea, making people worry whether a potential crisis across the Taiwan Strait or on the Korean Peninsula would turn into a hot conflict. Given the sea lines of communication, such conflict will no doubt upset the tenuous calm that the Indo-Pacific region has been experiencing as of late.

This article aims to explore the conditions under which a potential conflict in the Korean Peninsula may link with that across the Taiwan Strait and how to manage if this situation occurs. This article will first analyze the current behavior of North Korea, then discuss the North Korea policy and response of the Biden administration. Finally, this article will derive possible directions for cooperation among Taiwan, the United States, and South Korea.

North Korea’s Truculent Behavior 

After South Korean President Moon Jae-in took office in May 2017, he actively promoted peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, showing goodwill towards North Korea. After North Korean leader Kim Jong-un announced a temporary halt to independent nuclear tests and missile launches on April 21, 2018, the leaders of the two countries signed the “Pyongyang Joint Declaration” on September 19, 2018, reaching a consensus on building a nuclear-free and peaceful homeland on the Korean Peninsula. The Trump-Kim Singapore Summit in June 2018, the subsequent Hanoi Summit in February 2019, and the trilateral talks between South Korea, North Korea, and the United States held at Panmunjom during U.S. President Donald Trump's visit to South Korea in June 2019 all expressed hope for problem resolution through dialogue. However, negotiations broke down in October 2019 following working-level talks between US and North Korean officials in Stockholm, Sweden, on the implementation of North Korea’s denuclearization. This led to a stalemate in relations between the two countries. On January 1, 2020, Kim Jong-un announced that North Korea would no longer abide by its commitments to suspend nuclear tests and missile launches and warned that action would be taken if the US did not compromise on its position in denuclearization negotiations. 

According to statistics from the Japanese Ministry of Defense, North Korea began ballistic missile testing in 2020 with four tests that year, nearly doubling to seven tests in 2021, and escalating to over 30 launches throughout 2022. The frequency of missile tests by North Korea has increased significantly over time, with events such as firing rounds of various shells in 2022. Despite the global pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war affecting North Korea and the country’s already poor economic situation, North Korea’s ability to conduct multiple missile tests suggests support from China and Russia. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) attempted to impose new sanctions on North Korea in 2022, but faced opposition from China and Russia, preventing the measures from passing. In response, US President Joe Biden held talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping before the G20 Summit held in Indonesia in 2022, addressing the North Korean issue. Biden hoped for Chinese restraint on North Korea to avoid escalating regional tensions. It is evident that China still holds a certain level of influence over North Korea, as North Korea’s actions heighten tensions in Northeast Asia, posing a serious threat to the United States, Japan, and South Korea, especially with the potential to directly target the continental United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), more so than threatening US forces in Japan and South Korea. 

In 2022, North Korea launched more than 90 ballistic and other missiles, and this number exceeded any other year before. Each launch was a serious defiance of UNSC resolutions prohibiting the country from testing ballistic missiles and nuclear devices.  

This escalation in missile testing raises concerns about the possibility of future nuclear tests. On December 30, 2023, at the 9th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of North Korea, Kim Jong-un announced that the relationship between North and South Korea is no longer a relationship of the same ethnicity or homogeneity, but has been completely fixed as a relationship between two belligerent parties in a perpetual state of war. 

On January 15, 2024, during the 10th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly, Kim Jong-un announced the dissolution of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country, along with two other agencies handling inter-Korean reconciliation: the National Economic Cooperation Bureau and the (Mount Kumgang) International Tourism Administration. He defined South Korea as the primary enemy and eternal main adversary through constitutional amendment, while simultaneously removing phrases such as “autonomy, peaceful reunification, and ethnic unity” from the constitution.

