Nuclear Why Non-Nuclear States Need Negative Security Assurances

Farrukh Khan is a visiting scholar at the University of Pennsylvania. This article is a product of a Perry World House workshop on “The Future of Nuclear Weapons, Statecraft, and Deterrence after Ukraine”, which took place on April 4, 2023. This workshop was made possible in part by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age in 1945, states have strived to limit, reduce, eliminate, or prevent the proliferation, use, or threat of nuclear weapons through the development of principles, norms, and treaties.

On the one hand—besides converging on the ultimate objective of nuclear nonproliferation—national nuclear doctrines, postures, and strategies have stemmed from the need for projecting power, technological prowess, deterrence, and self defense. Within these, deterrence and self defense have remained overarching notions. On the other hand, the global nuclear discourse or statecraft has converged mainly on questions such as how to regulate, restrict, or prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, including against non-nuclear states.

As opposed to the above, there has been a consensus among non-nuclear states that the only guarantee against nuclear war is the complete elimination of such weapons—an objective that has remained elusive, if not impossible. With disarmament remaining a distant or an unachievable goal, as early as 1966, the UN General Assembly, in Resolution 21/53A, called upon the then-Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (later converted into the Conference on Disarmament, or CD) “to consider urgently the proposal that nuclear weapons powers should give an assurance that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states without nuclear weapons on their territories.”

In 1978, the first special session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD-I) unanimously called upon nuclear states to “pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.” As part of international nuclear statecraft, these calls have been debated in great detail at the CD; the UN General Assembly – including the annual resolution tabled by Pakistan for over thirty years – the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); and various nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs). The UN Security Council has also released at least two resolutions on the subject, one in 1968 and another in 1995.

For over four decades, the CD has remained fixated on the question of codifying the Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) as one of its three original nuclear agenda items. Many countries, including Pakistan, have submitted proposals to the CD to transform the assurances enshrined in the UN Security Council resolutions or the NWFZs into legal guarantees. However, progress has been and remains elusive.

While the increasingly fractured state of geopolitics may suggest that commencing negotiations on the NSA Convention is unrealistic, its confidence and trust-building potential ought to spur the development of such a legally binding arrangement as a core constituent of responsible nuclear statecraft, now and in the future. Non-nuclear states have been advocating for a reduction in nuclear weapons, leading to their eventual elimination by nuclear weapon states, as agreed in the NPT. The former has supplemented these efforts through the creation of NWFZs. Frustrated by what the non-nuclear states perceive as a lack of meaningful progress on nuclear disarmament or the inadequate level of non-use assurances in the NWFZ treaties, these states have concluded a Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

Even with these efforts and outcomes, most non-nuclear states outside the nuclear umbrella continue advocating for legally binding NSAs to enhance national security. These states also view the security assurances currently offered to them as insufficient, fragmented, and well short of the original consensus for the following reasons:

First, unilateral declarations by some nuclear states, though it is hard to find a legal basis for them, are full of qualifiers and caveats. Interpreting the caveats remains the prerogative of the states making such declarations, which erode much, if not all, of their intended impact. Such declarations do not fulfil the evidentiary standard of verification and compliance.

Second, the approach of the relevant Security Council Resolutions is contested. By way of illustration, non-nuclear states question whether the Security Council, especially all its nuclear state permanent members, will act immediately by the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations if a non-nuclear state is the victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, nuclear aggression. For example, how can or will the Security Council “act immediately” if the perpetrator is also a veto-wielding member that can block any joint action by the Council?

Third, NWFZs have served a limited purpose. They are neither universal in intent nor do they cover all regions. Not only are non-nuclear states outside existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, but also, in some regions like South Asia, the concept has no relevance owing to the existence of nuclear weapons in these regions. Moreover, the insertion of qualifiers and caveats by some nuclear states in the NWFZ undermines the spirit of establishing such zones. Legally speaking, such insertions could be untenable under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

Fourth, although the NPT has played an important role as an international agreement based on a “bargain” between some nuclear states and non-nuclear states, its failure to achieve progress on disarmament while insisting on nonproliferation alone, inter alia, erodes the very basis of the so-called “grand bargain.”

Finally, the questions around nuclear weapons' transit and movement are further complicated by the onset and introduction of new developments and technologies. The issue of nuclear weapons also remains intrinsically tied to their means of delivery. As some states possess means with global reach and without any constraints on such means, NWFZs in and of themselves do not offer a viable solution.

While non-nuclear states could conceive several options, including alliances and other asymmetrical means based on new technologies, the imperatives of global and regional stability and security point to responsible behavior by nuclear weapons states, especially those with the largest arsenals and means. They must take tangible steps to bridge the security gap between nuclear and non-nuclear states.

There are two categories of non-nuclear states, i.e., those under a nuclear umbrella and those without it. This has created inherently discriminatory arrangements. In principle, renouncing the right to acquire nuclear weapons should be enough to receive legally binding NSAs. However, given that certain non-nuclear states maintain security arrangements or alliances with nuclear states, there is an obvious difficulty in extending assurances to such states, especially given the strategic doctrines espoused by some nuclear states or the military arrangements they are party to.

For practical reasons, such an instrument should (i) include all nuclear states and (ii) evolve a formula to provide negative security assurances to all non-nuclear weapon states, those that have renounced the right to develop nuclear weapons under an international treaty, and also those who despite having done so remain under a nuclear umbrella or arrangements of any sort with some nuclear states.

In light of the above, for non-nuclear states, a vital indicator of responsible nuclear statecraft and a key means of ensuring their national security is the commencement of negotiations on a legal instrument on NSAs. The CD, as the only international platform with all nuclear states as its members, remains the obvious venue to negotiate and conclude an NSA.

Indeed, there are worrying signs of erosion in the efficacy of the existing nuclear order and its constituents, including its failure to deliver binding disarmament obligations.

The war in Ukraine highlights both the failure of diplomacy and the failure of processes and arrangements that are meant to address the legitimate security concerns of the warring parties. There should be no doubt that strengthening the security of one state at the cost of another cannot be a recipe for peace and stability. In fact, such an approach would stand in sharp contrast to the concept of collective security embedded in the UN Charter. In this turbulent global situation, further failure to address security concerns could limit incentives for nuclear and non-nuclear states to maintain the nuclear order. This dangerous trajectory must be avoided at all costs. One way to address this is to negotiate a legally binding instrument that provides NSAs to non-nuclear states.

The statements made and views expressed in this article are solely the responsibility of the author.