Biden’s Policy toward North Korea 

Trump’s policy dubbed as “maximum pressure and engagement” quickly hit a bottleneck. Although Trump and Kim agreed to work towards achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, they did not touch upon specific steps to be taken, including whether to include North Korea’s missile systems or how to verify them, which became a source of disputes. During Trump’s tenure, although North Korea did not conduct ballistic missile or nuclear tests, it continued to develop short-range missiles, publicly stating in October 2020 its intention to continue developing ballistic missiles. Regarding the retrieval of the remains of US soldiers, about 40 individuals were identified in 2018, but there has been no progress since. A liaison office was established between North and South Korea, international and US economic sanctions have hindered some of Moon Jae-in’s plans from being implemented, leading North Korea to blame South Korea for this. In June 2020, citing dissatisfaction with North Korean defectors spreading leaflets and South Korea’s violation of the Panmunjom Declaration, North Korea detonated the inter-Korean liaison office located in the Kaesong Industrial Complex. 

Unlike Trump, the Biden administration initially focused on domestic economic development and pandemic response, then seeking to rebuild trust with allies and attempting to reshape America’s international leadership position. The Biden administration began a comprehensive review of its North Korea policy around April 2021, with the White House National Security Council (NSC) stating that a pragmatic policy would be adopted toward North Korea. During his first address to Congress on April 28, Biden stated that a strategy of diplomacy and stern deterrence would be pursued. An NSC spokesperson further clarified that this approach would be a precise and pragmatic one, somewhere between Obama’s strategic patience and Trump’s grand bargaining. However, North Korean state media responded by stating that the US attitude was filled with hostility. 

In April 2023, while hosting President Yoon Suk-yeol of South Korea at the White House for a state visit, Biden committed that any nuclear attack by North Korea would “result in the end” of the government in Pyongyang. This is a clear turn from diplomacy to deterrence in response to the threat from North Korea’s volatile dictatorship. In addition, Biden announced that the US would dock nuclear missile submarines in South Korea if necessary, signaling that the US nuclear umbrella is to cover the South and put the latter as a crucial and integral part in US nuclear strategic planning. In response, Yoon recanted South Korea’s effort to nuclearize its arsenal, despite strong support from the society. A trilateral summit meeting between US, Japan, and South Korea was held in Camp David in August 2023, indicating a new page in history for further collaboration between Japan and South Korea in the face of North Korea’s aggression.   

Even though competition defines the current US-China relations and China has been the weakest link in the global sanctions against North Korea, a truculent North Korea also provides a point of potential cooperation between the US and China. North Korea is undeniably exploiting the US-China rivalry and the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, as evidenced by Kim Jong-un’s meeting with Putin in Russia. China is assisting Russia in military industries, and yet Russia’s close help to reciprocate in North Korea may lead China to further question North Korea’s intention. This may motivate the US and China to try to manage the overall security situation in the Korean Peninsula, as suggested by US Secretary of State Tony Blinken and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Munich, where both sides agreed to have coordination over the North Korean issue through the channel between special envoys.  

Taiwan’s Opportunities and Challenges 

Taiwan, like all members of the Indo-Pacific region, has its stake in peace and stability in both the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula. While the new administration in Taiwan needs to navigate its relations with China, it is also imperative to pay attention to the Korean Peninsula and prevent China from linking the two issues as leverage vis-à-vis the United States and other stakeholders. From time to time, Chinese experts contend the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait are intertwined, as they used to say: Turmoil in the four seas (Yellow Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea) is good for China one way or another. 

Against this backdrop, it is likely that China would utilize North Korea as a leverage vis-à-vis the US. What does this mean to Taiwan? Taiwan is willing to side with the United States and the international community to take collective actions against North Korea’s truculent behavior and to maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, how the United States manages its relations with North Korea and China inevitably draws attention in Taiwan. Especially when President Trump met with Kim, people were wondering how well, if at all, the United States this policy with its formal allies, such as South Korea and Japan. 

More communication is absolutely needed among the United States, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, and this sort of coordination can increase the cost of China’s attempt to link or even exploit the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait issues.  

For starters, Taiwan should be able to identify its security concerns and national interests. South Korea is facing undue pressure from the North, and Taiwan should work with like-minded partners including South Korea to push back. This gesture should be welcomed by the region, and the next question is how to push back.  

Although Taiwan and South Korea have been competitors rather than collaborators for decades in the semiconductor industry, now it is the time for Chip4 and other platforms led by the United States to coordinate the policies. On top of that, Taiwan’s new administration should forge an Indo-Pacific strategy in line with the United States and other stakeholders in this region.